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Preface
Public economic theory analyzes the role of the state within the economy.
As in many other textbooks, Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) identify three
main functions of the public sector: allocation, stabilization and distribution.
The revenue required to meet these demands is mainly collected by taxes.
Along those lines one arrives immediately at the categorization according to
which public economics is taught also at the University of Munich: tax pol-
icy (Steuerpolitik), allocation policy (Allokationspolitik), stabilization policy
(Fiskalpolitik), and distribution policy (Sozialstaat).
The essays embedded in the dissertation at hand belong to the fields of
taxation and allocation. Accordingly, the book basically consists of two self-
contained parts: Part I deals with methods of capital gains taxation, Part II
with public goods provision in large economies.
In a world with ever-growing financial markets, the question how to treat
capital gains for tax purposes is getting more and more important. And in
an economy like Germany, being on its way from a pay-as-you-go pension
system to a funded one, it is also a question that affects more and more
people. Should the gains from an asset, for example a stock fund, be taxed
periodically as they accrue or only at the time when the fund is sold and
gains or losses are actually realized? What are the Pros and Cons for one
method of taxation or the other? How should the tax scheme look like in
order to overcome the disadvantages of one method without running into
the problems of the other? How is the market price of an asset affected by
the method of taxation? And what impact does it have on welfare and its
distribution? Those are some of the questions investigated in Part I which
contains two chapters.
Chapter 1 is based on my survey article Imitating accrual taxation on a
realization basis and discusses the design of the capital gains tax schemes
proposed in the literature. Unlike other surveys on that topic, it offers a
uniform formal way of describing those proposals. The chosen approach
allows to easily compare and evaluate them from a theoretic point of view.
ix
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Chapter 2 is an extended version of my paper Methods of capital gains
taxation and the impact on asset prices and welfare. The study provides a
comparison between accrual and realization taxation with respect to the re-
sulting asset prices and welfare. As to my knowledge, it is the first article in
this field of literature to explicitly incorporate distributional aspects within
the welfare analysis.
Part II of this book presents the so-far output of an ongoing project
studying the provision of public goods in large economies. This is joint work
together with Felix Bierbrauer from Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods in Bonn. We aim at combining the literature on public
goods provision in the tradition of Clarke-Groves with the literature on op-
timal income taxation originating from Mirrlees (1971). Our attempt relies
on the basic idea that in general the decisions about financing and providing
a public good cannot be separated from each other but should be considered
simultaneously.
How many highways should be constructed? How much should be spent
on armed forces and police? The fundamental task of public goods provision
is to find out the amount that fits best the joint requirements of the economy’s
members. This is a problem of information aggregation: In order to provide
the efficient amount, the social planner has to learn about the individuals’
valuation for the public good.
However, the individual answers to the questions raised highly depend
on the financing scheme: Who has to contribute how much to the provision
of these commodities? Usually, the contributions individuals have to make
depend on their abilities to generate income. And so do their answers: Their
effective valuation for a public good is the result of the interplay between
both their tastes and skills.
Part II also consists of two chapters. Chapter 3 is based on our paper
Public goods provision in a continuum economy with two-dimensional hetero-
geneity. In such an economy the presence of aggregate uncertainty causes a
problem of information aggregation that has been ignored by the literature
so far. The solution we offer requires to modify the Samuelson rule for pub-
lic goods provision according to the extent of skill heterogeneity among the
individuals.
In order to derive this result we develop a new solution concept. Chapter
4 is based on our paper Robustness to sampling. It introduces this notion of
robustness to a general framework providing a useful tool for a great variety of
problems of information aggregation in continuum economies with aggregate
uncertainty.
xi
Reading the book
The two parts of the book are self-contained and can be read apart. In prin-
cipal, the same is true for the two chapters of each part as well. However,
in order to avoid redundancies, some cross-references are indicated. An ap-
pendix at the end of both Chapter 2 and 3 provides the technical details and
longer proofs of the derived results. Items which enter the index are defined
on the displayed page and italicized at their first appearance.
Acknowledgments
First and foremost I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Bernd Hu-
ber. With his frankness and experience he was very inspiring and helpful in
choosing a topic and getting started at the beginning of my doctorate. Later,
when I began to develop own ideas, he was always encouraging me and gave
me the freedom to pursue the chosen projects.
I am deeply indebted to Klaus Schmidt who agreed to serve as second
supervisor on my thesis committee. I benefitted a lot from his insightful
comments to my tutorial presentations as well as from his outstanding course
on contract theory.
Andreas Haufler, who completes my thesis committee as third examiner,
has always shown much interest in my work and has taken the time to discuss
it. I am very grateful for his constructive hints and proposals as well as for
encouraging me to apply for conferences and publications.
Special thanks go to my colleagues at the Lehrstuhl fu¨r Finanzwissen-
schaft : To Ulrich Woitek and Frank Westermann, my representative super-
visors, for giving me a new angle on numerous economic topics. To Christoph
Eichhorn, who has always been the first to share (economic) ideas with – and
who is also the co-author of our article Monopoly Pricing, Demand Quality
and Two-Sided Markets, which is not part of this dissertation. To Marco
Runkel for his detailed comments on one of my papers. To Nadine Riedel
for helping me proof-reading. To Gregor Gehauf, Florian Wo¨hlbier, and
Gu¨nther Oppermann for introducing me to the chair and the department.
To Anita Hofmann for keeping the expenditure of administrative work low.
To Christiane Starbatty for finding the requested articles for me. To Florian
Ranzi for assisting me in case of technical problems.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my teachers Clemens Fuest,
Achim Wambach, and Sven Rady. Starting my doctorate as a mathemati-
cian, their doctoral courses deepened my economic thinking a lot.
I thank all participants of the faculty’s various seminars I presented my
work at for vivid discussions and useful comments. The same gratitude I owe
xii PREFACE
to the numerous participants of the conferences at which I had the chance
to talk.
Chapter 2 of this thesis is based on my paper Methods of capital gains
taxation and the impact on asset prices and welfare. I presented an earlier
version of this paper at the Annual Congress of the European Economic As-
sociation (EEA) 2005 in Amsterdam, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian
Economic Association (NOeG) 2005 in Innsbruck, and at the Annual Meeting
of the Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik (VfS) 2004 in Dresden.
Chapter 3 is based on the paper Public goods provision in a continuum
economy with two-dimensional heterogeneity, which is joint work with Fe-
lix Bierbrauer. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Public
Economic Theory Meeting (PET) 2005 in Marseille as well as at the Spring
Meeting of Young Economists (SMYE) 2005 in Geneva. For this paper, we
are also very grateful for inspiring suggestions from Felix Bierbrauer’s super-
visor Martin Hellwig.
Of course, special thanks go to my co-author Felix Bierbrauer himself.
As a close friend, he has been the one to arouse my interest not only for the
specific topic of public goods provision but (public) economics in general.
The joint work has been both a lot of fun and a rewarding experience.
Most importantly I am indebted to my family. With their support for
and trust in all my decisions and plans, my parents Heidi and Ju¨rgen Sahm
helped me a lot. The same notably applies to my wife Eva Sahm. She has
always encouraged my work as if it were her own one.
Part I
Methods of capital gains
taxation
1
3In most of the world’s economies changes in the value of an investor’s
asset (or entire portfolio) are subject to a tax, the so-called capital gains tax.
From a theoretic point of view, there are basically two different methods of
collecting this tax: taxation of capital gains upon accrual or upon realization.
Under an accrual system – sometimes also referred to as ‘yield-to-matu-
rity’ approach – the tax is payable, in theory, as soon as there is a change
in the value of an asset (e.g. by a change in the asset price) or, in practice,
periodically. Among others the most severe problems that arise under an
accrual tax are those of liquidity and valuation. Some investors might be
forced to sell some of their assets, which they would keep hold of otherwise,
just in order to pay the tax. For some assets that are not frequently or not
publicly traded it can be very costly if not impossible to permanently or
periodically assess their value.
For those practical reasons, assets for which such problems arise are
mostly taxed upon realization. Under a realization system – sometimes also
referred to as ‘wait and see’ approach – the tax is payable only when the in-
vestor sells the asset thereby realizing a gain or a loss. Solving the problems
of liquidity and valuation, the realization tax creates a new problem of its
own: It equips the investor with a timing option that enables him to realize
capital losses immediately and defer capital gains in order to save taxes. This
so-called lock-in effect distorts the investor’s optimal liquidation policy and
hence possibly his investment decision.
Considering the possible distortions caused by the lock-in effect, there
is a natural question arising: Does taxation of capital gains upon realiza-
tion create a welfare loss? Put differently: Is social welfare smaller under a
realization tax than under an accrual tax?
There is a whole branch of the literature on capital gains taxes that
implicitly answers in the affirmative and, hence, searches for tax systems
avoiding or, at least, reducing the lock-in effect. Chapter 1∗ surveys the
corresponding articles that are found in the economic as well as in the tax law
literature. The proposals made are mostly based upon the idea of imitating
an accrual tax by retrospective taxation on a realization basis in order to
circumvent the lock-in effect without running into the problems of liquidity
and valuation.
The main contribution of Chapter 1 consists in developing a uniform
formal way of describing the different proposals. This uniform approach does
not only allow to easily compare the proposed tax schemes and recognize their
common grounds or differences but also evaluate and categorize them on an
abstract level.
∗Chapter 1 is based on my paper Imitating accrual taxation on a realization basis.
4Chapter 2∗∗ returns to the question how social welfare is affected by the
method of taxation. The timing option provided by a realization tax has
important implications for the investors’ optimal consumption and saving
behavior and, hence, for equilibrium asset prices. Within a simple general
equilibrium model of an exchange economy with heterogeneous agents it is
shown that asset prices are higher under a realization based tax system than
under an accrual one. However, due to distributional effects, total welfare is
not necessarily lower.
Insofar Chapter 2 can be regarded as a more rigorous attempt to clarify
the conditions under which the proposals for imitating an accrual tax dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 should in fact be implemented in order to attain the
economy’s normative goal.
∗∗Chapter 2 is based on my paper Methods of capital gains taxation and the impact on
asset prices and welfare. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Annual Congress
of the European Economic Association (EEA) 2005 in Amsterdam, at the Annual Meeting
of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG) 2005 in Innsbruck, and at the Annual
Meeting of the Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik (VfS) 2004 in Dresden.
Chapter 1
Imitating accrual taxation on a
realization basis
While taxation of capital gains upon accrual poses problems of liquidity and
valuation, taxation upon realization evokes the so-called lock-in effect that
possibly induces distortions of the investors’ liquidation and investment deci-
sion. Those problems are discussed in Section 1.1. The tax schemes, proposed
in the literature in order to remedy simultaneously the shortcomings of both
taxation methods, are mostly based on the idea of imitating accrual taxation
on a realization basis. Section 1.2 surveys those proposals and develops a
uniform formal way of describing the suggested schemes that allows to easily
compare and evaluate them from a theoretic point of view. Section 1.3 con-
cludes with some brief remarks on the practical applicability of the discussed
proposals.
1.1 The basic problem
1.1.1 Accrual vs. realization taxation
One rationale for tax systems all over the world is the ability-to-pay principle.
Since people’s skills are not directly observable, the personal income serves as
a proxy and mostly provides the taxable base. If capital gains are considered
to be part of this tax basis and if the income tax is collected periodically,
then, for the sake of consistency, the taxation of capital gains or losses should
be based on changes in the values of assets during the corresponding period.
Put differently, this would be in accordance with the Haig-Simons definition
of income as the sum of consumption and the change in value of property.
The method of taxing capital gains when they actually accrue is referred
5
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to as taxation upon accrual or yield-to-maturity approach. In many coun-
tries it particularly applies to financial instruments with fixed returns. For
example, bonds issued at deep discount are taxed upon accrual in the US as
well as in many other OECD countries.1
For an asset with fixed returns the price path is, more or less, predeter-
mined. Hence, the tax authorities can easily assess the current value and
corresponding tax liability, i.e. administrative costs caused by valuation are
low. Moreover, since the holder of such an asset knows the taxes due in
advance when he purchases it, there should neither be a problem of liquidity.
However, things look different for assets with contingent returns. The
stochastic price path of financial instruments like stock or stock options often
is quite volatile. It may happen that investors are forced to sell some of their
assets, which they would keep hold of otherwise, just in order to pay the tax
due. Moreover, it might be quite costly if not impossible to permanently or
periodically assess the current value of volatile assets with contingent returns
that are not frequently or not publicly traded. Like Warren (2004) or Shakow
(1986), most authors consider the problems of liquidity and valuation to be
the most severe drawbacks of accrual taxation and the main reasons for the
fact that in most countries capital gains from assets with contingent returns
are taxed upon realization.2
Under a realization system – also referred to as wait-and-see approach
– the tax is payable only when the capital gain or loss is actually realized,
i.e. when the asset is sold or otherwise disposed of. On the one hand, this
solves the problems of liquidity and valuation. On the other hand, of course,
the realization method provides an inconsistency for an income tax otherwise
assessed periodically. This inconsistency has several important consequences
for the investors’ economic behavior.3
First, the realization tax provides a timing option that allows the investor
to realize capital losses immediately and defer capital gains in order to save
taxes. This distortion of the optimal liquidation policy is known as lock-in
effect and will be explained in Section 1.1.2 in some more detail.
Second, in the presence of several investment opportunities, the investors’
portfolio choice and investment decision may also be distorted as shown in
Section 1.1.3.
Section 1.1.4 demonstrates that, if the method of taxation is not uniform
but relies on distinctions, such as the difference between fixed and contingent
returns mentioned above, the problem of distortions is heightened by financial
1See OECD (1994); for a numerical example see also Warren (2004).
2See e.g. OECD (1994).
3A comprehensive discussion about the pros and cons of the realization requirement
can be found in Land (1996).
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innovations that undermine the relevant distinction.
Finally, if ordinary income is taxed periodically while capital gains are
taxed upon realization, this inconsistency may affect even the production de-
cision, since relative prices for the factors capital and labor possibly change.
However, the problems arising from the different character (whether ordinary
income or capital gain) are discussed at length in the literature on dual in-
come taxation4 and will not be addressed any further in this book. Likewise,
problems arising from distinctions in source (whether domestic or foreign) or
voice (whether debt or equity) of capital gains are ignored.5
The study at hand focusses on the timing of taxation under the two
controversial methods. In order to simplify the formal analysis, this chapter
abstracts from many specific real world conditions and makes the following
assumptions with respect to the assets, the capital market, and the tax code:6
Assumption 1.1 The assets under consideration do not produce any inter-
mediate cash flows, and their shares are infinitely divisible.
Assumption 1.2 On the capital market, investors are price takers and trade
only at equilibrium prices. Transaction costs are zero. There are no restric-
tions on short sales.
Assumption 1.3 All capital gains and losses are taxed at the constant rate
0 < τ < 1. No distinction is made between the short term and long term
status of capital gains and losses.
1.1.2 The optimal liquidation policy
In order to illustrate the lock-in effect arising under a realization tax, Con-
stantinides (1983) investigates the optimal liquidation policy of an investor.
Thus the discussion focusses on the timing of income under a realization tax.
He considers a single good exchange economy with a risky asset (stock),
which is taxed upon realization at the rate τ , and a riskless, tax exempt bond
with yield r > 0.7 Suppose the actual price for one share of stock at time t
to be Pt and let T > t be some arbitrary future time. Consider the problem
4See e.g. Sørensen (1994), Alstadsæter (2003), Fjaerli and Lund (2001).
5See Warren (2004) for a short discussion of those distinctions creating problems for
income taxation. A very similar categorization of the basic weaknesses of current tax
systems can be found in Alworth (1998).
6The assumptions are similar to those made in Constantinides (1983).
7Equivalently, one could assume that the bond is taxed upon accrual and yields the
after tax rate r.
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of an investor, who holds one share of stock with basis P0 purchased at some
previous time 0 and aims at maximizing the after-tax value of his investment
at time T deciding on his liquidation policy. In particular, compare the
following two strategies: Either (H) hold the asset till time T , which then
yields
WH := PT − τ(PT − P0) = (1− τ)PT + τP0,
or (R) sell and repurchase the asset at time t. To repurchase the asset after
taxation upon realization at time t in case of a realized gain, i.e. for Pt > P0,
the investor must borrow the tax payment τ(Pt − P0) at the riskless rate r
by going short in the bond; in case of a loss, i.e. for Pt < P0 he can lend this
amount buying shares of the bond. Compounding interest continuously, his
after tax proceeds at time T are given by
WR := PT − τ(PT − Pt)− τ(Pt − P0)er(T−t)
= (1− τ)PT + τP0 − τ(Pt − P0)(er(T−t) − 1).
A comparison of those values shows that
WH ≥ WR ⇐⇒ Pt ≥ P0,
i.e. in case of accrued gains the ‘hold’-strategy is preferable whereas in case of
losses the ‘sell and repurchase’-strategy should be chosen.8 Put differently,
taxation upon realization provides a timing option that should be exerted
only in the case of capital losses, whereas gains are locked-in. Therefore, this
result is labelled the lock-in effect. Since T > t has been chosen arbitrarily,
it can be summarized as follows:
Theorem 1.1 (Constantinides (1983)) If Assumptions 1.1–1.3 hold,
then the optimal liquidation policy under a realization tax is to realize losses
immediately and defer gains as long as possible.
1.1.3 The impact on portfolio choice
The previous section has demonstrated that taxation upon realization causes
a distortion of the investor’s liquidation decision. In this section the question
under consideration is whether the lock-in effect may distort the investor’s
portfolio choice as well. Following Auerbach (1991), it is shown that in the
8Note that this conclusion is independent of the investor’s expectations on the future
asset price PT .
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presence of alternative investment opportunities there are realistic circum-
stances under which the answer is yes.
Look at the following two-period version of the above framework with
two riskless assets: A, yielding the rate of return ρ, and B, yielding the rate
of return i. Consider an investor, who holds one share of asset A with actual
price P1 and basis P0. Suppose that a capital gain has accrued (P1 > P0).
The investor aims at maximizing the after-tax value of his investment in
period 2 deciding on the structure of his portfolio. In particular, compare
the following two strategies: Either (H) hold asset A till period 2, which
then yields
WH = P1(1 + ρ)− τ [P1(1 + ρ)− P0]
= P1(1 + ρ)− τ [(P1 − P0) + ρP1] ,
or (R) sell the asset A and reinvest in asset B yielding
WR = [P1 − τ(P1 − P0)] [1 + i(1− τ)]
= P1(1 + i)− τ [(P1 − P0) [1 + i(1− τ)] + iP1] .
A comparison of those values for identical rates of return ρ = i shows, again,
the preferability of the ‘hold’ strategy:
WH −WR = τ(P1 − P0)i(1− τ) > 0.
Since ∂WH
∂ρ
= (1 − τ)P > 0, the after tax yield WH is increasing in the rate
of return ρ, and hence there is a cut-off value ρmin < i such that for all
ρ with ρmin < ρ < i the inequality WH > WR still holds. Economically
spoken, the investor is willing to keep hold of asset A even for a range of
pre-tax returns that fall short of the pre-tax return of the alternative asset
B. In such cases, the realization tax in fact distorts the investor’s portfolio
choice: Tax considerations lock-in the accrued gains and avoid an efficient
reallocation of the portfolio.
1.1.4 The role of financial innovations
As emphasized by many authors, e.g. Alworth (1998), Boadway and Keen
(2003) or Warren (2004), financial innovations often aggravate the distorting
character of a realization tax for the following reason: If the method of taxa-
tion is not uniform but relies on distinctions, such as the difference between
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fixed and contingent returns mentioned above, the investors might be able to
circumvent the relevant distinction by the use of new financial instruments.
The notion of financial innovations is not always used consistently in the
literature. According to Alworth (1998) it includes the invention of new
trading strategies as well as the design of new assets and synthetic portfolio
positions for the purposes of risk management and (tax) arbitrage.
The ‘sell and repurchase’ strategy that has been proven to be favorable
in the case of losses (see Section 1.1.2) may be seen as an example of such an
innovative trading strategy. It is labelled a wash-sale, because the transaction
is conducted just in order to qualify for a tax credit washing away the losses.
However, the tax codes of most countries like the US do not allow a tax credit
for transactions identified as wash sales.9
The most prominent example for a synthetic portfolio position that un-
dermines the distinction between fixed and contingent returns is the famous
put-call-parity for European options.10 An European option is a contract
which provides the buyer with the right to buy (call) or sell (put) a specific
quantity of an underlying asset (e.g. stock) at a specific priceK on a specified
future date T from or to the seller respectively. Let S, P and C be the actual
prices for a share of stock that does not pay dividends, a put option, and a
call option with the same strike price K and expiration date T , respectively.
Moreover, let i be the pre-tax rate of return of a zero coupon bond with
maturity at date T . The assumption that no arbitrage is possible on the
financial market implies the following identity, known as put-call-parity:
K(1 + i)−T = S + P − C. (1.1)
Hence, investing an amount of K(1 + i)−T in the zero coupon bond is just
equivalent to the synthetic position of buying a share of stock as well as a
put option and selling short a call option. Though each of the assets within
this synthetic position has contingent returns, their combination generates a
fixed one that equals the return of the zero coupon bond. Put differently, the
put-call-parity makes the distinction between fixed and contingent returns
obsolete.
However, while the return of the zero coupon bond is usually taxed upon
accrual, the gains or losses arising from each of the assets within the synthetic
portfolio are usually taxed upon realization (see Section 1.1.1). This means
that the investor himself can decide, which method of taxation should be
applied to a position with fixed return i by investing either in the zero coupon
bond or the synthetic portfolio. In particular, he can pick realization taxation
providing him with the timing option even for instruments with fixed returns.
9See e.g. Warren (2004).
10See e.g. Alworth (1998), Boadway and Keen (2003), Warren (2004).
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1.2 Formulaic taxation
1.2.1 The different solution concepts
Warren (2004) categorizes the actual and proposed solutions to the problems
discussed in the previous section as follows: transactional analysis, anti-
avoidance provisions, taxation of changes in the market values, and formulaic
taxation.
Transactional analysis
Transactional analysis means “to analyze the components of a new trans-
action in order to achieve consistent treatment with other, more familiar,
assets” (Warren, 2004, p. 904). The approach includes disaggregation (also
labelled bifurcation) as well as integration of (new) financial instruments, as
described by Shuldiner (1992) or Warren (1993).
For example, the put-call-parity (1.1) suggests to integrate the transac-
tions of selling (short) a share of stock as well as the corresponding put option
and buying the corresponding call option in a joint position that should be
taxed like the disposal of the equivalent zero coupon bond.11 As pointed out
by Warren (1993), it might be possible in theory but is surely difficult in
practice to properly identify such offsetting positions, since it requires case
by case considerations inducing high administrative costs.
Anti-avoidance provisions
Anti-avoidance provisions are regulations “that authorize disallowance of tax
benefits in certain transactions motivated by tax avoidance” (Warren, 2004,
p. 920). The basic idea behind those rules is the so-called substance over
form principle: Transactions should be taxed according to their economic
substance rather than their judicial or contractual form.
For example, as already mentioned in the preceding section, most tax
codes do not allow a tax credit for wash-sales: The transactions embodied
in the corresponding ‘sell and repurchase’ strategy do not really alter the
economic position of the investor but are conducted for tax purposes only.
However, in practice it is not always as easy as for a wash-sale to identify
whether a transaction is mainly motivated by tax avoidance. As for the
transactional analysis, it often requires case by case considerations inducing
high administrative costs (see Warren (1993)).
11See Warren (2004) for a rich variety of other examples of transactional analysis.
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Besides the practical problems of difficult identification and expensive bu-
reaucracy, the solution concepts of transactional analysis and anti-avoidance
provisions are affected with a major theoretical drawback: They might be
useful to maintain the tax-relevant distinctions, such as the difference be-
tween fixed and contingent returns, but they do not solve the basic problem
of capital gains taxation upon realization, namely the inconsistency in tim-
ing and the resulting distortions of the investors’ liquidation decision and
portfolio choice. By the very nature of this problem it cannot be solved
just altering the institutional framework at an ad-hoc basis but solely by a
comprehensive adjustment in the taxation method itself. The following two
types of solution represent such concepts (see Alworth et al. (2002)).
Taxation of changes in the market values
The most naive possibility would be, of course, to shift completely to a pure
accrual tax, i.e. (periodically) taxing the changes in the market value of an
asset independent of a realization event. However, the problems of liquidity
and valuation discussed in Section 1.1.1 have made many economists sceptical
whether this approach is viable (see Alworth et al. (2002)).
Nevertheless Shakow (1986) argues in favor of a wider use of accrual
taxation. For many assets and transactions, he proposes solutions to the
drawbacks of liquidity and valuation. In particular, for publicly traded assets
with observable market prices, valuation poses no problem: their value can
be permanently assessed by ‘marking them to market’. That is the reason
why taxation upon accrual is sometimes also referred to as mark to market
approach. In fact, in many countries like the US (see Warren (2004)) or Italy
(see Alworth et al. (2002)), accrual taxation is applied to a growing variety
of assets which meet those requirements.
However, the mark to market approach does not solve the liquidity prob-
lem and cannot be used for assets without publicly observable prices. There-
fore, “the realization requirement is widely considered to be essential to make
the tax system administrable” (Land, 1996, p. 48).
Formulaic taxation
Sticking to the requirement of raising taxes on a realization basis one has
to deal with the lock-in effect and the induced distortions of the investor’s
liquidation and investment decision (see Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3). The pro-
posed solutions to that problem suggest to carry on collecting taxes upon
realization but attempt to assess the tax due in such a way as to avoid or,
at least, reduce the distortions mentioned above. Because the tax liability
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is calculated from the realized gain by a certain tax formula, Warren (2004)
refers to this approach as formulaic taxation. The basic idea behind formu-
laic taxation consists in imitating accrual taxation on a realization basis by
imputing a certain rate of return on the deferred gains (see Boadway and
Keen (2003) as well as Warren (2004)).
The remainder of this section surveys the various tax formulas suggested
in the corresponding literature. Inspired by the work of Boadway and Keen
(2003), it is the first article in that field to offer a uniform formal way of
describing the different proposed tax schemes.
The several proposals differ with respect to the specific rates of return
used to accumulate gain on the one hand and imputed on deferred gains
on the other hand as well as with respect to the informational requirements
concerning the price path and the holding period of the taxable asset. Those
parameters are decisive for both the practical applicability12 and the extend
to which the lock-in effect and the resulting distortions can be overcome.
The big advantage and the main contribution of the work at hand lies
in the fact that by using a uniform formal description, those parametric dif-
ferences become apparent directly from the tax formulas. This allows to
compare and evaluate them from a purely theoretic point of view.
Each of the following subsections has a closer look to one proposal of
formulaic taxation. For each proposed tax scheme the corresponding tax
formulas both in continuous and discrete time are derived and illustrated by
a numerical example. Moreover, the economic intention of each approach as
well as its success in combatting the valuation problem on the one hand and
the lock-in effect on the other hand are discussed.
In the formal analysis, the tax liability of an investor who, at time T ,
sells an asset purchased at some previous time 0 is computed. To this end,
Assumptions 1.1–1.3 are supposed to hold; in particular, the relevant assets
are assumed to generate no intermediate cash-flows. The asset price at time
0 ≤ s ≤ T is denoted Ps and the riskless rate of return i, for simplicity,
supposed to be constant over time. The formulas in continuous time are
derived by just calculating the relevant integral; the discrete time formulas
are computed by evaluating the corresponding sum making consistently use
of the following relation for geometric series: for any constant c,
T∑
s=1
cs = c
1− cT
1− c . (1.2)
12Of course, the practical applicability is lower the higher the informational require-
ments.
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In order to illustrate how the tax formulas work, a numerical example is
provided throughout employing the following parameters:
T = 2, P0 = 100, P1 = 180, P2 = 200, i = 0, 1, τ = 0, 25. (1.3)
Before discussing eight different proposals for formulaic taxation made in
the literature, two benchmark cases are analyzed: the status quo, i.e. taxa-
tion upon realization, and a hypothetical scheme that serves as a reference
case, because it is completely equivalent to an accrual tax.
1.2.2 The status quo: realization taxation
Usually, the tax liability under a realization tax is just the difference between
the selling price and the purchase price times the tax rate: τ(PT−P0). While
the drawbacks of realization taxation have been discussed at length, note that
its informational requirements are very low: only the purchase price and the
selling price must be observed.
However, additionally knowing the length of the holding period T , one
can determine the average internal rate of return. This can be used to state
the following identities that will prove useful for later references.
Continuous time formula
Computing the average internal rate of return in continuous time g yields
g =
1
T
ln
(
PT
P0
)
. (1.4)
The implicit value of the asset at time s is then given by P impls = PT e
−g(T−s).
Consequently,
Taxc
real
=
∫ T
0
τgPT e
−g(T−s)ds = τ(PT − P0), (1.5)
expressing that if the realized gains are distributed uniformly all over the
holding period, the realization method will be equal to permanently taxing
the implicit gains gPT e
−g(T−s) at the rate τ (without imputing any interest
on the deferred tax payments).
Discrete time formula
The average internal rate of return in discrete time γ is given by
γ = T
√
PT
P0
− 1, (1.6)
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the implicit value of the asset at time s by P impls = PT (1 + γ)
−(T−s), and
hence
Taxd
real
=
T∑
s=1
τPT (1 + γ)
−T
[
(1 + γ)s − (1 + γ)s−1] = τ(PT − P0) (1.7)
with an interpretation analogous to that given above.
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) the realization tax due is given by
Tax
real
= 0, 25× (200− 100) = 25.
1.2.3 The reference case: full equivalence
If liquidity was the only problem under an accrual tax, in theory it would
be possible to adjust taxes paid upon realization to those that would have
accrued if the asset had been marked to market. The necessary adjustment is
determined by ex post calculating the accrued gain and implicit tax due for
each tax period between purchase and realization of the asset, and imputing
the net-of-tax period-by-period internal rate of return on the deferred tax
payments.13 Since such a scheme would perfectly mimic an accrual tax on a
realization basis in the sense that “after paying the adjusted tax at realization
the investor’s terminal wealth from investing into a particular asset would be
equivalent to the terminal wealth under accrual taxation” (Alworth et al.,
2002, p. 4), it is referred to as full equivalence method.
Continuous time formula
In continuous time, the value of the asset at time s times the internal rate
of return at that date leads to the gain gsPs at time s. This gain is taxed at
rate τ and the deferred tax payment is compounded forward to the time of
realization T at the internal rate of return, leading to the following formula:
Taxcacc =
∫ T
0
e
R T
s gt(1−τ)dtτgsPsds, (1.8)
13See Alworth et al. (2002). Note that holding the asset for one more period can be
interpreted in terms of taxation as ‘reinvesting’ the deferred tax payments into the asset.
Hence the implicit tax due appreciates at the internal rate of return. However, since it
should not be taxed again in the subsequent periods, the net-of-tax return applies.
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where gs :=
dPs/ds
Ps
is the internal rate of return at time s. Usually there is no
hope that the price path of the asset is in fact differentiable.14 Therefore, the
integral should not be taken literally but rather understood as an illustrative
notation similar to that used in stochastic integration.15
Discrete time formula
In discrete time, charging the tax due as described above leads to the follow-
ing formula:
Taxdacc =
T∑
s=1
τ(Ps − Ps−1)
T∏
t=s+1
[1 + γt(1− τ)], (1.9)
where γs :=
Ps
Ps−1
− 1 is the internal rate of return in period s.
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) the tax due under the full equivalence method
is given by
Taxacc = 0, 25× (180− 100)
[
1 +
200
180
(1− 0, 25)
]
+ 0, 25× (200− 180)
≈ 26, 67.
Discussion
Eliminating the lock-in effect, however, the full equivalence method would
require to observe the entire price path between purchase and realization of
the asset, i.e. not solve the problem of valuation. Hence, in practice it would
be applicable only where the mark to market approach applies anyway.
1.2.4 Retrospective taxation at the actual rate
(Vickrey, 1939)
Full, i.e. ex-post, equivalence between taxation upon accrual and realization
is sufficient but not necessary to eliminate the lock-in effect. Vickrey (1939)
proposes a retrospective tax scheme that is rather similar to the full equiv-
alence method. But instead of imputing the period-by-period internal rate
14For example, if, as usual, the price path of common stock is modelled to follow an Itoˆ-
process (see e.g. Welcker et al. (1992)), it would be nowhere differentiable with probability
1 (see e.g. von Weizsa¨cker and Winkler (1990)).
15See e.g. von Weizsa¨cker and Winkler (1990).
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of return on the deferred tax payments, it uses the riskless rate of return.
This makes investors indifferent between accrual and realization based taxes
ex-ante, i.e. at the moment they decide whether to sell the asset or keep
on holding it, because it equates the certainty-equivalent after-tax returns
(see Alworth et al. (2002) and Auerbach (1991)). Imputing interest on the
deferred tax payments at the riskless rate could be interpreted as the gov-
ernment lending these virtual payments to the investor for him to reinvest
them in the asset.
Continuous time formula
In continuous time, the tax due is given by
TaxcV =
∫ T
0
ei(1−τ)(T−s)τgsPsds, (1.10)
where, again, gs :=
dPs/ds
Ps
. The remark made on the continuous time formula
under the full equivalence method applies here as well.
Discrete time formula
In discrete time, the tax due amounts to
TaxdV =
T∑
s=1
τ(Ps − Ps−1)[1 + i(1− τ)]T−s. (1.11)
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) the tax due under retrospective taxation a
la Vickrey (1939) is given by
TaxV = 0, 25× (180− 100) [1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)] + 0, 25× (200− 180)
= 26, 5.
Discussion
Eliminating the lock-in effect, however, with the same informational require-
ment to observe the entire price path of the asset, the applicability of this
approach does not exceed the one under the full equivalence method.
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1.2.5 Retrospective taxation at the constant rate
(Meade, 1978)
In order to reduce the informational requirements, Meade (1978) proposes to
retrospectively allocate the realized gain as if the asset would have appreci-
ated uniformly at the implicit average internal rate of return over the holding
period and impute the net-of-tax riskless rate of return on the corresponding
virtual tax payments. Hence, only the purchase and sell prices P0 and PT as
well as the length of the holding period T have to be observable.
Continuous time formula
For taxation in continuous time this leads to a tax payment of
TaxcM =
∫ T
0
ei(1−τ)(T−s)τgPT e
−g(T−s)ds
=


TτgPT if g = i(1− τ)
τg
g−i(1−τ)
(1− e[i(1−τ)−g]T )PT else
, (1.12)
with g defined as in (1.4).
Discrete time formula
In discrete time the tax formula is given by
TaxdM =
T∑
s=1
τPT [(1 + γ)
−(T−s) − (1 + γ)−(T−(s−1))][1 + i(1− τ)]T−s
=


Tτ γ
1+γ
PT if γ = i(1− τ)
τγ
γ−i(1−τ)
(1− [1+i(1−τ)
1+γ
]T )PT else
, (1.13)
where (1.2) is used and γ is defined as in (1.6).
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) the tax due under retrospective taxation a
la Meade (1978) is given by
TaxM = 0, 25×
(
200√
2
− 200
2
)
[1 + 0, 1×(1− 0, 25)] + 0, 25×
(
200− 200√
2
)
≈ 25, 78.
1.2. FORMULAIC TAXATION 19
Discussion
From a comparison of the formulas (1.12) and (1.5) as well as (1.13) and
(1.7) respectively, it becomes apparent that the status quo taxation upon
realization can be interpreted as an application of retrospective taxation
with an imputed interest of i = 0.
Unfortunately, the proposed method can only alleviate but not eliminate
the lock-in effect. Like in the example at hand, for an asset with above-
normal rates of return initially, the investor still has an incentive to keep
on holding it because this allows him to spread the uniform accrual pattern
retrospectively imputed for his gain over several periods. “Likewise, an as-
set that had declined in value would offer its owner the incentive to sell”
(Auerbach, 1991, p. 168).
1.2.6 Continuous yield to maturity (Land, 1996)
Land (1996) proposes a tax formula that requires to know only the purchase
and realization price of the asset but is still able to eliminate the lock-in
effect. His scheme might be regarded as a version of retrospective taxation
similar to that of Meade (1978). But instead of imputing the riskless rate
of return on the deferred gains, it compounds interest on the internal rate
of return. This may be interpreted as if the government would become an
equity partner entitled to a share of the investor’s asset equal to the deferred
tax payments.
Continuous time formula
The proposed formula is given by
TaxcL =
∫ T
0
eg(1−τ)(T−s)τgPT e
−g(T−s)ds
= PT − P τ0 P 1−τT , (1.14)
where, again, g is defined as in (1.4). Interestingly, for the method to be able
to eliminate selective realization and, hence, the lock-in effect, continuous
compounding is necessary. The name of the proposal is due to that obser-
vation. The reason why there is a deferral advantage remaining in discrete
time lies in the fact that interest is compounded on the deferred tax payment
for an accrued gain only for all subsequent periods but not for the period in
which this gain accrues. With decreasing length of the taxation period this
error decreases and vanishes in the limit as the length tends towards zero.
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Discrete time formula
However, for the sake of completeness, the discrete time version of the pro-
posed method is provided as well:
TaxdL =
T∑
s=1
τPT [(1 + γ)
−(T−s) − (1 + γ)−(T−(s−1))][1 + γ(1− τ)]T−s
= PT − P0[1 + γ(1− τ)]T , (1.15)
where, again, (1.2) is used and γ is defined as in (1.6).
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) the tax due according to the continuous time
formula is given by
TaxcL = 200− 1000,25 × 2001−0,25 ≈ 31, 82.
Using the discrete time formula one derives
TaxdL = 0, 25×
(
200√
2
− 200
2
)[
1+(
√
2−1)(1−0, 25)
]
+ 0, 25×
(
200− 200√
2
)
≈ 28, 22.
Discussion
Despite its low informational requirements and the ability to circumvent the
lock-in effect, the suggested method is not free from shortcomings. Besides
the administrative burden that it puts for assets with intermediate cash-
flows (see Land (1996) or Warren (2004)) its implementation would certainly
create severe problems of political acceptance. As one can see from a glance
at formula (1.14), the proposed scheme is not only not linear but not even
monotone in the realized gain either. Figure 1.1 illustrates, for example,
that an investment of P0 would produce no refund if it became worthless
over time, whereas the effective marginal tax rate for growing gains tends
towards 100 %.
1.2.7 Expected value taxation (Shuldiner, 1992)
The basic idea behind expected value taxation put forward by Shuldiner
(1992) is to tax anticipated gains on an accrual basis but unanticipated gains
upon realization. This requires to determine an expected rate of return for
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Figure 1.1: Tax under the continuous yield to maturity approach
each asset with contingencies and then periodically tax the virtual (antici-
pated) gain that accrues according to this predefined rate till the date the
actual gain is realized. At realization, when contingencies are resolved, the
unanticipated gain is taxed as the difference between actual sell price and
expected value of the asset according to the predefined expected rate of re-
turn.
Continuous time formula
Let r be the expected (average) rate of return. At time s the expected
value of the asset is then given by P0e
rs. According to the original proposal
of Shuldiner (1992), the resulting virtual gain rP0e
rs should then be taxed
upon accrual at the rate τ . To compute the final value for this stream of tax
payments at the time of realization T , compound interest at the net-of-tax
riskless rate of return. Adding the tax for the unanticipated gain yields
TaxcS =
∫ T
0
ei(1−τ)(T−s)τrP0e
rsds+ τ(PT − P0erT )
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=


TτrP0e
rT + τ(PT − P0erT ) if r = i(1− τ)
τr
r−i(1−τ)
(erT − ei(1−τ)T )P0 + τ(PT − P0erT ) else.
(1.16)
Discrete time formula
Analogously one derives the discrete time formula
TaxdS =
T∑
s=1
τP0[(1 + ρ)
s − (1 + ρ)s−1][1 + i(1− τ)]T−s
+ τ [PT − P0(1 + ρ)T ]
=


Tτ ρ
1+ρ
P0(1 + ρ)
T + τ [PT − P0(1 + ρ)T ] if ρ = i(1− τ)
τρ
ρ−i(1−τ)
([1 + ρ]T − [1 + i(1− τ)]T )P0
else,
+ τ [PT − P0(1 + ρ)T ]
(1.17)
where, again, (1.2) is used, and now the expected (average) rate of return is
denoted ρ.
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) and additionally assuming ρ = i, the tax due
according to expected value taxation is given by
TaxS = 0, 25× 100×
[
(1, 1− 1) [1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)] + (1, 12 − 1, 1)]
+0, 25× (200− 100× 1, 12)
≈ 25, 19.
Discussion
One big challenge with this approach is to determine an appropriate expected
rate of return. Given such a rate, the informational requirements are low –
only the purchase and sell price have to be known – but choosing this rate
in a suitable way may require to learn prices (e.g. forward prices) that are
not publicly observable (see Shuldiner (1992) or Warren (2004)).
Comparing the formulas (1.16) and (1.5) as well as (1.17) and (1.7) respec-
tively, the status quo realization tax can be regarded as the particular case
of expected value taxation in which the expected rate of return is supposed
to equal zero (r = ρ = 0), i.e. the entire gain is considered unanticipated. On
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the other hand, if the expected rate of return equals the actual internal rate
of return (r = g or ρ = γ), the tax liability under expected value taxation
equals the one under retrospective taxation a la Meade (1978), as a compari-
son of (1.16) and (1.12) or (1.17) and (1.13), respectively, shows. The special
case in which the expected rate of return equals the riskless rate of return16
is discussed in Section 1.2.10.
However, even if an appropriate expected rate of return is available, ex-
pected value taxation can only alleviate but not remedy the lock-in effect
since the incentive to defer unanticipated gains still remains (see Shuldiner
(1992) or Warren (2004)).
1.2.8 Imputing interest on basis
(Cunningham and Schenk, 1992)
The proposal made by Cunningham and Schenk (1992) is based upon the idea
that ex-ante, an investor who purchases an asset assumes it to appreciate at
least at the riskless rate of return. Otherwise he could invest at the riskless
rate. Hence, from an ex-ante point of view, the tax liability should be (at
least) as high as for an asset appreciating at the riskless rate. Consequently,
the authors suggest to simply impute the riskless interest rate on the basis
of an asset and tax the gains that would accrue if the asset appreciated at
the riskless rate of return. If the tax payments are deferred till realization,
interest will be compounded at the net-of-tax riskless rate.
Continuous time formula
This procedure yields the following continuous time formula:
TaxcCS =
∫ T
0
ei(1−τ)(T−s)τiP0e
isds
= P0
[
eiT − ei(1−τ)T ] . (1.18)
Discrete time formula
Applying (1.2), the discrete time formula is given by
TaxdCS =
T∑
s=1
τP0[(1 + i)
s − (1 + i)s−1][1 + i(1− τ)]T−s
16Auerbach (1991) argues that under the assumption of optimal portfolio choice by the
investors, in equilibrium the certainty-equivalent value of the expected rate of return must
equal the riskless rate of return.
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= P0
[
(1 + i)T − (1 + i(1− τ))T ] . (1.19)
Example
For the values specified in (1.3), the tax due according to the method sug-
gested is given by
TaxCS = 0, 25× 100×
[
(1, 1− 1) [1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)] + (1, 12 − 1, 1)]
≈ 5, 44.
Compared to the liabilities under the other schemes the tax payment is quite
low due to the fact that only the virtual gain that would have accrued at the
riskless rate is taxed but not the much higher actually realized one.
Discussion
Although under the proposed scheme an investor’s tax liability does not
depend on his accrued gain at all, the method is not able to eliminate the
lock-in effect. The investor has an incentive to selectively realize losses and
defer gains in order to qualify for a tax basis as low as possible. Despite
the very low informational requirements – only the purchase price and the
length of the holding period must be observable – installing such a scheme
would presumably cause severe problems of political acceptability. Its ex-ante
character, i.e. the fact that the tax liability does in no way reflect the ex-post
realized gain, is usually not compatible with the traditional notions of fairness
and solidarity that try to find compensation ex-post, after contingencies have
been resolved. A similar critique applies to the method proposed in the next
section (see Auerbach (1991)).
1.2.9 Retrospective taxation at the riskless rate
(Auerbach, 1991)
In his seminal article Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation Auerbach (1991)
proposes a tax scheme very similar to the previous method. But instead of
imputing interest on the basis, he suggests to retrospectively tax the asset
as if it would have appreciated to its realization price at the riskless rate of
return.
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Continuous time formula
In continuous time, the virtual asset price at time s is derived by discount-
ing interest on the realization price yielding PT e
−i(T−s). The virtual gain
iPT e
−i(T−s) at time s is then taxed at rate τ . Imputing the net-of-tax risk-
less rate of return on the deferred tax payments leads to the following tax
formula:
TaxcA =
∫ T
0
ei(1−τ)(T−s)τiPT e
−i(T−s)ds
= PT
[
1− e−iτT ] . (1.20)
Discrete time formula
The discrete time formula is derived by an analogous procedure and applying
(1.2):
TaxdA =
T∑
s=1
τPT
[
(1 + i)−(T−s) − (1 + i)−(T−(s−1))] [1 + i(1− τ)]T−s
= PT
[
1−
(
1 + i(1− τ)
1 + i
)T]
. (1.21)
Example
For the values specified in (1.3), the tax due according to the method sug-
gested is given by
TaxA = 0, 25×200×
[(
1
1, 1
− 1
1, 12
)
[1 + 0, 1×(1− 0, 25)] +
(
1− 1
1, 1
)]
≈ 8, 99.
Here as well, the tax payment is relatively low because only the virtual gain,
that would have been necessary for the asset to accumulate at the riskless rate
to the selling price, is taxed but not the much higher one actually realized.
Discussion
Using the assumption of optimal portfolio choice, Auerbach (1991) shows
that facing this tax scheme, in equilibrium an investor is ex-ante indifferent
between either holding the asset for one more period or selling the asset and
reinvesting the proceeds at the riskless rate of return. Hence, despite its low
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informational requirements – only the sell price PT and the length of the
holding period T must be observable – the method is able to eliminate the
lock in effect and the induced distortions.17 However, ex-post the tax liability
does not depend on the gain actually realized. Therefore, with respect to
concerns of fairness, the scheme faces a similar critique as the proposal of
Cunningham and Schenk (1992).
1.2.10 Arbitrary gain reference date (Bradford, 1995)
This critique might be regarded as the motivation for the work of Bradford
(1995). Introducing the notion of a gain reference date (GRD), he proposes
a tax scheme, which is able to eliminate the lock-in effect with comparable
low informational requirements but still allows to charge tax for the actual
realized gain. The method may be looked upon as a combination and en-
hancement of the proposals made by Auerbach (1991), Shuldiner (1992), as
well as Cunningham and Schenk (1992) and works as follows:
Continuous time formula
Before the investor makes any transaction, a so-called arbitrary gain reference
date D is fixed. If an asset, purchased at basis P0, is held for the time T and
then sold at price PT , in order to determine the resulting gain at date D, the
basis would be compounded forward and the sell price would be discounted
back to that date at the riskless rate. This ‘unanticipated’ gain as of time D,
i.e. the difference PT e
−i(T−D) − P0eiD is taxed at rate θ, which is also set in
advance and may differ from the tax rate τ for ‘anticipated’ gains. The total
tax liability at realization is then composed of three parts: (1) the tax on the
‘unanticipated’ gain compounded forward from the GRD D to the realization
date T at the net-of-tax riskless rate of return, and the tax on ‘anticipated’
gains – compounded forward at the same rate – resulting from (2) imputing
the riskless rate of return on the basis P0 from the time of purchase 0 till the
GRD D (see equation (1.18)) and (3) discounting the riskless rate of return
from the sell price PT from the time of realization T back to the GRD D (see
equation (1.20)).
TaxcB = θ
[
PT e
−i(T−D) − P0eiD
]
ei(1−τ)(T−D)
+ P0
[
eiD − ei(1−τ)D] ei(1−τ)(T−D)
+ PT
[
1− e−iτ(T−D)]
17In fact, this scheme is the only one to eliminate the lock in effect getting along
with these informational requirements (see Auerbach (1991) and Auerbach and Bradford
(2002)).
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= PT
[
1− (1− θ)e−iτ(T−D)]
− P0ei(1−τ)T
[
1− (1− θ)eiτD] (1.22)
Discrete time formula
In discrete time, an analogous procedure yields the following tax formula:
TaxdB = θ
[
PT (1 + i)
−(T−D) − P0(1 + i)D
]
[1 + i(1− τ)]T−D
+ P0
[
(1 + i)D − (1 + i(1− τ))D] [1 + i(1− τ)]T−D
+ PT
[
1−
(
1 + i(1− τ)
1 + i
)T−D]
= PT
[
1− (1− θ)
(
1 + i(1− τ)
1 + i
)T−D]
−P0[1 + i(1− τ)]T
[
1− (1− θ)
(
1 + i(1− τ)
1 + i
)−D]
.(1.23)
Example
For the values specified in (1.3) and additionally assuming D = 1 to be the
GRD and the tax rate for anticipated and unanticipated gains to coincide,
i.e. θ = τ , the tax due according to the proposed scheme is given by
TaxB = 0, 25×
(
200
1, 1
− 100× 1, 1
)
[1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)]
+0, 25× 100× (1, 1− 1) [1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)]
+0, 25× 200×
(
1− 1
1, 1
)
≈ 26, 53.
Discussion
Consider some special cases with respect to the parameters D and θ. First
note by a comparison of equations (1.20) and (1.22) or (1.21) and (1.23)
respectively, that for D = θ = 0, i.e. if the gain reference date is set to equal
the purchase date and unanticipated gains remain untaxed, the proposed
tax scheme will reduce to the one of Auerbach (1991). Second, if θ = 0 and
D = T , the tax formulas (1.22) and (1.23) will equal those under the approach
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of Cunningham and Schenk (1992) given in (1.18) and (1.19), respectively.
Finally, if θ = τ and D = T , the tax formulas (1.22) and (1.23) will equal
those under the approach of Shuldiner (1992) as given in (1.16) and (1.17)
respectively, assuming that the expected rate of return r or ρ respectively, is
equal to the riskless rate i. Note however, that the GRD is set in advance
and cannot be influenced by the investors realization decision, i.e. D = T
may happen only by chance. Exactly this is the reason why the approaches
of Shuldiner (1992) and Cunningham and Schenk (1992) fail to eliminate the
lock-in effect, whereas the method of Bradford (1995) succeeds.
As mentioned, the proposed method requires only little information –
the prices P0, PT and the length of the holding period T must be known –,
eliminates the lock-in effect, and alleviates the problem of ex-post fairness by
taxing the actual gain. Despite those advantages the political acceptance for
this approach would presumably be quite low because its rather complex tax
formula would counteract the effort made in order to reach more simplicity
and transparency in the tax code.
1.2.11 Generalized cash-flow taxation
(Auerbach and Bradford, 2002)
The approach suggested by Auerbach and Bradford (2002) is somewhat odd
in this review of income tax schemes since it actually represents a cash-flow
tax. However, as the authors show, it is equivalent to an income tax collected
upon accrual. The basic idea of generalized cash-flow taxation can best be
understood reconsidering the tax formulas (1.22) or (1.23), respectively, un-
der the approach of Bradford (1995).
Continuous time formula
The difference in equation (1.22), for example, can be regarded as consisting
of a (cash-flow) tax at rate
[
1− (1− θ)e−iτ(T−D)] on the sale at time T and
a deduction of the present value of a (cash-flow) tax at rate
[
1− (1− θ)eiτD]
on the purchase at time 0. It seems natural to disentangle those taxes by
collecting two separate tax payments via a cash-flow tax. In continuous time,
a positive (negative) cash-flow Ps at time s would then cause a tax liability
(credit) according to the following formula:
TaxcAB = Ps
[
1− (1− θ)e−iτ(s−D)] , (1.24)
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where D and θ are parameters fixed in advance that could be given a similar
interpretation to that in the scheme of Bradford (1995).18
Discrete time formula
In discrete time, the analogous formula is given by
TaxdAB = Ps
[
1− (1− θ)
(
1 + i(1− τ)
1 + i
)s−D]
. (1.25)
Example
For the values specified in (1.3), with D = 1 and θ = τ the generalized cash
flow tax generates a credit of
TaxAB0 = 100×
[
1− (1− 0, 25)×
(
1, 1
1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)
)]
≈ 23, 26
at purchase and a liability of
TaxAB2 = 200×
[
1− (1− 0, 25)×
(
1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)
1, 1
)]
≈ 53, 41
at realization. The final value of the tax payments adds up to
TaxAB = Tax
AB
2 − TaxAB0 × [1 + 0, 1× (1− 0, 25)]2 ≈ 26, 53,
the same value as under the approach of Bradford (1995).
Discussion
Note that the cash-flow tax rate under the proposed scheme is increasing
over time, and that at just the right rate to simulate an accrual tax at rate
τ (see Auerbach and Bradford (2002)). Therefore, the approach is able to
eliminate the lock-in effect.19
The informational requirement is very low – only the amount of cash-
flow must be observable – but installing the proposed scheme would mean
to switch from an income tax system to a cash-flow tax. Such a switch is
frequently discussed but in most countries far from being realized.
18See Auerbach and Bradford (2002) for a discussion how the values for these parameters
should be chosen appropriately.
19However, a rising cash-flow tax rate discourages current deductible investment (see
Auerbach and Bradford (2002)).
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1.2.12 Schematic comparison and evaluation
The most important characteristics of the proposed tax schemes analyzed in
this chapter are (1) their informational requirements, (2) the rate of return
used to assess the accumulated (real or virtual) gain, and (3) the rate of
return imputed on deferred tax payments. Those characteristics are decisive
for the practical applicability of the method as well as for its ability to elim-
inate the lock-in effect. Table 1.1 is summarizing those attributes and the
corresponding success in combatting the induced distortions.
Informational Rate of return Rate of return Eliminates
requirements used to imputed on the lock-in
Proposal accumulate gains deferred taxes effect
Status P0, PT g 0 no
quo
Full equiva-
lence
(Ps)
T
s=0 (gs)
T
s=0 [(1− τ)gs]Ts=0 yes
Vickrey
(1939)
(Ps)
T
s=0 (gs)
T
s=0 (1− τ)i yes
Meade
(1978)
P0, PT , T g (1− τ)i partly
Land
(1996)
P0, PT , T
a g (1− τ)g yesb
Shuldiner
(1992)
P0, PT , T r (1− τ)i partly
Cunningham
and Schenk
(1992)
P0, T i (1− τ)i no
Auerbach
(1991)
PT , T i (1− τ)i yes
Bradford
(1995)
P0, PT , T i (1− τ)i yes
Auerbach
and Brad-
ford (2002)
Ps — (1− τ)i yes
aT is needed only for taxation in discrete time.
bThe lock-in effect is eliminated entirely only for taxation in continuous time.
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the proposed tax schemes
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1.3 Concluding remarks
This chapter has surveyed the proposals made in the literature in order to
simultaneously solve the problems of accrual and realization taxation based
on the idea of imitating an accrual tax on a realization basis. In order to
describe the different tax formulas, a uniform formal approach has been in-
troduced, which allows to easily compare and evaluate the proposed schemes
from a purely theoretic point of view. As the proposal made by Bradford
(1995) shows, in theory it is possible to overcome the problems of an accrual
system, namely liquidity and valuation, as well as those of a realization one,
namely the lock-in effect, at the same time and still tax the actually realized
gain. However, this comes at the cost of a rather complex and opaque tax
formula that is not very likely to be implemented in practice.
In order to keep the analysis simple a list of assumptions has been made
(see Assumptions 1.1–1.3) abstracting from numerous and often varying real
world conditions. In particular, the problems arising from the following three
realities have been neglected: (1) assets that produce intermediate cash-flows,
e.g. dividends; (2) tax rates or interest rates that vary over time or from in-
dividual to individual; (3) credits that authorities might allow for inflation.
How the respective schemes have to be modified in order to cope with these
issues is usually discussed in the corresponding original articles. However,
such a discussion is beyond the scope of the survey at hand. Here the focus
is rather on basic concepts than on workable tax codes.
So far there has been only little attempt to really implement formulaic
capital gains taxation. Alworth et al. (2002) describe the Italian experience
of having experimented with both the mark to market approach proposed
by Shakow (1986) (see Section 1.2.1) as well as introducing retrospective
taxation of capital gains along the lines suggested alternatively by Vickrey
(1939), Meade (1978), Auerbach (1991), Bradford (1995), and Auerbach and
Bradford (2002). The Italian 1998 tax reform “introduced an accruals based
regime in a number of situations. Where this was not feasible, various types
of retrospective capital gains taxation were introduced with the purpose of
‘equalizing’ realizations based taxes with those resulting from a system based
on accruals” (Alworth et al., 2002, p. 3). This ‘equalizer’ could be regarded as
a version of the tax formulas proposed by Vickrey (1939) and Meade (1978)
and was introduced with delay in January 2001. Though it worked quite
well creating only few distortions,20 the ‘equalizer’ was first suspended and
20Alworth et al. (2002, p. 3) assert in an empirical study that the distortions from the
‘equalizer’ “do not appear to be very significant.”
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then abolished only seven months after its introduction due to problems of
political acceptance. Alworth et al. (2002, p. 29) judge that as a “warning
signal” and comment on it as follows:
“There exists a gap between the methods and concepts used by
economists in analyzing issues like the ‘lock-in’ effect and the
methods and concepts that can be used in the political and legal
arena for upholding ex-post adjustments of realized income. Even
the more sophisticated adjustments such as those put forward by
Auerbach are not immune from political pressures and ‘ex-post’
equity considerations. . . . [I]t is difficult to argue in the political
arena that net-returns would have been the same as under the
accrual system if portfolio allocations had been changed as would
be dictated by rational behavior.”
Put differently, if politics aims at a successful introduction of efficient formu-
laic taxation, the lessons to be learned from the Italian experience suggest
to improve the social acceptance for ‘ex-ante’ concepts of fairness as well as
for complex tax formulas.
An entirely different question is whether it is desirable after all to replace
the status quo method of realization taxation by an accrual tax or an imitat-
ing scheme. One might argue that the preferential tax treatment provided by
the advantage of deferral has social value. In a first-best world, as Auerbach
(1991, p. 173) shows, a “tax benefit for capital assets need not be provided
via a distortionary deferral advantage.” However, in a second-best world in
which the method of taxation is the only policy instrument available, things
are not that clear. Chapter 2 will throw some light on the impact the method
of capital gains taxation has on (the distribution of) welfare.
Chapter 2
The impact on asset prices and
welfare
Taxation of capital gains upon realization instead of accrual provides incen-
tives to hold winners as long as possible and sell losers immediately. This
so-called lock-in effect possibly distorts the liquidation and investment de-
cision and hence is usually regarded as harmful. This chapter analyzes the
impact the method of taxation has on asset prices and welfare within a sim-
ple general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with heterogeneous
agents. It is shown that asset prices are higher under a realization based tax
system than under an accrual one. However, due to distributional effects,
total welfare is not necessarily lower.
2.1 The basic problem revisited
As explained in Chapter 1.1, solving the problems of liquidity and valuation
arising under an accrual tax, the taxation of capital gains upon realization
possibly distorts the investors’ liquidation decision and portfolio choice. The
following example reconsiders this problem and shows that the lock-in effect
may arise in an even simpler framework.
The owner of an asset with basis P0, actual price P1 and final payout P2
decides on either selling and repurchasing the asset in period 1 or holding the
asset till period 2 in order to maximize his period-2-payout after taxation at
the constant rate 0 < τ < 1.
Under an accrual tax the investor obviously is indifferent between the two
strategies. Both of them leave him with the same after-tax payout in period
2 equal to
W acc :=
P1 − τ(P1 − P0)
P1
[P2 − τ(P2 − P1)] .
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Note that under the hold strategy he still has to liquidate part of the asset
in period 1 in order to fulfill his tax liability. Under a realization system the
after-tax payout in period 2 following the ‘hold’-strategy is
W realH := P2 − τ(P2 − P0),
whereas the sell-and-repurchase strategy yields
W realR :=
P1 − τ(P1 − P0)
P1
[P2 − τ(P2 − P1)] ,
the same payout as under an accrual tax. A comparison of the two strategies
shows that
W realH ≥ W realR ⇔ (P0 ≥ P1 ≥ P2) ∨ (P0 ≤ P1 ≤ P2) . (2.1)
If one assumes that, as in most of the relevant cases, the investor expected the
asset to appreciate when he purchased it and still does in period 1 (P0, P1 ≤
P2), the optimal liquidation policy according to (2.1) suggests to choose
W realH if P0 ≤ P1 and W realR otherwise, i.e. defer gains (as long as possible)
and realize losses (immediately).
As shown in Section 1.1.2, the same result is derived by Constantinides
(1983) from a similar situation (see Theorem 1.1), but where firstly the as-
set is risky, secondly there is an alternative investment opportunity, which
thirdly is taxed upon accrual, i.e. different taxation methods coexist.1 The
above analysis shows that the result hinges on neither of those additional
assumptions.2
However, following Auerbach (1991) and additionally assuming the ex-
istence of an alternative investment opportunity, Section 1.1.3 proves that
the investor finds it optimal to keep hold of an asset with accrued capi-
tal gains instead of selling it and buying the alternative one even for some
(expected) pre-tax rates of return smaller than the alternative pre-tax rate.
This indicates that besides the distortion of the optimal liquidation policy
a realization-based tax possibly leads to inefficient portfolio selection and a
distortion of the investment decision.
Usually both distorting effects arising from taxing capital gains upon re-
alization are summarized and labelled the lock-in effect. Nevertheless for an-
alytical purposes it is worth while distinguishing between one and the other:
1The assumption of a riskless, tax exempt bond by Constantinides (1983) is equivalent
to the assumption of a riskless bond taxed upon accrual, which yields the same after tax
rate.
2However, the above analysis requires the assumption that the investor expects the
asset to appreciate (P0, P1 ≤ P2), which is not necessary for the result in Constantinides
(1983) to hold (see Section 1.1.2).
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The effect on the optimal liquidation policy is always present and referred to
as primary lock-in effect for the remainder of this chapter. The effect on the
investment decision arises only in the presence of alternative investment op-
portunities and is referred to as secondary lock-in effect. Note again that the
assumptions of uncertainty and the coexistence of different taxation methods
are not necessary for those effects to occur. Hence the analysis stated below
surrenders these assumptions in order to isolate the lock-in effect from possi-
bly additional effects due to risk3 and the concomitance of different taxation
methods. Moreover, to begin with, only the impact of the primary lock-in
effect is investigated.
Considering the distortions caused by the lock-in effect, there is a natural
question arising: Does taxation of capital gains upon realization do harm
creating a welfare loss? Put differently: Is social welfare smaller under a
realization tax than under an accrual tax? The answer usually given in the
economic literature is yes4, but the reasoning is rather based on heuristic
considerations than proper analysis in a formal model (e.g. Kovenock and
Rothschild (1987)). The present paper tries to fill the gap and examines the
question more closely.
Of course a welfare analysis within the framework used in the above
example, where asset prices are exogenously given, is not very fruitful as
it neglects the impact a specific method of capital gains taxation has on
asset prices. To take this price effect into account but still keep the analysis
tractable, a simple general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with
heterogeneous agents is investigated. It is shown that in the presence of
accrued capital gains asset prices are higher under a realization tax than
under an accrual system. Since the realization system creates incentives
to defer accrued gains to later periods, actual total demand for the asset
and thus its price increase. However, the impact the method of taxation
has on welfare is ambiguous: Due to distributional effects, total welfare is
not necessarily smaller under a realization system than under an accrual
one. While a realization system discriminates agents without accrued capital
gains, it is in favor of individuals holding assets with such gains.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 offers
a short review of the related literature. Section 2.3 specifies the model by
introducing some basic and technical assumptions and establishes the con-
sumer’s problem of utility maximization under different regimes of capital
gains taxation. The analysis shows that comparative statics results within
3For the relation between risk taking and capital gains taxation see e.g. Sandmo (1985).
4This positive answer is the implicit motivation for the proposed tax schemes surveyed
in Chapter 1.
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the existing literature often are due to special assumptions, mostly with re-
spect to the consumers’ utilities. The details of this analysis are provided in
the Appendix 2.6. In Section 2.4 the impact of the method of taxation on as-
set prices and welfare is analyzed by comparing an accrual based system with
a realization tax. The results are illustrated in Appendix 2.7 by the example
of quasi-linear logarithmic preferences within a slightly extended version of
the model. Section 2.5 concludes discussing some possible extensions of the
model.
2.2 Review of the literature
While the papers discussed in Chapter 1 ask how a realization based tax
system should look like to circumvent the distortions raised by the lock-in
effect, there is another branch of the literature on capital gains taxation that
puts a different question: How will portfolio selection and asset prices be
affected if capital gains are taxed upon realization?
As in Auerbach (1991) the impact on portfolio selection can be analyzed
within a partial equilibrium framework, where (expected) asset prices or,
equivalently, (expected) pre-tax rates of return are exogenously given. Bal-
cer and Judd (1987) show that the method of capital gains taxation as well
as investor’s individual horizons for saving will affect optimal portfolio com-
position. Similarly, in a simulation model, Dammon et al. (2001) show that
the optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio decision is a function of the
investor’s age, initial portfolio holdings, and tax basis. Kovenock and Roth-
schild (1987) compute the effective tax rates under a realization system and
compare the net returns of different portfolio strategies. However, if one
wants to take price effects into account, a general equilibrium model has to
be engaged.
As pointed out, for example by Lang and Shackelford (2000), whenever
investigating price effects of capital gains taxation one has to be aware of an
impact that arises independently from the method of taxation, be it accrual
or realization based: A higher tax rate lowers the after-tax return of an asset
which in turn results in a lower demand for the assets and hence, given a fixed
supply, a lower asset price. This so-called capitalization effect is opposed to
the lock-in effect that occurs only under a realization based system: A higher
tax rate induces bigger incentives to postpone the realization of accrued
capital gains resulting in higher demand for those assets and hence, given
a fixed supply, higher asset prices. The intuition behind the capitalization
effect can also be stated as follows: The owner of an asset with accrued
capital gains will sell it only if he is compensated for the tax advantage he
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foregoes by selling it. Thus prices must rise. Empirical studies mostly show
the dominance of the capitalization effect (e.g. Lang and Shackelford (2000),
Rendleman and Shackelford (2003)), but also evidence for the lock-in effect
can be found (e.g. Landsman and Shackelford (1995)).
There is a broad literature modelling the capitalization effect in different
settings under the assumption of an accrual tax.5 In contrast, so far only
few articles exist that explicitly account for the fact that capital gains are
usually taxed upon realization, and hence are able to incorporate the lock-in
effect.
Constantinides (1983) develops a capital asset pricing model under the
assumptions of a realization tax and perfect capital markets. However, us-
ing short-selling strategies, in his model investors are able to separate their
liquidation decision from their consumption and saving decision and thus to
defer tax payments until so-called ‘events of forced liquidation’ (e.g. death).
Consequently, the lock-in effect is capitalized in the asset prices only to the
extend such events occur.
Stiglitz (1983) shows that under realistic assumptions, by applying so-
phisticated trading strategies investors on perfect capital markets can avoid
not only the payment of realization based capital gains taxes but all income
taxes. This provides an indication and Poterba (1987) supports empirical ev-
idence that the assumptions of perfect capital markets, especially the one of
unlimited short-selling, are not sustainable if one wants to describe a reality
in which investors pay a considerable amount of capital gains taxes.
Klein (1999) engages a general equilibrium model to study the impact
of capital gains taxation on asset prices and portfolio selection under the
assumptions of imperfect capital markets where short-selling is not allowed.
In a multi period setting, finitely many individuals maximize their utility
from consumption by periodically deciding on how much to consume and
save given their initial endowments. The investment opportunities are ex-
ogenously given and consist in a riskless asset taxed upon accrual and finitely
many risky assets taxed upon realization. His findings can be summarized as
follows: The pre-tax returns for assets with accrued capital gains are smaller,
i.e. their prices are higher, than for assets without accrued gains. The lock-in
effect is capitalized in asset prices and might overcompensate for the capi-
talization effect. Put differently, asset prices may increase by higher taxes.
Moreover, the optimal portfolio selection depends not only on one’s own
amount of accrued capital gains and saving horizon but also on the amounts
of accrued capital gains and the saving horizons of all other investors.
The complexity of Klein’s framework makes it very hard if not impossible
5e.g. Auerbach (1979), Gordon and Bradford (1980), Collins and Kemsley (2000)
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to use it for a welfare analysis. His model is rich in the sense that it does
not only account for the pure effects of capital gains taxation,6 but also for
possibly additional effects arising from uncertainty and the coexistence of
different taxation methods. The idea of the analysis presented below is to
simplify the model in order to separate the different effects from each other.
The aim is to remain in the position to analyze the impact the method of
capital gains taxation has on asset prices but in addition to get into a position
that allows to undertake a welfare analysis. The model described in the fol-
lowing sections accomplishes that by renouncing risk and the coexistence of
different tax systems. To begin with, only the impact of the primary lock-in
effect will be analyzed, i.e. there is a single saving opportunity. Furthermore,
as compared to the framework of Klein (1999), the model uses stronger as-
sumptions concerning the initial endowments of the agents, whereas it gets
by with much weaker assumptions on consumers’ preferences.
2.3 A simple general equilibrium model
In this section, the model outlined above is developed more formally and used
to derive some comparative statistics results for different regimes of capital
gains taxation.
2.3.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a two period (t ∈ {1, 2}) exchange economy with two agents (i ∈
{1, 2}), who are price takers and trade only at equilibrium prices. Given their
initial endowments, they maximize their utility U i(ci1, c
i
2) from private con-
sumption in period 1, ci1, and 2, c
i
2, deciding on how much to save in period
1. To guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium,7 assume the pref-
erences to be continuous, strictly convex, strongly monotone, and, moreover,
such that consumption in period t is a normal commodity, as it is common
for large aggregates.8 For analytical convenience, assume that preferences
can be expressed by twice continuously differentiable utility functions
U i : (R+0 )
2 → R such that ∂
2U i
∂cit
2 < 0 <
∂U i
∂cit
.
For the time being and the reasons mentioned above let there be a single
saving opportunity: one arbitrarily divisible share of an asset with basis
6i.e. the capitalization effect and the (primary and secondary) lock-in effect
7See e.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Section 17.C.
8See e.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Section 2.E.
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P0 and safe payout P2 in period 2. The asset can be interpreted as a real
investment in the following way: At some prior time9 the amount of P0
consumption goods has been invested in a project that has a safe payout of
P2 consumption goods in period 2 but cannot be liquidated before (in period
1). The analysis aims at finding the asset price P1, i.e. the price a share of
this investment is traded at in period 1.
2.3.2 Specific assumptions
The most general framework would allow for arbitrary amounts of consump-
tion goods in both periods and an arbitrary division of the share in period 1
as the consumer’s initial endowments. However, such a setting would create
the problem of identifying the seller and the buyer of the asset respectively.
As in Klein (1999) one had to separately look at the cases where consumer 1
is either the buyer or the seller or no trade takes place. To avoid this problem
the following assumption is made:
Assumption 2.1 At the beginning of period 1, consumer 1 holds one unit
of the asset purchased in period 0 with basis P0 ≤ P2 but no other wealth,
whereas consumer 2 has initial wealth W in consumption goods but no shares.
Besides the payout of the asset, none of them has any additional income in
period 2.
Therefore, at any equilibrium consumer 1 sells shares to consume in period
1 and consumer 2 buys them to consume in period 2.10 Admittedly this
situation is not the only possible scenario but an economically interesting
and relevant one: If one aims at analyzing distributional effects of the taxa-
tion method, one has to introduce some source of heterogeneity between the
agents. And the easiest way to do so is by different initial endowments. In
this model, there is heterogeneity between the individuals with respect to
their initial share ownership in a way that fits pretty well the situation at
the housing market in the UK.11 In Great Britain a relatively huge amount
of total wealth is held in the form of housing equity (see e.g. Banks et al.
(2002)). Accordingly, like in Assumption 2.1, on the one hand there is the
group of house owners endowed with a considerable amount of that asset
9For the analysis of the accrual tax regime it is convenient to assume that this time
lies in period 0 in order to guarantee that no capital gains taxes have been paid for the
asset until period 1.
10In particular, by Assumption 2.1, short-selling does never take place. Hence, the
assumption of no short-selling is not necessary but, of course, additionally could be made
like in Klein (1999) or Dammon et al. (2001).
11I would like to thank Frank Cowell from LSE for pointing out this example to me.
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and, on the other hand, a group of people without housing wealth. Capital
gains on that market have a striking influence on wealth distribution and
consumption in the UK (see e.g. Henley (1998), Disney et al. (2003)), which
explains the vivid discussion about how to tax them.
Under Assumption 2.2, the agents’ different initial endowments imply
heterogeneity with respect to their accrued capital gains as well.
Assumption 2.2 In equilibrium the asset price P1 in period 1 satisfies
P0 ≤ P1 ≤ P2.
Again, this assumption is primarily made to abbreviate the analysis and
avoid case differentiation. But now it is not an assumption on the input
but the outcome of the model and thus seems to be quite strong at a first
glance. Three different arguments can be made in order to defend it: First
of all, it can be shown that for any given utility functions with the above
properties there are values for the parameters P0, P2 and W such that an
equilibrium with P0 ≤ P1 ≤ P2 exists, i.e. the analysis does not refer to the
empty set. Secondly, there is no risk in the model and thus a constellation
at which the asset is appreciating over time seems to be most plausible to
look at. Finally, if one wants to study the influence of accrued capital gains,
the relevant situations are those in which at least P0 ≤ P1.
2.3.3 The problem under different tax regimes
In period 1 the asset is traded. Let Si be the fraction of the asset consumer i
possesses after trade has taken place. The market clearing condition requires
S1 + S2 = 1. (2.2)
Capital gains are taxed at the constant rate 0 ≤ τ < 1 in each period after
trade or rather payout and before consumption have taken place. Now the
consumer’s problem can be stated and analyzed under different tax regimes.
To highlight some basic equilibrium properties first look at
The problem without taxation.
By the choice of Si ∈ [0, 1] consumer i maximizes U i(ci1, ci2) such that the
budget constraints
c11 = (1− S1)P1
c12 = S
1P2 (2.3)
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and
c21 = W − S2P1
c22 = S
2P2 (2.4)
respectively hold. From the first order conditions
∂U i/∂ci1
∂U i/∂ci2
=
P2
P1
(2.5)
price dependent demand functions Si(P1) for the asset can be derived, and the
market clearing condition (2.2) delivers an equilibrium price P ∗1 . Applying
the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions yields the following
comparative statics results:12
dS1
dP1
≥
<
0,
dS2
dP1
< 0. (2.6)
An increasing asset price P1 makes consumption in period 1 relatively cheap-
er, i.e. has a negative substitution effect on consumption in period 2 and
hence decreases savings Si for both consumers. While the income effect
is also negative for agent 2, it is positive for agent 1. Therefore the asset
demand of consumer 2 is decreasing in the asset price, whereas the effect is
not clear cut for consumer 1.
Under the assumptions made, there is – as mentioned above – always an
equilibrium price but it is not necessarily unique. However, as illustrated by
figure 2.1, in the case of multiple equilibria for almost every combination of
values P0, P2 and W a locally isolated equilibrium price P
∗
1 exists such that
aggregated asset demand is decreasing in P1, i.e.
13
d(S1 + S2)
dP1
< 0 . (2.7)
The following analysis refers always to this type of equilibrium.
The problem with taxation upon accrual
Under an accrual tax the consumer’s budget constraints are given by
c11 = (1− S1)P1 − τ(P1 − P0)
c12 = S
1[P2 − τ(P2 − P1)] (2.8)
12The formal analysis is presented in Appendix 2.6.1.
13See e.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Section 17.D.
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Figure 2.1: Multiple equilibria
and
c21 = W − S2P1
c22 = S
2[P2 − τ(P2 − P1)] (2.9)
respectively. Note that the taxable base of consumer 1 in period 1 is not only
the realized part but his entire capital gain. The first order conditions for a
maximum become
∂U i/∂ci1
∂U i/∂ci2
=
P2 − τ(P2 − P1)
P1
. (2.10)
Now the consumers’ asset demand depends not only on the price P1 but also
on the tax rate τ . Additionally, consumer 1’s consumption and hence asset
demand responds to changes in accrued capital gains, i.e. changes in the basis
P0. Consequently, in general one has S
1 = S1(P1, τ, P0) and S
2 = S2(P1, τ)
respectively and hence the equilibrium price P ∗1 = P
∗
1 (τ, P0) is also a function
of tax rate and accrued capital gains.
With the same reasoning as before, the comparative statics results of ex-
pression (2.6) hold in the presence of an accrual tax.14 Investigating changes
14The formal analysis is presented in Appendix 2.6.2.
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in the tax rate one gets a somewhat surprising result:
dS1
dτ
≥
<
0,
dS2
dτ
≥
<
0 and thus
dP ∗1
dτ
≥
<
0. (2.11)
Because income and substitution effect work in opposite directions with re-
spect to consumption in period 1, in the absence of additional assumptions,
a change in the tax rate has no clear-cut effect on the consumers’ saving
decision and hence the price effect is ambiguous as well. This is often over-
looked by the literature describing the depressing nature of the capitalization
effect15: Even under an accrual system an increasing tax rate does not nec-
essarily result in decreasing asset prices.
Moreover, in the existing literature, the amount of capital gains is often
thought to be neutral under an accrual tax in the sense that it does not affect
the saving and investment decision.16 However, this is not true if taxes are
collected only periodically like in the model presented here. To see this first
note that consumer 2’s problem and thus asset demand are not altered by
a change in the accrued capital gain of consumer 1, i.e. by a change in P0.
In contrast, a lower accrued gain, i.e. higher P0, has a pure income effect
increasing consumer 1’s consumption in both periods. Since his period 2
consumption does not depend directly on P0 it can only be augmented by
saving more, i.e.17
dS1
dP0
≥ 0. (2.12)
Applying the implicit function theorem on the market clearing condition
(2.2), and employing inequalities (2.7) and (2.12) yield the following result:
dP ∗1
dP0
= −
∂S1
∂P0
∂(S1+S2)
∂P1
≥ 0. (2.13)
Put differently, as a reaction to higher accrued gains total asset demand and
hence the equilibrium price may decrease. This means, in particular, that in
the presence of capital gains taxes asset prices do not only depend on future
(expected) payoffs but possibly also on past prices, even if the tax is levied
upon accrual.
The problem with taxation upon realization
While consumer 2’s budget constraints (2.9) and first order condition (2.10)
do not alter under a realization system, consumer 1 now pays taxes in period
15See e.g. Lang and Shackelford (2000).
16See e.g. Auerbach (1991).
17The formal analysis is presented in Appendix 2.6.2.
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1 only for the realized part of his capital gains and, hence, faces the following
constraints
c11 = (1− S1)[P1 − τ(P1 − P0)]
c12 = S
1[P2 − τ(P2 − P0)] (2.14)
resulting in the first order condition
∂U1/∂c11
∂U1/∂c12
=
P2 − τ(P2 − P0)
P1 − τ(P1 − P0) . (2.15)
As a consequence, if there is heterogeneity among the agents with respect to
their accrued capital gains, i.e. if P0 < P1, consumers do no longer face the
same relative prices for consumption in period 1 and 2 respectively.18 Put
differently: Whereas under an accrual tax, the marginal rates of substitution
for consumer 1 and 2 coincide, they differ under a realization tax. Hence,
the resulting equilibrium allocation under taxation upon realization cannot
be Pareto efficient. This result may be seen as a formal justification for
the branch of literature surveyed in Chapter 1, that tries to find a way
of circumventing the lock-in effect by simulating an accrual system on a
realization basis. However, as Proposition 2.2 will show, the result does not
imply that the equilibrium allocation resulting from an accrual tax Pareto
dominates the equilibrium allocation under a realization tax.
Comparative statics show that relations (2.6) and (2.11) still hold under
a realization tax.19 This means in particular that, as in the model of Klein
(1999), an increasing tax rate may possibly lead to higher asset prices.
However, the prediction of Klein (1999) that the pre-tax returns for assets
with accrued capital gains are smaller, i.e. their prices are higher, than for
assets without such accrued gains cannot be verified in this setting. Yet, in
contrast to the case of an accrual system20, under a realization tax higher
accrued capital gains can possibly increase asset prices as the following com-
parative statics show:21
dS1
dP0
≥
<
0 (2.16)
and hence
dP 1
dP0
= −
∂S1
∂P0
∂(S1+S2)
∂P1
≥
<
0 .
18For P0 = P1 the FOC’s (2.10) and (2.15) coincide. For P0 < P1, by inequality (2.1)
consumption in period 2 is relatively cheaper for consumer 1 than 2.
19The formal analysis is presented in Appendix 2.6.3.
20Remember inequality (2.13).
21The formal analysis is presented in Appendix 2.6.3.
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The intuition behind this result is as follows: Now, a smaller accrued gain,
i.e. higher P0, does not only result in a positive income effect on consumption
in both periods but also in a substitution effect such that consumption in
period 2 becomes more expensive. Thus the overall effect on consumption in
period 2 and hence on saving is ambiguous.
Comparative statics results
The results derived so far can be summarized in the following way: In general
the optimal saving decision of an investor depends on his accrued capital gain,
even under an accrual tax. Under an accrual tax P1 is increasing in P0, i.e. the
higher the accrued capital gain the lower the asset price. Under a realization
tax, in general the impact of a change in P0 on P1 is ambiguous, i.e. the
effect possibly can but does not necessarily have to be reverted. Moreover,
the influence of a change in the tax rate on asset prices is not clear cut either,
not even under an accrual system. In contrast to that somehow unsatisfactory
ambiguity with respect to the tax rate as an instrument of public policy, the
next section will show, that comparing the impact of taxation methods on
asset prices leads to clear cut results.
2.4 Price and welfare effects
In this section the impact the method of capital gains taxation has on asset
prices and welfare is investigated. To this end, the equilibrium allocation un-
der an accrual based taxation system is compared to the equilibrium outcome
under a realization based one.
2.4.1 The impact on asset prices
To carry out a welfare analysis, first one has to learn how equilibrium prices
are affected by a certain method of taxation.
Proposition 2.1 (Price effect) Given a fixed tax rate 0 < τ < 1, in the
presence of accrued capital gains (P0 < P1) the equilibrium asset price P
∗
1 is
higher under a realization tax than under an accrual system.
The result is intuitive: Compared to accrual taxation, the realization system
creates an incentive for agent 1 to defer part of his accrued gains till period
2 in order to save taxes, while consumer 2 is not affected by the method of
taxation. Thus total demand for the asset and hence its price are higher;
more formally:
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Proof. Consumer 2’s problem and hence asset demand S2(P1) are the same
under both taxation methods.22 As for any given P0 < P1 ≤ P2 inequality
(2.1) ensures
P1 − τ(P1 − P0)
P1
[P2 − τ(P2 − P1)] ≤ P2 − τ(P2 − P0),
consumer 1’s problem under a realization tax differs from the one under
an accrual tax in two ways: As one can see from the intertemporal budget
constraints resulting from (2.8) and (2.14) respectively,
c1 acc2 =
P2 − τ(P2 − P1)
P1
[P1 − τ(P1 − P0)]− P2 − τ(P2 − P1)
P1
c1 acc1 and
c
1 real
2 = P2 − τ(P2 − P0)−
P2 − τ(P2 − P0)
P1 − τ(P1 − P0) c
1 real
1 ,
first his budget set is larger. Secondly consumption in period 2 is relatively
cheaper. Since consumption in period 2 is a normal commodity, both income
and substitution effect are positive with respect to period 2 consumption of
consumer 1, and hence c
1 real
2 > c
1 acc
2 . The situation is illustrated in figure
2.2. However, this is only possible by higher savings, because for any given
S1 and P0 < P1 ≤ P2 by the constraints (2.8) and (2.14)
c1 acc2 = S
1[P2 − τ(P2 − P1)] > S1[P2 − τ(P2 − P0)] = c1 real2
holds, i.e. ceteris paribus consumer 1’s consumption in period 2 is higher
under an accrual than a realization system. Therefore consumer 1’s demand
S1(P1) and thus total demand for the asset are higher under a realization
tax. By inequality (2.7), that results in a higher equilibrium price P ∗1 .
2
2.4.2 The impact on welfare
In order to investigate welfare effects in a framework with taxes, generally
one has to take into account how tax revenues are spent in the public sector.
As stated by the following Lemma, in the present setting this problem fortu-
nately can be neglected: Assuming that the government does not discount,23
22This observation, of course, is due to the special structure of the model, where con-
sumer 2 holds the asset for exactly one period and, hence, the methods of taxation are
equivalent.
23This could be modelled explicitly by assuming that, for example, the government had
to finance a public good in period 2 but no access to the capital market.
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Figure 2.2: Consumer 1’s problems
total tax revenue and hence expenditures are not affected by the method of
taxation.
Lemma 2.1 Given a fixed tax rate 0 < τ < 1 and no intertemporal discount-
ing by the public authorities (ρ = 0), the present value of total tax revenue
is the same under an accrual based tax system and a realization based one
respectively.
Proof. Compare the present value of total tax revenue under an accrual
system Tacc and a realization one Treal respectively:
Tacc = τ(P1 − P0) +
1
1 + ρ
[
τS1(P2 − P1) + τ(1− S1)(P2 − P1)
]
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ρ=0
= τ(P2 − P0) ,
T
real
= τ(1− S1)(P1 − P0) + 1
1 + ρ
[
τS1(P2 − P0) + τ(1− S1)(P2 − P1)
]
ρ=0
= τ(P2 − P0) .
2
Note in particular that under neither system the revenue depends on the
asset price P1 in period 1. By means of Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.1 it is
possible to prove the following statement concerning total welfare.
Proposition 2.2 (Welfare effect) Given a fixed tax rate 0 < τ < 1 and
no intertemporal discounting by the authorities (ρ = 0),24 the equilibrium
allocation under neither of both taxation methods Pareto dominates the other.
In the presence of accrued capital gains (P0 < P1) consumer 1’s utility is
higher and consumer 2’s utility is lower under a realization tax than under
an accrual system.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, total tax revenue and thus expenditure is equal under
each of both methods. Put differently, there is no effect on utilities caused by
different public spending. As seen in the proof of Proposition 2.1 the method
of taxation has no direct effect on the problem of consumer 2 whereas the
budget set and hence utility of consumer 1 is larger under a realization tax
than an accrual one. Additionally, by Proposition 2.1 the equilibrium price
P1 is higher under a realization tax, which has, compared to the situation
under an accrual tax, two opposed effects: On the one hand, this further
relaxes the budget constraint (2.14) of consumer 1 and thus increases his
budget set and, hence, utility. On the other hand, this tightens the budget
constraint (2.9) of consumer 2 and thus decreases his budget set and utility.
2
As has been pointed out in Section 2.3, the equilibrium allocation under a
realization tax cannot be Pareto efficient, while the one under an accrual tax
may be. However, Proposition 2.2 shows that the Pareto welfare criteria are
not able to give a political device on the preferability of one taxation method
or the other.
24Using the continuity of the relevant functions, one easily verifies that Proposition 2.2
will still hold for sufficiently small discount rates ρ > 0 if the tax rate is adopted to the
corresponding method of taxation in a way such that total tax revenue remains unchanged.
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In the light of the large literature on how to avoid the lock-in effect of
capital gains taxation upon realization surveyed in Chapter 1, the above re-
sult is somewhat surprising. However, there are some authors, like Kovenock
and Rothschild (1987), who doubt there is a strong negative welfare effect
arising from a realization tax. The analysis presented here may be seen as a
further justification for this point of view.
2.4.3 Distributional aspects
In view of Proposition 2.2, without further assumptions efficiency does not
provide a fully convincing justification for an accrual tax on normative
grounds. If the policy space is restricted to the choice of the taxation method,
the Pareto welfare criterion is not able to answer the question whether a re-
alization or accrual tax should be established. To decide on the method
of taxation, a weaker concept of social welfare has to be employed, which
involves the aggregation of individual utilities. Note that any such utility
aggregation, for example by a social welfare function, implicitly incorporates
an interpersonal comparison, i.e. a certain ideal of how utility should be dis-
tributed within the economy. The example provided in the Appendix 2.7
shows that the optimal method of taxation depends on the social welfare
function employed. Hence, in the political process, the distributional norm
is decisive for the method of taxation.
For example, if the norm is fairness, the above result may give a hint
on how this decision might look like: As demonstrated in Proposition 2.2,
compared to an accrual based tax system, a realization based one discrimi-
nates consumer 2 while it favors consumer 1, i.e. it is in favor of agents with
relatively large accrued capital gains. It should be easy to find empirical
evidence for the claim that such gains occur more often among ‘wealthy’
individuals than ‘poor’ as well as more often among ‘elderly’ people than
‘young’. Given these presumptions, a realization based tax system in which
the lock-in effect is present has to be refused if the political aim is to ‘close
the gap’ and ‘reduce the burden of future generations’ respectively.
2.4.4 Concerns of optimal taxation
From the viewpoint of optimal taxation the analysis presented so far investi-
gates the question, whether taxation upon accrual or realization is preferable
for a given tax rate τ . In the light of lemma 2.1, this is equivalent to the
assumption of an exogenous revenue requirement. As discussed above, the
answer depends upon the welfare criterion used by the planner.
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Alternatively, one may ask the following question: What is the optimal
tax rate τM given a certain method of taxation M? And more specific: Do
the optimal tax rates under accrual and realization taxation coincide or differ
(systematically)?
The problem can be studied within a slight extension of the above frame-
work, in which the planner uses the tax revenues to provide a public good at
the end of period 2. Although the revenue for a given tax rate τ is identical
under both taxation methods, as shown in Lemma 2.1, one easily verifies
the following result, that is illustrated in the example provided in Appendix
2.7: In general, the optimal tax rates under accrual and realization taxation
differ, but not systematically (e.g. always τ ∗acc ≤ τ ∗real). This result is due
to the fact that the method of taxation alters the distribution of utilities in
the economy as stated in Proposition 2.2. According to his welfare criterion
the planner may want to correct for this change by adjusting the amount of
public good provided and hence may set different tax rates. Consequently,
from the viewpoint of optimal taxation, a change in the method of taxation
usually requires an adjustment of the corresponding tax rate. This point
should not be overlooked in the ongoing discussions about reforms of capital
gains taxation.
2.5 Extensions and concluding remarks
This chapter has investigated the effects of accrual and realization based
taxation of capital gains within a simple general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous agents. It has been shown that in the presence of accrued
capital gains equilibrium asset prices are higher under a realization tax than
under an accrual tax. However, due to distributional effects, the impact of the
taxation method on welfare is ambiguous, though taxation upon realization
cannot be Pareto efficient.
The analysis can be extended in various directions. So far, only the dis-
tortion of the liquidation decision is incorporated but not the distortion of
the portfolio choice. To take this secondary lock-in effect into account one
should look at a situation with alternative saving opportunities and where
both taxation methods coexist. Within such a setting, instead of just com-
paring the two taxation methods, the homogenization of a hybrid system
towards either a pure accrual or realization tax should be studied, something
that is definitely closer to what can be observed in reality.
It would also be more realistic to allow for arbitrary initial endowments.
Nevertheless, to investigate the interesting cases with different amounts of
accrued capital gains among consumers, one has to introduce some source of
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heterogeneity between the agents. And the easiest way to do so is by assum-
ing different initial endowments. The consideration of multiple consumers
does not seem very promising either, as it would considerably complicate the
analysis while presumably change the results only slightly if at all.
The relation between uncertainty and the taxation of capital gains is
mostly studied under an accrual tax system and the results depend upon
how tax revenues are spent in the corresponding model.25 Kovenock and
Rothschild (1987) explicitly assume a realization tax and show that due to
the lock-in effect the effective tax rate is higher in the presence of risk. It
would be interesting to carry forward their analysis within the framework
presented here.
One of the most promising extensions and a step towards reality certainly
would be to look at a model with endogenous production, i.e. endogenous
asset supply.26 As long as production is exogenously given, the lock-in effect
is at most able to distort the decisions on liquidation and portfolio selection
but not on real investment. Hence the welfare analysis presented in this
paper can at best provide some hints, how a more complete picture might
look like and has to be subjected to further research.
2.6 Appendix: Comparative statics
The subsequent analysis makes intensive use of the fact that, due to the
normality assumption, for an interior solution to consumer i’s problem of
utility maximization the following inequalities hold:
∂2U i
∂ci1
2 −
(
∂U i/∂ci1
∂U i/∂ci2
)
∂2U i
∂ci2∂c
i
1
< 0,
(2.17)
∂2U i
∂ci1∂c
i
2
−
(
∂U i/∂ci1
∂U i/∂ci2
)
∂2U i
∂ci2
2 > 0.
This can be seen by applying the implicit function theorem on consumer i’s
first order condition for a maximum and using the property, that his second
order condition for a maximum is fulfilled at an interior solution, as well as
taking into account, that consumption is assumed to be a normal commodity
in both periods.
25See Sandmo (1985) for a survey of this topic and, for example, Konrad (1991) or
Christiansen (1995) for some later general equilibrium results.
26For the framework presented here, this would require to explicitly model the decision
on how much to invest in period 0, i.e. to ‘endogenize’ the ‘price’ P0.
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2.6.1 The case of no taxation
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions (2.5)
yields for i ∈ {1, 2}
dSi
dP1
= −
P2
P1
2 +
∂

∂Ui/∂ci
1
∂Ui/∂ci
2

∂P1
∂

∂Ui/∂ci
1
∂U1/∂ci
2

∂Si
. (2.18)
Using the quotient rule and inequalities (2.17) as well as taking the budget
constraints (2.3) and (2.4) respectively into account, one can determine the
sign of the following terms
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and hence the sign of the expressions in (2.18) as stated in (2.6).
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2.6.2 The case of accrual taxation
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions (2.10)
yields for i ∈ {1, 2}
dSi
dP1
= −
P2(1−τ)
P1
2 +
∂

∂Ui/∂ci
1
∂Ui/∂ci
2

∂P1
∂

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, (2.19)
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1
∂U1/∂c1
2

∂S1
. (2.21)
Using the budget constraints (2.8) and (2.9) respectively, one can determine
the sign of the following terms
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(
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2
)
∂Si
=
(
∂2U i
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)
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(
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+ ∂
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)
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=
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[
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2
)
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2
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]
+
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2
dSi
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1
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2
−
(
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1
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2
)
∂2U i
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2
2
]
∂U i/∂ci2
> 0 ,
∂
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∂U1/∂c1
1
∂U1/∂c1
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)
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=
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∂c1
1
2
dc1
1
dP1
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2
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)
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and hence the sign of the expressions in (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21) as stated
in (2.6), (2.11), and (2.12) respectively.
2.6.3 The case of realization taxation
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order condition (2.15) for
consumer 1 and (2.10) for consumer 2 respectively yields
dS1
dP1
= −
(1− τ) P2−τ(P2−P0)
(P1−τ(P1−P0))2
+
∂

∂U1/∂c1
1
∂U1/∂c1
2

∂P1
∂

∂U1/∂c1
1
∂U1/∂c1
2

∂S1
, (2.22)
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= −
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Using the budget constraints (2.14) and (2.9) respectively, one can determine
the sign of the following terms
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and hence the sign of the expressions in (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), and
(2.26) as stated in (2.6), (2.11), and (2.16) respectively.
2.7 Appendix: An example with quasi-linear
logarithmic preferences
The considerations concerning optimal taxation briefly discussed in Section
2.4.4 are illustrated by an example using quasi-linear logarithmic preferences.
To this end, consider a slight extension of the model presented above: A
social planner spends the tax revenues to provide a certain amount g of a
public good at the end of period 2, which enters the utility function of the
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consumers:
U i(ci1, c
i
2, g) = ln(c
i
1) + ln(c
i
2) + θg.
The taste parameter θ expresses the valuation of the public good. By Lemma
2.1, g = τ(P2 − P0) under both methods of taxation.
2.7.1 Individual utility maximization
The consumers take the tax rate τ and hence the amount g as given and
maximize their utilities U i(ci1, c
i
2, g) deciding on their savings S
i in period
1. The relevant budget constraints for consumer 1 are described by (2.8)
under accrual taxation and by (2.14) under realization taxation, whereas for
consumer 2 they look the same under both methods of taxation and are given
by (2.9). From the first order conditions for the consumers’ utility maxima
one can compute their optimal savings for a given asset price in period 1,
Si(P1). Under an accrual tax, consumer 1’s asset demand equals
S1acc =
1
2
P1 − τ(P1 − P0)
P1
,
under a realization tax it is given by
S1
real
=
1
2
.
Consumer 2’s asset demand is the same under both methods of taxation:
S2 =
1
2
W
P1
.
For assumption 2.2 to hold, it is sufficient to assume that the parameters of
the model fulfil the following inequality:
P0 < W < P2.
Making use of the market clearing condition (2.2), the equilibrium asset
price is then computed to be, in fact, higher under realization than accrual
taxation, as stated in Proposition 2.1:
P ∗1 acc =
W + τP0
1 + τ
< W = P ∗1 real .
Substituting these prices into the corresponding asset demand functions and
budget constraints one derives the equilibrium values for savings and con-
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sumption. For consumer 1, this yields
S1
∗
acc =
1
2
W+τ(2P0−W )
W+τP0
≤ 1
2
= S1
∗
real,
c11
∗
acc =
1
2
W − τ
1+τ
(W − P0)
≤ 1
2
W − τ
2
(W − P0) = c11∗real,
c12
∗
acc =
1
2
(1− τ)P2W+τP0−τ(W−P0)W+τP0 + 12τ
W+τ(2P0−W )
1+τ
,
1
2
(1− τ)P2 + 12τP0 = c12
∗
real,
and for consumer 2,
S2
∗
acc =
1
2
W+τW
W+τP0
≥ 1
2
= S2
∗
real,
c21
∗
acc =
1
2
W = c21
∗
real,
c22
∗
acc =
1
2
(1− τ)P2W+τWW+τP0 + 12τW
≥ 1
2
(1− τ)P2 + 12τW = c22
∗
real.
Using those results one observes that for the consumers’ equilibrium utility
levels
U2
∗
acc ≥ U2∗real,
(2.27)
U1
∗
acc ≤ U1∗real,
hold as stated in Proposition 2.2. For consumer 2 this is obvious from his
respective equilibrium consumption levels, for consumer 1 one can verify it
by comparing the products c11 accc
1
2 acc and c
1
1 real
c12 real respectively; note that
U i(ci1, c
i
2, g) = ln(c
i
1c
i
2) + θg.
Moreover, for t ∈ {1, 2} and M ∈ {acc, real} the consumers’ equilibrium
consumption levels satisfy c2tM ≥ c1tM in this example. Hence, in equilibrium
the utility level of consumer 2 is at least as high as that of consumer 1 under
either method of taxation:
U2
∗
M ≥ U1∗M . (2.28)
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2.7.2 Socially optimal method of taxation
Of course, consumer i’s equilibrium utility level does depend not only on the
method of taxation M ∈ {acc, real} but also on the tax rate τ ∈]0, 1[. His
indirect utility is henceforth denoted by U iM
∗
(τ). Now consider the problem
of a social planner who maximizes social welfare by a choice in his two-
dimensional policy space, i.e. deciding on the method of taxation and the
tax rate. For the sake of concreteness, assume a weighted utilitarian type of
(indirect) social welfare function V with
V (M, τ) = αU1
∗
M(τ) + (1− α)U2∗M(τ), (2.29)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The socially optimal policy can be found by computing
the optimal tax rates under either method of taxation τ ∗M and choosing the
method of taxation that yields the highest level of welfare resulting from
taxation at the corresponding optimal rate: M∗ ∈ argmaxM(V (M, τ ∗M)).
However, corresponding to the discussion in Section 2.4.3, first look at
a situation in which the planner faces an exogenous revenue requirement,
i.e. he has to provide a fixed amount g of the public good, and therefore
sticks to the tax rate τ with g = τ(P2 − P0). From inequalities (2.27) it is
obvious that a cut-off value 0 < α0 < 1 exists such that the planner chooses
accrual taxation for all 0 ≤ α ≤ α0 and a realization tax for all α0 < α ≤ 1.
Put differently, whenever he puts enough weight on the utility of consumer
1, he chooses taxation upon realization.
2.7.3 Socially optimal tax rate
Now consider the planner’s problem to maximize social welfare by choosing
the optimal tax rate for a given method of taxation. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate the fact discussed in Section 2.4.4, that in general the
optimal tax rates differ, although for a given tax rate revenue is the same
under both methods (see Lemma 2.1).
To this end, suppose α = 0, i.e. the planner only cares about the well-
being of consumer 2; by inequality (2.28), here this is equivalent to the
assumption of a Maxmax social welfare function.27 Using the optimal con-
sumption levels of consumer 2, one derives the first order condition for the
optimal tax rate under taxation upon realization
∂V
real
∂τ
=
∂U2
∗
real
∂τ
=
W − P2
(1− τ)P2 + τW + θ(P2 − P0) = 0. (2.30)
27Analogously, α = 1 is equivalent to the assumption of a Maxmin (Rawlsian) social
welfare function.
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The second order condition for a maximum is fulfilled (
∂2V
real
∂τ2
< 0) and the
optimal realization tax rate is given by
τ ∗
real
=
P2
P2 −W −
1
θ(P2 − P0) . (2.31)
If one assumes the taste parameter to be
θ =
2(P2 −W )
(P2 − P0)(P2 +W ) ,
then the optimal realization tax rate equals τ ∗
real
= 1
2
.
Now it is shown that the optimal accrual tax rate τ ∗acc must differ from
1
2
.
Again, using the optimal consumption levels of consumer 2, the first order
condition for the optimal tax rate under taxation upon accrual equals
∂Vacc
∂τ
=
∂U2
∗
acc
∂τ
=
W − P2
[
W+τW
W+τP0
+ τ W−P0
(W+τW )2
]
(1− τ)P2W+τWW+τP0 + τW
+
2(P2 −W )
P2 +W
= 0. (2.32)
However, substituting τ = 1
2
into (2.32) and rearranging terms, the expression
on the left hand side proves to be negative and therefore τ ∗acc <
1
2
= τ ∗
real
,
since
∂2Vacc
∂τ2
< 0. Put differently, shifting from accrual to realization taxation
the planner tries to compensate consumer 2 for his reduction in private utility
by a higher level of public good provision, which can be achieved by choosing
a higher tax rate.28
28Of course, this is no general result but hinges on the special structure of the chosen
example.
Part II
Public goods provision in large
economies
61
63
The work presented in Part II of this book is the result of an ongoing joint
project together with Felix Bierbrauer from the Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods in Bonn. In the center of our research agenda
we put the intent to combine the literature on public goods provision in the
tradition of Clarke-Groves with the literature on optimal income taxation
originating from Mirrlees (1971). The objective is based on the idea that
the decisions about financing and providing a public good usually cannot be
separated from each other but should be considered simultaneously.
The standard model in the literature on optimal income taxation is the
continuum economy and the problem at hand is a screening problem: The
planner tries to tax the agents according to their individual skills. On the
other hand, the standard model in the literature on public goods provision
is the finite economy and the problem at hand is a problem of information
aggregation: The planner aims at providing the appropriate amount of public
goods according to the aggregated individual valuations. Given that, if one
tries to address both problems in a single model, it is convenient to include
both relevant heterogeneities: skill and taste. However, one has to make a
decision wether to use the framework of a finite or a continuum economy.
Our choice is the continuum economy, because it captures best the fact we
aim to model: the observation, that in a large economy a single individual
has only a marginal influence on aggregate data.
Since this individual influence is only marginal, one may think that in a
continuum economy the classical free rider problem is solved trivially, i.e. the
social planner gets the relevant information for free and is able to provide the
efficient amount of public goods according to the Samuelson rule. However,
Chapter 3∗ illustrates that this point of view is not plausible in an environ-
ment with aggregate uncertainty where individuals differ with respect to the
two dimensions, taste and skill. Instead, we argue that the process of infor-
mation aggregation comes at a cost, since the social planner must provide
additional incentives in order to learn the true state of the economy. Put
differently, the Samuelson rule has to be modified to make public goods pro-
vision robust to marginal individual influence. It is shown that the necessary
modification crucially depends on the extent of skill heterogeneity among the
individuals.
In order to derive those results, we model the marginal individual influ-
ence as follows: For the purpose of information aggregation, we restrict the
communication between the social planner and the agents to finite samples.
∗Chapter 3 is based on our paper Public goods provision in a continuum economy with
two-dimensional heterogeneity. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Public
Economic Theory Meeting (PET) 2005 in Marseille as well as at the Spring Meeting of
Young Economists (SMYE) 2005 in Geneva.
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Reporting their characteristics, sample members can influence the planner’s
state perception. As the sample size grows, this influence vanishes. The
provision of public goods will be called robust to sampling, if it is immune
against this vanishing influence. Chapter 4∗∗ introduces this notion of robust-
ness for a more general framework. Moreover, it identifies this concept with
a second one, the so-called requirement of informative subscription, which
is an adaption from the literature on voting. This identification provides
a useful tool for a great variety of problems of information aggregation in
continuum economies with aggregate uncertainty.
∗∗Chapter 4 is based on our paper Robustness to sampling.
Chapter 3
Public goods provision in a
continuum economy with
aggregate uncertainty
We consider the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a
continuum economy. Individuals differ with respect to their valuation of a
public good and with respect to their skills. We argue that the standard
notion of incentive compatibility is not suitable for problems of information
aggregation in continuum economies with aggregate uncertainty. We thus
introduce a refinement of this solution concept, called robustness to sampling.
When applied to the free-rider problem in a quasilinear environment it yields
the following results: Skill heterogeneity implies that the optimal incentive
compatible mechanism for public good provision is not robust. The extent
of information aggregation undertaken by an optimal robust mechanism is
inversely related to the polarization of preferences which results from the
properties of the skill distribution.
3.1 Introduction
Public good provision faces the classical problem of free-riding . Individuals
like to enjoy public goods but they do not like to contribute to the cost of
provision. Still, one would like to provide public goods in such a way that
the decision on provision reflects the aggregate valuation by the individuals
who are supposed both to enjoy and to pay for it. However, the information
on the aggregate valuation is dispersed among individuals. Consequently,
allocation mechanisms which are to determine the quantity of a public good
need to take the strategic reactions of individuals into account. Such an
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allocation mechanism hence has to fulfill the task of information aggregation
under incentive constraints.
This chapter addresses the problem of information aggregation under
incentive constraints in the context of a large economy , represented by a
continuum of individuals. To this end, it introduces a concept for robust
implementation in dominant strategies and applies it to a simple version of
the classical free-rider problem. In Chapter 4 this concept, called robustness
to sampling, is established for a more general framework and discussed in
greater detail.
The reason for using the modelling device of a continuum to represent
a large economy – as opposed to a large but finite economy – is analytical
simplicity. As we argue in more detail below (see Section 3.2), a continuum
economy has several convenient features which make it an attractive model of
large economic systems. However, the existing literature on implementation
in continuum economies has so far not developed an approach which allows
to incorporate a free-rider problem. It implicitly takes the view, that, when
it comes to the problem of information aggregation, strategic behavior is not
an issue. As no single individual has an impact on the aggregate valuation of
a public good, there are no gains to strategic behavior and hence information
aggregation becomes a trivial task.
In Section 3.3, we provide a detailed discussion of the implications of this
view in the context of a simple public goods problem and argue that it rests
on unsatisfactory behavioral assumptions. The main point of the criticism
is the following: even in a continuum economy, if individuals participate
in a process of information aggregation and moreover have specific interests
concerning the desired outcome of this procedure, then one should not impose
behavioral assumptions on them which run counter to these interests.
In order to ensure that an allocation mechanism is not vulnerable to
strategic behavior if a problem of information aggregation arises, Section
3.4 introduces the requirement of robustness to sampling. Underlying is the
idea, that an allocation mechanism is trustworthy when it comes to informa-
tion aggregation in a large economy, only if it survives giving individuals a
marginal impact on the perceived state of the world. The robustness require-
ment is incorporated into a mechanism design problem with the objective
to determine an optimal level of public goods provision as a function of the
aggregate valuation, which is taken to be an unknown variable. Within this
framework, the individual impact is modelled by sampling : First, on a stage
of information aggregation, only data from a finite sample of individuals is
used to estimate the aggregate valuation and to choose an appropriate pro-
vision level. Second, on a financing stage, the cost of providing the chosen
amount of public goods has to be covered by the design of a contribution
3.1. INTRODUCTION 67
scheme that is incentive compatible for all agents in the economy.
Our application contributes to the literature on the free-rider problem in
quasilinear environments (see Section 3.2 below for an account of this litera-
ture). However, it differs from the standard framework in the following way:
A second source of individual heterogeneity is introduced into the model.
As usual, individuals differ regarding their taste parameters which capture
their marginal valuation of the public good. In addition, we allow for skill
heterogeneity. For less skilled individuals it is harder to generate income
and hence they suffer from a larger utility loss if forced to contribute to the
cost of public good provision. The interaction of taste and skill parameters
determines an individual’s effective valuation of the public good.
As an example, think of a taxi driver, who works at night in the danger-
ous districts of a town. He would ceteris paribus be very happy to see more
policemen in the street. On the other hand, he presumably risks being at-
tacked only because he has a hard time generating income. Hence, having to
give away money in order to contribute to this public good is really harmful
for him. The balance of these two concerns pins down the quantity of the
public good the taxi driver wants to have.
The presence of both skill and taste parameters allows to generate a rich
set of observations, even in the very simple model we investigate. The most
interesting ones, presented in Section 3.5, are as follows: Information aggrega-
tion causes additional incentive problems – i.e. on top of individual incentive
compatibility in the financing scheme – if and only if there is skill heterogene-
ity. Moreover, by how much an optimal decision on public good provision
may reflect the actual aggregate valuation, depends on the polarization of
skills within the groups of individuals with the same tastes. The higher this
within-group polarization, i.e. the stronger the effect of skill heterogeneity on
the effective valuations, the less information aggregation is undertaken by an
optimal rule for providing public goods.
In addition, as shown in Section 3.6, the proposed concept of robustness
to sampling may serve as a theoretical foundation for the requirement of
informative voting, which is known from the field of political economy. This
condition requires that, whenever facing two alternatives, any individual with
a low taste parameter is – irrespective of his skill – willing to vote for a
lower amount of public goods, and any individual with a high valuation is
– irrespective of his skill – willing to vote for a higher provision level. Our
analysis demonstrates that the concepts of informative voting and robustness
to sampling coincide in the limit as the sample size grows.
Section 3.7 contains concluding remarks on possible extensions of this
chapter’s analysis. All longer proofs can be found in the Appendix 3.8.
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3.2 Relationship to the literature
In this section we comment on both related strands of the literature: the
literature dealing with the characterization of implementable allocations in
continuum economies as well as the literature addressing the free-rider prob-
lem of public goods provision in quasilinear environments with a countable
number of individuals.
3.2.1 Implementation in continuum economies
In this paragraph, we first discuss what are, according to our view, the major
advantages of using the model of a continuum economy, as opposed to a large
but finite economy. We then debate why the literature on implementation
in continuum economies has not taken problems of information aggregation
into account. Finally, we explain how the solution concept that we propose
tries to fill this gap.
A main convenience of a continuum of individuals for economic modelling
is the following property: via some large numbers effect, the continuum as-
sumption allows to separate idiosyncratic uncertainty , also referred to as
individual specific risk or assignment uncertainty , from the behavior of ag-
gregates.1 Such randomness on the individual level may be combined with
a deterministic aggregate, i.e. the randomness induced by individual-specific
shocks washes out in the aggregate. Alternatively, there may be aggregate
uncertainty , that is, the individual randomness washes out conditional on a
given state of the world, the latter being a random variable as well. In either
case, the central idea is that uncertainty in the behavior of aggregates can
be separated from uncertainty referring to individual data.
As noted by Hammond (1979), this separation proves particularly useful
in the description of anonymous allocation mechanisms. That is, how an
individual with characteristics x is treated by an allocation mechanism de-
pends on x and on some state s of the economy. Such a separation remains
mathematically sound even if a state s is defined by a cross-section distribu-
tion of characteristics, e.g. by the fraction of individuals with property x in
the whole system. Obviously, this kind of separation is not feasible in a fi-
nite economy as any change in the characteristics of one particular individual
always affects the composition of the economy as a whole.
Under such an anonymous allocation mechanism, strategic interdepen-
dence is drastically reduced. The payoff of a specific individual depends on
the reported characteristics of others only via aggregate data. These proper-
1See Alo`s-Ferrer (2002) for a discussion of prominent applications.
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ties imply that anonymous allocation mechanisms are an attractive tool for
a characterization of outcomes which result from decentralized interactions,
for instance via market transactions, tax systems or voting procedures.
As an example, the usefulness of such mechanisms has been demonstrated
by Guesnerie (1995) in an attempt to provide a foundation for the consider-
ation of tax systems in public economic theory.2 Guesnerie (1995) identifies
tax systems with the class of allocation mechanisms with the property of
being decentralizable via some (possibly non-linear) price system. He uses
the continuum assumption as a justification for a model which exhibits at
the same time uncertainty about individual characteristics and a commonly
known cross-section distribution of characteristics. The latter property per-
mits to work with a deterministic public sector budget constraint. In addition
it is assumed that individual characteristics are realizations of an indepen-
dently and identically distributed (iid) random process. Guesnerie (1995)
argues that, under those assumptions, it entails no loss of generality to re-
strict attention to tax systems, in the sense, that there do not exist allocation
mechanism outside the class of anonymous allocation mechanisms with su-
perior welfare properties.
This example demonstrates what we consider the main advantage of the
continuum assumption: simplicity. It allows to make simultaneous use of
the possibilities to work with a deterministic budget constraint, to separate
individual and aggregate data in the description of an anonymous allocation
mechanism, and finally to justify anonymity itself. Moreover, if the overall
aim is an analysis of decentralized allocation mechanisms with a large num-
ber of participants these assumptions seem very plausible.
Our criticism of the literature on continuum economies is as follows:
There is no study of implementation problems in which a problem of infor-
mation aggregation causes incentive problems.3 Something like a free-rider
problem is entirely ignored by this literature. Typically, the cross-section dis-
tribution of characteristics in the economy is assumed to be commonly known
and the analysis is hence limited to pure screening problems, i.e. the problem
to determine for each agent his position in the predetermined cross-section.4
This creates a concern of robustness. Whenever there is aggregate uncer-
2Further contributions to this line of research are Hammond (1987), Dierker and Haller
(1990) or Hellwig (2003b, 2004b).
3An exception is Bierbrauer (2005). This paper combines a problem of information
aggregation with a problem of optimal income taxation.
4This is true for all mentioned references from the area of public economic theory.
Further studies which are based on a known cross-section distribution of characteristics
are Makowski and Ostroy (1992) and Mas-Colell and Vives (1993).
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tainty, i.e. the cross-section distribution of characteristics is not commonly
known, an allocation mechanism has to fulfill two tasks: screening and infor-
mation aggregation. That is, one has to figure out how the composition of
the economy actually looks like while identifying the characteristics of each
particular individual. However, if only the screening part of an allocation
problem is taken into account, this implies a vulnerability to the possibility
that individuals exploit their impact on the perceived state of the world.
Our objective is to fix this robustness problem in a constructive manner.
We attempt to maintain all the convenient properties of the continuum econ-
omy mentioned above, while, at the same time, providing a more plausible
treatment of the information aggregation part of the problem.
To this end we strengthen the solution concept of individual incentive
compatibility (I-IC) by an additional requirement that we term robustness
to sampling (RS). The term sampling refers to a hypothetical situation
in which a randomly chosen large but finite subset of individuals – a large
random sample of individuals – is, prior to the working of the final allocation
mechanism, asked to report their characteristics. The reported data is only
used in order to obtain an estimate of the distribution of characteristics in
the economy. Hence, sample members have a small but strictly positive
impact on the perceived state of the world. We say that RS holds if any
individual, conditional on being in the sample, is willing to reveal the own
characteristics.
We interpret this solution concept as a refinement of I-IC. It serves to
eliminate those equilibria from the game induced by an individually incentive
compatible allocation mechanism, that turns out to be weakly dominated in
the presence of sampling. The overall idea is, at an intuitive level, best
understood in comparison with the problem of voting over two alternatives
in a continuum economy. Suppose there are two alternatives A and B and
a continuum of individuals who have to decide on the chosen alternative
via majority voting. One might argue that individual voting behavior is
indeterminate. As no single individual is able to affect the ‘numbers’ of
A-votes and B-votes, respectively, any voting behavior is a best response.
Nevertheless, in the voting literature one often finds the following somewhat
vague statement:5 Only sincere voting (i.e. an individual votes for A if and
only if A is preferred) survives the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
That is, it is required that individual behavior is such as if there was for
each individual some chance of being decisive for the outcome of the voting
procedure.
The analogy to our solution concept is as follows: Suppose an individual
5See e.g. Gersbach (2002) or Meirowitz (2004).
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is indifferent between a variety of announcements because it has, in a con-
tinuum economy, no impact on the perceived state of the economy. Then
our refinement requires to eliminate those best responses that turn out to be
weakly dominated as soon as the individual is granted some influence on the
perceived state of the economy.
3.2.2 The free-rider problem in finite economies with
quasilinear preferences
Articles classified under this heading have the following setup in common:
There is a number n ∈ N of individuals with quasilinear utility functions and
private information on their valuation of a public good. The aggregate valua-
tion of the public good is a random variable defined as the sum of individual
valuations. The quantity decision on a public good as well as individual
contributions to the cost of provision are determined via a direct revelation
mechanism. The main question underlying the analysis is to what extent
the so-called free-rider problem in public good provision may be resolved.
I.e. how are the welfare costs of having to finance public good provision in
such a way that any individual is willing to reveal his willingness to pay.
The focus of the early literature in that field has been the question
whether one may have simultaneously ex-post efficiency and incentive com-
patibility. This question has been addressed with two different solution con-
cepts, implementation in dominant strategies as well as the weaker notion of
Bayesian implementation.6 The more recent literature starts out from the
observation that, even in a Bayesian framework, the requirements of ex-post
efficiency and incentive compatibility imply that participation constraints
cannot be respected.7 Hence, the requirement of ex-post efficiency has to be
dropped. This branch of literature has instead moved to an investigation of
surplus-maximizing or second best allocation mechanisms under incentive as
well as participation constraints.8
6Green and Laffont (1977) establish an impossibility result for implementation in dom-
inant strategies, while Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) establish
the possibility of implementing an efficient allocation as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
7This result is due to Gu¨th and Hellwig (1986). These authors extend the famous
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)-Theorem to a public goods problem with n ∈ N partic-
ipants.
8Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Hellwig (2003a) analyze this question for a non-
excludable public good and discuss how the welfare properties of an optimal allocation
depend on the number of individuals who consume the public good. Schmitz (1997) and
Norman (2004) observe that exclusion becomes a valuable instrument in this second-best
setting and analyze how an optimal mechanism makes use of it.
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As contrasted with this literature, we are considering the provision of
a non-excludable public good in a continuum economy. This implies that
there is neither a chance to respect participation constraints nor to make
payment obligations a function of individual valuations of the public good:
As, for any individual, the influence on the quantity decision is negligible,
individuals are concerned only with a minimization of their contribution to
the cost of provision. This implies that equal cost sharing turns out to be the
only incentive compatible payment scheme. Moreover, if there is equal cost
sharing and participation constraints are imposed, then the maximal amount
of public good provision is determined by those individuals with the lowest
valuation of the public good. This implies that the quantity decision on the
public good may react to changes in the aggregate valuation only if there is
the possibility to extract payments from individuals irrespective of their own
valuation.9
These observations are the starting point of our analysis. As we want to
study the public goods problem in a continuum economy, we have to accept
the restriction of equal cost sharing as well as the fact that our analysis ap-
plies only to those situations in which there is a right of coercion. However,
accepting the need of coercion does not yet answer the question how to em-
ploy it. The fact that all individuals, irrespective of their characteristics, are
treated equally by the payment scheme implies a rich pattern of opposing
views on the desirable level of public good provision. We impose the require-
ment that any procedure of information aggregation, even in a continuum
economy, has to respect these interests. This allows to derive a set of incen-
tive constraints, which are imposed in addition to equal cost sharing. We
thus finally arrive at a second best problem of public good provision for a
continuum economy.
3.3 The problem of information aggregation
This section illustrates by means of an example why the concept of individual
incentive compatibility yields unreasonable outcomes if used as an instrument
of information aggregation in a large economy. The chosen application is a
problem of public goods provision under private information of individuals
on their valuation of the public good. As will become clear, with quasilinear
preferences, this public goods problem is essentially a problem of information
aggregation under incentive constraints. I.e. the only question of interest is
how to elicit the aggregate valuation of the public good.
9This observation has been made earlier by Olsen (1965), who defines a large group by
the necessity of coercion for public good provision.
3.3. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION 73
3.3.1 Basic assumptions
Individual characteristics
The economy under consideration consists of a continuum of individuals i ∈
I := [0, 1]. All individuals are identical but with respect to two parameters,
namely their individual ability to earn income, also referred to as their skill
wi, and their individual valuation of the public good, also referred to as their
taste θi. For simplicity, assume that the taste parameter may take only two
different values:
θi ∈ Θ := {θL, θH} with 0 ≤ θL < θH ,
where θL stands for a low valuation of the public good and θH for a high one.
The productivity parameter belongs to the compact interval
wi ∈ Ω := [w
¯
, w¯] with 0 < w
¯
< w¯,
where w
¯
denotes the lowest possible earning ability and w¯ the highest one.
Each individual derives utility from the consumption of a public good,
but he does not like to contribute to its provision. In particular, we use the
following additively separable and quasi-linear function to express agent i’s
utility:
U i = θiQ− t
i
wi
.
Q denotes the quantity of a non-excludable public good and ti captures i’s
contribution to the cost of public good provision. Note that lower levels of
skill wi translate into a larger utility loss due to a given payment obligation.
This reflects the idea that, for less able individuals, it is harder to generate
the income needed to meet a given payment obligation.
The function U i is the cardinal representation of preferences which is
relevant for welfare assessments. An individual’s ranking of alternatives can
be equivalently expressed by the monotone transformation
wiU i = θiwiQ− ti .
We refer to the product θiwi as individual i’s effective valuation of the public
good.
Informational structure
The parameters wi and θi are both private information of individual i. We
assume the wis as well as the θis to be independently and identically dis-
tributed (iid) and both distributions to be independent of each other. The
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skill distribution is represented by a function F : Ω → [0, 1] with density f .
Moreover, we define
p := Prob{θi = θH}
as the probability for individual i to have a high valuation for the public
good.
In the following we assume that a law of large numbers (LLN) applies10 in
the sense that the value F (w) and the probability p can be interpreted as the
fractions of individuals with earning ability wi ≤ w and high valuation for the
public good in the population respectively. While the distribution F is known
to the policy maker, i.e. there is no uncertainty about skill distribution on
the aggregate level, p is a random variable of its own. I.e. there is uncertainty
with respect to the aggregate valuation of the public good. The planner only
has a prior belief on the distribution of p. For ease of calculation, this prior
is assumed to be a uniform distribution of p on [0, 1]. Note that, since we
are interested in robust mechanisms and therefore consider implementation
in dominant strategies as equilibrium concept, we do not need to impose any
common prior assumption.
To sum up, the information structure exhibits a deterministic aggregate
regarding the productivity parameter and aggregate uncertainty with respect
to the taste parameter. That is, individual differences in productivity entirely
disappear on the aggregate level while the aggregate distribution of taste is
not taken to be known. Thus, the unknown parameter p is henceforth also
referred to as the state of the economy . It is the relevant object for the
process of information aggregation.
3.3.2 Individual incentive compatibility (I-IC)
We now describe what individual incentive compatibility (truthful implemen-
tation in dominant strategies) means for the problem at hand. In Chapter 4
this concept is defined in the context of a general allocation problem.
Individually incentive compatible allocations
An anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) consists of a provision rule for the public
good and a payment scheme to cover the cost of provision. The provision
10The problem, that the LLN may not hold for a continuum of iid random variables,
i.e. a stochastic process, is discussed, for example, in Judd (1985), Feldman and Gilles
(1985), Sun (1998), Alo`s-Ferrer (2002), and Al-Najjar (2004). These authors offer sev-
eral opportunities how to deal with it. A more rigorous description of the informational
structure is provided in Chapter 4.
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rule Q assigns to alternative values of p a quantity of the public good,
Q : [0, 1]→ R+, p 7→ Q(p).
The payment scheme t specifies for each individual i a payment obligation
as a function of the distribution of characteristics in the economy p and in-
dividual i’s characteristics (θi, wi). The payment scheme is anonymous in
the sense that individuals with the same characteristics have the same pay-
ment obligation, in every state p of the economy. Put differently, individual
payments do not depend on the index i. Formally the payment scheme is
described as a function
t : [0, 1]×Θ× Ω→ R, (p, θ, w) 7→ t(p, θ, w).
Definition 3.1 (I-IC) An anonymous allocation rule is called individually
incentive compatible (I-IC) if ∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∀(θ, w) ∈ Θ × Ω, and ∀(θˆ, wˆ) ∈
Θ× Ω,
θwQ(p)− t(p, θ, w) ≥ θwQ(p)− t(p, θˆ, wˆ).
The I-IC property requires that for any given state p of the economy no
individual has an incentive to hide his true characteristics.
Remark 3.1 In the continuum economy, the concept of I-IC is equivalent
to the concept of truthful implementation in dominant strategies. An anony-
mous allocation rule is said to be truthfully implementable in dominant strate-
gies (straightforward incentive compatible)11 if ∀i ∈ [0, 1], ∀(θi, wi) ∈ Θ×Ω,
∀(θˆi, wˆi) ∈ Θ× Ω, and ∀(θ−i, w−i) ∈ (Θ× Ω)I\{i}
θiwiQ(p)− t(p, θ, w) ≥ θwQ(pˆ)− t(pˆ, θˆ, wˆ),
where p = p((θi, θ−i), (w
i, w−i)) and pˆ = p((θˆ
i, θ−i), (wˆ
i, w−i)). However, in
the continuum, under an anonymous allocation rule, no single individual has
an impact on the (perceived) state of the economy, i.e. p = pˆ.
In any state of the world p, incentive compatibility requires for each indi-
vidual the minimal payment obligation. Formally, we arrive at the following
observation, which results immediately from the definition of I-IC.
Lemma 3.1 The following statements are equivalent.
1. (Q, t) is I-IC.
11See Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Chapter 23).
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2. (Q, t) satisfies ∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∀(θ, w) ∈ Θ× Ω and ∀(θˆ, wˆ) ∈ Θ× Ω,
t(p, θ, w) = t(p, θˆ, wˆ).
As the economy is large, no single individual has an impact on the level
of public good provision. This implies that incentive compatibility can be
achieved only via an equal treatment of all individuals by the payment
scheme. This is the classical free-rider problem. As access to the public
good is free, no one is willing to pay more than he is forced to.12
Consequently, any I-IC payment scheme is constant, in the sense that,
for given p, all individuals are treated equally. The converse statement is
also true. That is, any anonymous provision rule Q : p 7→ Q(p) gives rise to
an I-IC allocation rule if accompanied by constant payments, i.e. a payment
scheme that does only depend on p.
The budget constraint and equal cost sharing
The costs of public good provision are represented by a twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function K : R+ →
R+, which satisfies K(0) = 0 as well as the boundary conditions
lim
x→0
K ′(x) = 0 and lim
x→∞
K ′(x) =∞.
The payment scheme has to be such that the costs of public good provi-
sion are covered. Combining the requirements of I-IC and of budget balance
(feasibility) yields the following observation:
Lemma 3.2 The only admissible payment scheme under I-IC is equal cost
sharing, i.e.
∀p ∈ [0, 1],∀(θ, w) ∈ Θ× Ω : t(p, θ, w) = K(Q(p)).
We summarize the observations made in Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 as fol-
lows:
Proposition 3.1 An anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) is I-IC and budget
balancing if and only if the payment scheme exhibits equal cost sharing.
Due to Proposition 3.1, in what follows, we restrict the search for an appro-
priate feasible I-IC anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) to the problem of finding
an appropriate provision rule Q accompanied by equal cost sharing.
12Note that if budget balance has to be achieved and there are limits to coercion due to
participation constraints as in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) or in Hellwig (2003a) and
there are individuals who do not value the public good at all – i.e. with effective valuation
of 0 – one will end up with Q ≡ 0 under any admissible, incentive compatible provision
rule.
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3.3.3 Information Aggregation under I-IC
The resolution of aggregate uncertainty requires to figure out the true state
of the economy, i.e. the fraction p of individuals with a high taste parameter.
By definition, the I-IC constraints ensure that no individual has an incentive
to hide the own characteristics for a given cross-section distribution of char-
acteristics. However, under aggregate uncertainty, an incentive compatible
allocation rule is used in addition for the purpose of information aggregation
as the mechanism designer has to deduce the actual distribution of charac-
teristics from the profile of individual announcements. To make this more
explicit, it is instructive to think of the revelation game in the following
sequential manner:
Sequence 3.1
Stage 1: The mechanism designer specifies a provision rule Q accompanied
by equal cost sharing. I.e. there is a distinct level of public good provi-
sion Q(p) and a distinct payment obligation K(Q(p)) for each possible
state p of the economy.
Stage 2: The mechanism designer collects all individual data and uses this
information to deduce the actual value pˆ for the state of the economy.
Stage 3: According to the specified rule, the amount Q(pˆ) of the public good
is provided. Individuals make the corresponding contributions K(Q(pˆ)).
Multiple equilibria
As outlined in Section 3.2, the problem of aggregate uncertainty in large
economies has not been addressed yet by the literature. An exception is
Hammond (1979). Based on his work, one could take the view that the
problem of information aggregation is resolved trivially as a corollary of I-
IC. Suppose, with no loss of generality, that, on stage 2, the planner can
communicate with all agents, asks them to report their characteristics13, and
is able to measure the fraction
pˆ = µ({i ∈ I | θˆi = θH})
of high valuation reports among the population14. The allocation rule, pro-
posed on stage 1, exhibits equal cost sharing and specifies the level of public
13The revelation principle tells that any achievable allocation can be attained by such
a direct mechanism.
14The problem of measurability is discussed, for example, by Judd (1985) or Al-Najjar
(2004), showing that an appropriate measure µ can be constructed. More details are
provided in Chapter 4.
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good provision as a function of the perceived state of the economy pˆ. Since
the economy is large, no single agent i is able to influence the planner’s per-
ception pˆ by his report θˆi. Hence, no individual has a payoff relevant move.
This implies that revealing the own characteristics is a best response. Of
course, the same can be said about any reporting behavior.
In other words, there are multiple equilibria and one faces a problem of
equilibrium selection. From the angle just outlined, this problem could be
solved trivially by just breaking the agents’ indifference in favor of truth-
telling. Hence, the planner would learn the true state of the world p and the
problem of information aggregation would disappear. It would be resolved
as a byproduct of I-IC.
However, we doubt this view and aim at offering an alternative one. To
illustrate the problem, we first explore the consequences of the perspective
that the need of information aggregation does not create additional incentive
problems, once I-IC has been taken into account and the costs of public good
provision are covered via equal cost sharing.
The optimal utilitarian allocation under I-IC
Given this notion of implementability we can solve for the provision rule
which is optimal from a utilitarian perspective. For given p and an arbitrary
provision rule Q, utilitarian welfare under equal cost sharing is given by
(pθH + (1− p)θL)Q(p)− λK(Q(p)) with λ :=
w¯∫
w
¯
f(w)
w
dw.
The parameter λ can be interpreted as the shadow cost of public funds.15 We
may equivalently assume that the utilitarian objective is to maximize
v¯(p)Q(p)−K(Q(p)) with v¯(p) := pθH + (1− p)θL
λ
and refer to the term v¯(p) as the effective utilitarian valuation or as the
effective aggregate valuation of the public good if the state of the economy is
p.
Now suppose that I-IC is a sufficient condition to guarantee that anyone
will truthfully report his taste. Using his prior beliefs on p being uniformly
15From a utilitarian welfare perspective, equal cost sharing as implied by I-IC, is a
distortion. A utilitarian planner would prefer that only individuals with earning ability w¯
pay for the public good.
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distributed, the planner assesses expected utilitarian welfare to equal
EW := λ
1∫
0
{v¯(p)Q(p)−K(Q(p))} dp.
The provision rule which maximizes this expression is denoted Q∗ and will
serve as a benchmark in the following. In combination with equal cost sharing
it forms the optimal feasible allocation rule that satisfies the I-IC constraints.
Q∗ is characterized by the following version of the Samuelson rule for public
good provision.
Proposition 3.2 The optimal feasible provision rule Q∗ : p 7→ Q∗(p) under
I-IC is characterized by a continuum of first order conditions,
K ′(Q∗(p)) = v¯(p) for p ∈ [0, 1].
Q∗ is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable with derivative Q∗′.
Proof. The properties of Q∗ follow immediately from the planners maxi-
mization problem taking into account the assumptions on K.
2
The need of a refinement
We now illustrate that the admissibility of the optimal utilitarian allocation
Q∗ requires that agents use actions which are not robust in the following
sense: Agents are assumed to behave in a way that would be incompatible
with implementation in dominant strategies as soon as they were given an
arbitrary small influence on the perceived state of the world. Hence, for
the problem at hand, the notion of individual incentive compatibility lacks
plausibility.
To see this, note first that the utility realized by an individual under
provision rule Q∗ is a function of the individual’s characteristics (θ, w) and
the unknown parameter p. This indirect utility function is henceforth written
as
U∗(p, θ, w) = θQ∗(p)− K(Q
∗(p))
w
.
Its partial derivative with respect to p equals
U∗1 (p, θ, w) =
1
w
Q∗′(p)[θw − v¯(p)].
Consequently, U∗ is increasing in p as long as θw > v¯(p), i.e. the individual’s
effective valuation of the public good exceeds the effective valuation of a
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utilitarian planner. Analogously, U∗ is decreasing in p if θw falls short of the
utilitarian valuation.
Now suppose, for the sake of concreteness, that p is such that16
θLw¯ > v¯(p) >
θL
λ
.
This implies that there exists a critical value wˆ ∈]w
¯
, w¯[ such that all individ-
uals with θi = θL and w
i < wˆ have an effective valuation θLw
i which falls
short of the utilitarian planner’s effective valuation v¯(p) and hence, according
to their indirect utility function, would prefer a slightly lower perceived value
of p. Analogously, individuals with θi = θL and w
i > wˆ have an effective
valuation θLw
i exceeding the one of the utilitarian planner. Therefore, they
would prefer a slightly larger perceived value of p.
Despite those conflicting interests, under the truth-telling assumption,
individuals in both sets are assumed to behave the same way, namely to re-
veal their low valuation of the public good. In particular, an individual with
θLw > v¯(p) is assumed not to exaggerate when reporting the own taste for
the public good, even though this individual would be happy if the utilitarian
planner could be induced to believe that the effective aggregate valuation of
the public good was in fact higher.
In more abstract terms, it has been noted above that, in a revelation game
with equal cost sharing, any kind of behavior constitutes a best response as
no individual is able to affect with the own announcement the planner’s
perception of the aggregate valuation v¯(p). At the same time individuals are
not indifferent regarding this perception. They just have no direct influence
on it. Still, they might want to marginally increase their indirect utility
by strategic reports in favor of their preferred state perception. Moreover,
being involved in the revelation game forces any individual to subscribe either
to the group of individuals with a high taste parameter or to the group of
individuals with a low taste parameter. Hence, the assumption that under
provision rule Q∗ any individual tells the truth, amounts to the postulate
that some individuals do not subscribe to the group whose size they would
be willing to support, but instead join the ‘wrong’ group. In that sense,
a solution that takes only the I-IC constraints into account is not robust
to the (illusion of) indirect individual influence on the perceived aggregate
valuation.
Note that this is not only a concern of whether or not it is acceptable
to break individual indifference in favor of truth-telling in the presence of
16As v¯(p) is a convex combination of θH
λ
and θL
λ
, for any x ∈ [ θL
λ
, θH
λ
] there exists p such
that v¯(p) = x.
3.4. ROBUSTNESS TO SAMPLING AS A REFINEMENT 81
multiple best responses. The point is, that individual indifference is taken
too literally. I.e. indifference is broken in favor of truth-telling even though
individuals should not be regarded as indifferent. Hence, in order to solve
the problem of multiple equilibria, we suggest to switch from the behavioral
assumption of truth-telling to the more plausible one that individuals behave
as if they had some (arbitrarily small) influence.
These observations serve as a starting point for the next section, which
introduces a refinement of individual incentive compatibility for the problem
at hand. Chapter 4 discusses this concept, called robustness to sampling, in
more detail and for a more general framework.
3.4 Robustness to sampling as a refinement
The basic idea behind the refinement of individual incentive compatibility
we propose is to postulate that the equilibrium allocation be robust to the
following perturbation of the revelation game: The allocation rule must be
implementable even if the individuals were provided with some influence on
the planner’s perceived state of the economy. Our approach of granting them
some influence is to restrict the communication between the planner and the
agents for the purpose of information aggregation to a finite random sample
SN ⊂ I of individuals with sample size N ∈ N.
The corresponding revelation game is defined in Section 3.4.1 as a prelim-
inary step for the definition of our refinement concept. The planner uses the
sample data on taste parameters to update his prior beliefs about the actual
state of the economy. Based on this estimation he decides on a level of public
good provision Q. It is assumed that the mechanism designer’s estimation
procedure is commonly known. This implies that all sampled agents can
predict how their own taste report affects the provision level. Consequently,
the former indifference is broken such that their taste announcement always
contributes to their most preferred state of the world. Hence, in order to
ensure that sampled individuals still are willing to reveal their true taste pa-
rameter, an additional set of incentive constraints comes into play, labelled
robustness to sampling of size N (RSN). These additional constraints al-
low to formulate the problem PN of finding an optimal robust provision rule
based on sampling of size N .
Making an appeal to purely formal analogy, in Section 3.4.2 the RSN con-
ditions are extended to a revelation game in the continuum in which not only
a subset of sampled agents but all individuals are involved in the process of
information aggregation. The resulting constraints prevent individuals from
strategic reports and ensure sincere ones instead. Thus, these conditions are
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referred to as the requirement of informative voting (IV). The corresponding
problem P of finding the optimal provision rule subject to IV is called the
informative voting problem. Our definition of informative voting is more than
a formal analogy to robustness to sampling of size N in the finite sample: As
will be shown in Section 3.6, the solutions of the finite problems PN converge
to the solution of the informative voting problem P . Put differently, the
optimal provision rule passing our refinement test can be understood as the
limit outcome of vanishing individual influence on aggregate data. In this
sense, the concept of robustness to sampling serves as a theoretic foundation
for the concept of informative voting.
3.4.1 Finite samples
Suppose that, for the purpose of information aggregation, the mechanism
designer communicates with only a finite numberN of individuals by drawing
a random sample SN ⊂ I.
Information aggregation based on sampling
In order to get information about the unknown state of the economy p,
the social planner evaluates the profile of reported taste parameters θN :=
(θ1, . . . , θN), where θi denotes the taste announced by the sample member at
position i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. He uses the number m of high taste reports,
m = #{i ∈ SN | θi = θH},
to update his prior beliefs about the true state of the economy p apply-
ing Bayes’ rule. Under the assumption of p being uniformly distributed on
[0, 1], this yields the following conditional density function φN , referred to as
perceived state of the economy.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose the social planner has prior beliefs of p being uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. After observing m high taste reports in a sample of size
N , he will update his beliefs such that the perceived state of the world is given
by the conditional density φN with
φN(p | m) = (N + 1)
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m. (3.1)
The proof is provided in Appendix 3.8.
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Implementable provision rules based on sampling
Having clarified how the mechanism designer uses the sample information
to update his prior beliefs on the likelihood of different states of the econ-
omy, we now characterize conditions for an allocation rule to be truthfully
implementable under sampling of size N .
An anonymous allocation rule based on sampling of size N , (QN , tN),
consists of a provision rule for the public good
QN : {0, 1, . . . , N} → R0+, m 7→ QN(m)
and a payment scheme
tN : {0, 1, . . . , N} ×Θ× Ω→ R, (m, θ, w) 7→ tN(m, θ, w).
Based on the sample observation m, the mechanism designer updates his
beliefs, provides an appropriate amount QN(m) of public goods, and chooses
an anonymous payment scheme tN(m, θ, w) in order to cover the cost of
provision.
Note that the assumption of anonymity with respect to the payment
scheme implies a no discrimination of sampled individuals-property. That is,
at the financing stage, individuals who happen to be in the sample are not
treated differently as individuals with the same characteristics who happened
not to be in the sample. In particular, this precludes the possibility to design
a specific scheme of payments for sample members to let them internalize
the impact of their statements on the whole system. In a word, to specify
the individual payments, again the planner must impose I-IC constraints:17
∀m ∈ {0, . . . , N}, ∀(θ, w) ∈ Θ× Ω, and ∀(θˆ, wˆ) ∈ Θ× Ω,
θwQN(m)− tN(m, θ, w) ≥ θwQN(m)− tN(m, θˆ, wˆ).
As before, one verifies immediately that a feasible allocation rule satisfy-
ing the I-IC constraints must exhibit equal cost sharing, i.e. for all m ∈
{0, . . . , N} and for all (θ, w) ∈ Θ× Ω
tN(m, θ, w) = K(QN(m)).
To sum up, whenever we consider allocation rules based on sampling of
size N , we refer to the following sequence of actions:
17However, here the condition is not used to collect information about the state of the
economy, but only to identify the individuals’ positions on the skill distribution in order to
fix their contributions to the public good. See Chapter 4 for an alternative interpretation
of I-IC.
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Sequence 3.2
Stage 1: The mechanism designer specifies a provision rule QN accompa-
nied by equal cost sharing. I.e. there is a distinct level of public good
provision Q(m) and a distinct payment obligation K(Q(m)) for each
possibly perceived state m of the economy.
Stage 2: The mechanism designer collects individual data from the mem-
bers of sample SN and uses this information to update his beliefs on p
according to the perceived state of the economy φN(· | mˆ).
Stage 3: According to the specified rule, the amount Q(mˆ) of the public
good is provided. Individuals make the corresponding contributions
K(Q(mˆ)).
Unlike the parameter p in the continuum, under sampling the parameter
m, i.e. the perceived state of the world, depends on the taste report θ of each
single individual within the sample; we account for that fact denotingm(θN).
In order to ensure that, on stage 2, the sample members truthfully report
their taste parameters, the planner must impose an additional constraint. Let
θN−i be the vector of characteristics for all sample members with exception
of individual i. Then, ∀i ∈ SN , ∀(θi, wi) ∈ Θ × Ω, ∀(θˆi, wˆi) ∈ Θ × Ω, and
∀(θN−i, wN−i) ∈ (Θ× Ω)N−1
θwQ(m)−K(Q(m)) ≥ θwQ(mˆ)−K(Q(mˆ)), (3.2)
with m = m(θi, θN−i) and mˆ = m(θˆi, θN−i) must hold.
If an agent i with characteristics (θi, wi) happens to be in the sample,
misreporting his true type, he can increase m by 1 if θi = θL or decrease
m by 1 if θi = θH , respectively. Reformulating (3.2), this gives rise to the
following definition:
Definition 3.2 (RSN) A provision rule QN is called robust to sampling of
size N (RSN) if the following inequalities hold for all m ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
and for all w ∈ Ω:
θLwQN(m)−K(QN(m)) ≥ θLwQN(m+ 1)−K(QN(m+ 1)) ,
θHwQN(m)−K(QN(m)) ≤ θHwQN(m+ 1)−K(QN(m+ 1)) .
(3.3)
The RSN constraints require that, whatever the distribution of characteristics
in the sample, an individual with a low taste parameter should prefer a lower
perceived state of the world m and an individual with a high taste parameter
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should prefer a larger level of m. The RSN requirement ensures ex post
incentive compatibility in the following sense: No sample member would ever
want to revise his taste announcement after having learned the distribution
of the announcements induced by all other N − 1 sample members.
Remark 3.2 The normal form representation of the revelation game based
on sampling as stated in Sequence 3.2 can be described as the following per-
turbation of the original revelation game as stated in Sequence 3.1: Again,
the planner asks all individuals in the economy to report their characteristics.
Now, however, he commits to use only the taste reports from the members of
a random sample SN for the purpose of information aggregation.
In Appendix 3.8 we show that a feasible allocation rule induces a dominant
strategy equilibrium of this game if and only if it consists of a RSN provision
rule accompanied by equal cost sharing. In other words, the concept of robust
implementation based on sampling of size N can be interpreted as applying the
concept of truthful implementation in dominant strategies on the perturbed
revelation game described above.
We provide some alternative formulation of RSN in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.4 The following statements are equivalent:
1. QN satisfies RSN .
2. For all m,m′ ∈ {0, . . . , N} with m < m′ and for all w ∈ Ω:
θLwQN(m)−K(QN(m)) ≥ θLwQN(m′)−K(QN(m′)) ,
θHwQN(m)−K(QN(m)) ≤ θHwQN(m′)−K(QN(m′)) .
(3.4)
3. For all m,m′ ∈ {0, . . . , N} with m < m′:
i) QN is increasing: QN(m) ≤ QN(m′).
ii) If QN(m) < QN(m
′), then
θHw
¯
≥ K(QN (m
′))−K(QN (m))
QN (m′)−QN (m) ≥ θLw¯ .
The proof is provided in Appendix 3.8.
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The mechanism design problem based on sampling
In this paragraph we formulate the utilitarian planner’s problem of finding
an optimal robust provision rule based on sampling of size N . A utilitarian
planner chooses the provision rule QN which maximizes expected utilitarian
welfare from an ex-ante perspective, that is on stage 1 before m is observed.
We first derive an explicit expression for this utilitarian objective based on
the assumption about the planner’s prior beliefs and the conditional updating
stated in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose the utilitarian planner views p as the realization of a
random variable that is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then, ex-ante expected
utilitarian welfare provided by a provision rule based on sampling of size N ,
QN , equals
EWN = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
QN(m)−K(QN(m))
}
. (3.5)
The proof is provided in Appendix 3.8. In particular, a planner who observes
a sample in which m individuals have a high valuation of the public good
ends up – after his prior beliefs are updated – with an effective valuation of
the public good given by
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
=
m+ 1
N + 2
θH
λ
+
N −m+ 1
N + 2
θL
λ
.
Note that the effective valuation is strictly increasing in m, and for all m ∈
{0, . . . , N} it exceeds v¯(0) and falls short of v¯(1).
Now we are ready to state the planner’s problem of finding an optimal
robust provision rule based on sampling of size N .
Definition 3.3 The following problem is called the finite problem based on
sampling of size N , henceforth referred to as PN :
Maximize EWN as given by equation (3.5) by the choice of a robust pro-
vision rule QN , i.e. fulfilling the RSN constraints as stated in (3.4), accom-
panied by equal cost sharing, i.e. fulfilling the budget constraint as well as
I-IC.
The solution to this problem is denoted by Q∗∗N , the induced optimal welfare
level by EW ∗∗N .
We omit to explicitly solve the problem here. As will become clear, however,
the structure of its solution is very similar to that of the solution to the
so-called informative voting problem we will introduce in the next section.
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3.4.2 Informative voting (IV)
We now turn back to the originally public goods problem as sketched in
Sequence 3.1, i.e. the planner communicates with all individuals in the econ-
omy. Recall our actual object of interest: We aim at sorting out provision
rules that are based on agents taking actions that would counteract their
interests if they had some influence on the planner’s decision.
The notion of informative voting
This will be achieved in the following by imposing additional constraints on
the public goods problem that exhibit perfect formal analogy to the RSN
constraints for finite samples as stated in equation (3.4).
Definition 3.4 (IV) A provision rule Q is said to fulfill the constraints of
informative voting (IV) if the following inequalities hold for any pair p, p′ ∈
[0, 1] with p < p′ and any w ∈ Ω:
θLwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) ≥ θLwQ(p′)−K(Q(p′)) ,
θHwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) ≤ θHwQ(p′)−K(Q(p′)) .
(3.6)
Hence, under the IV constraints no individual ever has an incentive to support
a higher perceived state of the economy p′ if he has a low valuation θL and
no individual ever has an incentive to support a lower perceived state of
the economy p if he has a high valuation θH . The notion of informative
voting (IV) reflects an interpretation based on the idea that any individual
subscribes to one of two groups, either to those individuals with θi = θL or
to the group with θi = θH . As there are only two such groups a decision on
subscription may alternatively be framed as a voting decision for a binary
choice between the alternatives Q(p) and Q(p′). Informative voting hence
ensures that each individual supports the group which shares the own taste
characteristic.18
As will become clear, the connection between IV and RSN is not only a
formal but a substantial one. In Section 3.6 we will show that the solutions
Q∗∗N of the problems PN converge, in some sense, to the solution Q
∗∗ of the
problem P induced by informative voting as defined in the next paragraph.
This result ensures that, in order to investigate the impact of vanishing indi-
vidual influence, as well as imposing the RSN constraints for growing sample
sizes one can rely on the IV constraints as the relevant ones. Consequently,
18A more extensive discussion of the notion of informative voting can be, for instance,
found in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
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in the following we will first concentrate on the analysis of the IV constraints
and their impact on the public goods problem at hand. Afterwards we will
come back to the finite problems PN and formally establish the mentioned
convergence.
The following Lemma is a straightforward adaption of Lemma 3.4 to the
present context.
Lemma 3.6 A provision rule Q satisfies IV, if and only if the following two
properties hold for any pair p, p′ ∈ [0, 1] with p′ > p:
i) Q is increasing: Q(p) ≤ Q(p′).
ii) If Q(p′) > Q(p), then
θHw
¯
≥ K(Q(p
′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p) ≥ θLw¯ .
A first step on the way to establish the more substantial connection be-
tween IV and RSN is the following observation. Let Q be any provision rule
and denote by Q|N its ‘restriction’ to the domain {0, 1, . . . , N} of a provision
rule based on sampling of size N , i.e. Q|N(m) := Q(
m
N
).
Lemma 3.7 If a provision rule Q satisfies IV, then its restriction Q|N will
be RSN for any N ∈ N.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Definition 3.4 using Lemma 3.4.
2
Statement of the informative voting problem
We now are ready to state the refined public goods problem of a utilitarian
planner, called the informative voting problem. Note that by the imposition
of the IV constraints the planner can be sure that anyone will truthfully
report his taste. Hence, at the interim stage 2, he learns the true state p of
the economy. Using his prior beliefs on p being uniformly distributed, he is
able to asses the ex-ante expected utilitarian welfare.
Definition 3.5 The following problem is called the informative voting prob-
lem, henceforth referred to as P : Maximize expected utilitarian welfare
EW := λ
1∫
0
{v¯(p)Q(p)−K(Q(p))} dp
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by the choice of a provision rule Q, which satisfies the IV constraints as
stated in (3.6), accompanied by equal cost sharing, i.e. fulfilling the budget
constraint as well as I-IC.
The solution to this problem is denoted by Q∗∗, the induced optimal welfare
level by EW ∗∗.
For the remainder of this chapter, problem P takes the center stage of our
examination. In Section 3.5 we will characterize its solution showing that
informative voting matters only in the presence of a second source of hetero-
geneity that influences, besides taste, the individual’s effective valuation of
the public good. Finally, in Section 3.6, we explore the deeper relationship
between the informative voting problem P and the finite problems PN .
3.5 The optimal provision rule under IV
In this section we solve the informative voting problem in the sense that
we characterize the structure of its possible solutions. As will become clear,
this structure depends on the polarization of skill levels. The lower the
polarization, the more information aggregation is possible and the more the
optimal provision rule Q∗∗ under IV resembles the solution Q∗ under I-IC
only.
3.5.1 The impact of skill heterogeneity
This section investigates the role of skill heterogeneity with respect to the
impact our refinement concept has on the optimal provision rule. To this end,
we employ some convenient terminology. In line with the idea of informative
voting, that each individual has to subscribe to one of the groups of agents
with either high or low valuation for the public good, we group together
individuals with the same taste parameter. Accordingly, we refer to the
extent of taste heterogeneity, i.e. the difference in effective valuations θHw−
θLw for a given skill parameter w, as between-group polarization. Likewise,
we refer to the extent of skill heterogeneity, i.e. the maximum difference in
effective valuations θw¯ − θw
¯
for a given taste parameter θ, as within-group
polarization.
In order to do comparative statics with respect to within-group polar-
ization, we fix the taste parameters θL and θH . It will be shown that the
within-group polarization determines the extent to which an optimal provi-
sion rule aggregates information.19 In an extreme case of within-group polar-
19These results are similar in spirit to those of signalling games in which the extent
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ization, any provision rule that satisfies IV is constant, i.e. provides the same
amount of public goods in all states of the economy. By contrast, if there is
no within-group polarization, then the optimal provision rule Q∗ according
to the Samuelson rule satisfies IV. However, as soon as there is skill hetero-
geneity among the agents, the Samuelson rule has to be modified in order to
fulfill the constraints of informative voting.
As a byproduct of our considerations, we derive very similar results for
the finite problems PN as well. They will be useful to finally establish the
equivalence between the concepts of IV and RSN in the limit as the sample
size N grows (see Section 3.6).
Extreme within-group polarization
The following observation is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.4 and
Lemma 3.6 respectively. It shows that skill heterogeneity may imply that
information aggregation via sampling becomes quite impossible.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose θHw
¯
< θLw¯. Then the following statements hold:
1. A provision rule QN based on sampling satisfies RSN if and only if
QN(0) = QN(1) = . . . = QN(N).
2. A provision rule Q satisfies IV if and only if it is constant:
∀p ∈ [0, 1] : Q(p) = Q¯.
The parameter constellation θHw
¯
< θLw¯ is extreme in the sense that the
within-group polarization is that intense that the given level of between group
polarization is insufficient to separate the effective valuations in one group
from the effective valuations within the other group. Put differently, irre-
spective of taste parameters, an individual from the upper end of the skill
distribution has a higher effective valuation of the public good as compared
to an individual from the lower end of the skill distribution. The RSN or
IV constraints respectively require both to prefer a larger provision level in
case of a high taste parameter and to prefer a smaller provision level with a
low taste. However, under θHw
¯
< θLw¯, if an individual with very low skills
wants to have more of the public good, then the same is true for a high ability
individual, even, if according to RSN or IV, this individual should prefer a
of information aggregation depends on the intensity of preference polarization between a
receiver and one or several senders. Examples include Crawford and Sobel (1982), Schultz
(1996) or Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 4).
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lower provision level. Hence, there is no way to aggregate information via a
decentralized procedure such as sampling under a RSN requirement.
In particular, the impossibility of information aggregation holds irrespec-
tive of the sample size N . This proves that imposing the requirements of
RSN or IV may heavily restrict the set of implementable allocations.
20 The
following Lemma makes this statement more precise and establishes the close
connection between the problems P and PN solving them for the given pa-
rameter constellation.
Denote by Qu the quantity of public goods an uninformed planner would
provide, i.e. if he could not communicate with the agents at all but was
constraint to choose a fix amount according to his prior beliefs irrespective
of the true state of the world. Hence, the uninformed optimum Qu is the
solution of maximizing
λ
1∫
0
{v¯(p)Q−K(Q)} dp
by the choice of Q and given by the first order condition
v¯(
1
2
) = K ′(Qu).
Lemma 3.8 If θHw
¯
< θLw¯, then for all N ∈ N, for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N},
and for all p ∈ [0, 1]
Q∗∗N (m) = Q
∗∗(p) = Qu.
The proof is provided in Appendix 3.8.
Lemma 3.8 completely characterizes what can be achieved in the case of
extreme within-group polarization. If θHw
¯
< θLw¯, there is no way to ag-
gregate information such that informative voting holds. The planner cannot
do better than an entirely uninformed one. Hence, in what follows, we may
assume that θHw
¯
≥ θLw¯.
Moreover, Lemma 3.8 shows that for the given parameter constellation
the solutions of the finite problems PN are identical to the restrictions of
Q∗∗ and hence converge to the solution of problem P . As will be proven in
Section 3.6 the convergence holds for any constellation of parameters. Hence,
the requirement of informative voting can be regarded as the limit outcome
of robust sampling for growing sample sizes.
20Recall from Section 3.3, that – irrespective of the properties of the skill distribution –
imposing only I-IC yields an optimal provision rule Q∗ : p 7→ Q∗(p) with a continuum of
different provision levels, one for each p ∈ [0, 1].
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No within-group polarization
The reasoning above suggests that within-group polarization may cause in-
centive problems. Indeed, the following proposition shows that heterogeneity
in skills is both necessary and sufficient for the optimal utilitarian provision
rule Q∗, derived in Proposition 3.2, to be affected by the requirement of IV.
Proposition 3.3 Q∗ satisfies IV if and only if w
¯
= w¯.
For the restrictions Q∗|N to finite samples the following statements hold:
i) If w
¯
= w¯, then Q∗|N will satisfy RSN for any N ∈ N.
ii) If w
¯
< w¯, then there will exist N0 ∈ N such that for all N ∈ N with
N0 ≤ N the restriction Q∗|N does not satisfy RSN .
The proof is provided in Appendix 3.8. Proposition 3.3 basically says that,
as soon as there is skill heterogeneity among the agents in the economy,
the provision of public goods must not follow the Samuelson rule Q∗, if
implementation under informative voting is aimed at. Instead, the Samuelson
rule for robust public goods provision has to be modified. The next section
clarifies how this modification should look like.
3.5.2 A taxonomy of possible solutions
So far, we have characterized the solution to the informative voting problem
P for the specific parameter constellations of no as well as extreme within-
group polarization. If there is no skill heterogeneity, i.e. w
¯
= w¯, then the IV
constraints will impose no further restriction, i.e. Q∗∗ = Q∗. On the other
hand, if there is extreme within-group polarization such that θHw
¯
< θLw¯,
information aggregation will become impossible, i.e. Q∗∗ = Qu.
We now investigate how the solution Q∗∗ might look like for the case
of intermediate within-group polarization where parameters are such that
w
¯
< w¯ and θHw
¯
≥ θLw¯. To this end, we first discuss which functional forms
a solution might possibly have. The latter clarification is required because, in
general, a solution to the informative voting problem will not be a continuous
function of p, but exhibit jumps and mass points. Hence, we cannot rely on
standard first order conditions as provided by optimal control theory or the
calculus of variations. Instead we are forced to use a more direct approach.
Additional notation
We first introduce some additional notation that will prove useful in the fol-
lowing. Denote by Q¯L the utility maximizing provision level for an individual
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with effective valuation θLw¯, i.e. the provision level for which
θLw¯ = K
′(Q¯L).
Analogously, denote by Q
¯H
, the utility maximizing provision level for an
individual with effective valuation θHw
¯
, i.e. the provision level for which
θHw
¯
= K ′(Q
¯H
).
Note that for w
¯
< w¯ we have w
¯
<
1
λ
< w¯ and thus Q∗(0) < Q¯L as well as
Q
¯H
< Q∗(1).
For any provision level Q with Q∗(0) ≤ Q < Q¯L, denote by Qˆ the provi-
sion level which satisfies Q < Qˆ and moreover
θLw¯Q−K(Q) = θLw¯Qˆ−K(Qˆ) .
That is, an individual with effective valuation θLw¯ is indifferent between the
provision levels Q and Qˆ. Likewise, for any Q with Q
¯H
< Q ≤ Q∗(1), denote
by Q˜ the provision level with Q˜ < Q and
θHw
¯
Q−K(Q) = θHw
¯
Q˜−K(Q˜) .
Categories for robust solutions
We now will show that a solution to the informative voting problem belongs
to one of the following four classes of provision rules:
Provision rules with four mass points. Provision rules in this class
are characterized by four mass points Qs4, Qˆ
s
4, Q˜
l
4 and Q
l
4. Q
s
4 satisfies Q
s
4 <
Q¯L and is linked with Qˆ
s
4 via a binding IV constraint for an individual with
effective valuation θLw¯. Likewise, Q
l
4 exceeds Q
¯H
and is linked with Q˜l4 via
a binding IV constraint for an individual with effective valuation θHw
¯
. In
addition it is required that Qˆs4 ≤ Q˜l4. Moreover, there is a range of values of
p for which the provision level is equal to Q∗(p), i.e. the provision level that
would be chosen in the absence of IV-constraints. Formally Q4 is defined by
Q4(p) :=


Qs4 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Qˆs4 for pˆ < p < pˆ
′ ,
Q∗(p) for pˆ′ ≤ p ≤ p˜′ ,
Q˜l4 for p˜
′ < p < p˜ ,
Ql4 for p˜ ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
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where the critical indices are implicitly defined by the following equations:21
v¯(pˆ) = θLw¯ , Q
∗(pˆ′) = Qˆs4 , Q
∗(p˜′) = Q˜l4 , v¯(p˜) = θHw¯
.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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-Q
θLw¯Q−K(Q)
θHw
¯
Q−K(Q)
r
Q∗(0)
r
Q∗(1)
r
Q¯L
r
Q
¯H
r
Q˜l4
r
Qˆs4
r
Ql4
r
Qs4
Figure 3.1: Provision rule with four mass points
Provision rules with three mass points. A provision rule with three
mass points can be considered as the degenerate case of a provision rule with
four mass points, which arises if Qˆs4 = Q˜
l
4.
This type of provision rule is characterized by three provision levels Qs3,
Qm3 and Q
l
3, where Q
m
3 is linked via a binding IV constraint for θLw¯ with
Qs3 and via a binding IV constraint for θHw¯
with Ql3, i.e. Q
m
3 = Qˆ
s
3 = Q˜
l
3.
Formally Q3 is defined by
Q3(p) :=


Qs3 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Qm3 for pˆ < p < p˜ ,
Ql3 for p˜ ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where the critical indices pˆ and p˜ are defined implicitly by the equations
v¯(pˆ) = θLw¯ and v¯(p˜) = θHw
¯
.
The situation is depicted in Figure 3.2.
21This already presumes an optimal choice of the critical indices. To see this, note that
a utilitarian planner will choose e.g. pˆ according to the following criterion: Let Q(p) = Qs
4
if and only if v¯(p)Qs
4
−K(Qs
4
) exceeds v¯(p)Qˆs
4
−K(Qˆs
4
). Given the binding IV constraint
which links Qs
4
and Qˆs
4
, this is equivalent to Q(p) = Qs
4
if and only if v¯(p) ≤ θLw¯.
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θLw¯Q−K(Q)
θHw
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Q−K(Q)
r
Q∗(0)
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Q∗(1)
r
Q¯L
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Figure 3.2: Provision rule with three mass points
Provision rules with two mass points. Such a provision rule is char-
acterized by two provision levels Qs2 and Q
l
2, which satisfy Q
s
2 < Q¯L and
Q
¯H
< Ql2. These are possibly linked by a binding IV constraint for an in-
dividual with effective valuation θLw¯ or via a binding IV constraint for an
individual with θLw¯.
22 Formally, a provision rule characterized by two mass
points Qs2 and Q
l
2 is written as
Q2(p) :=


Qs2 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Ql2 for pˆ < p ≤ 1 ,
where the critical index pˆ is defined implicitly be the equation
v¯(pˆ)Qs2 −K(Qs2) = v¯(pˆ)Ql2 −K(Ql2) .
In the context of two mass points, the IV constraints can be equivalently
represented as the condition that pˆ has to be such that
θHw
¯
≥ v¯(pˆ) ≥ θLw¯ .
The situation of a solution with two mass points is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
22Note that as long as θLw¯ < θHw
¯
, two different provision levels are linked by at most
one of these IV constraints.
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Figure 3.3: Provision rule with two mass points and binding IV for type θLw¯
Constant provision rules. Such a provision rule is characterized by a
single provision level, namely the one an uninformed planner would choose;
formally:
Q1(p) := Q
u for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
We are now able to state the main result of this section: In order to solve
the informative voting problem P , one may restrict attention to the classes
of provision rules introduced so far.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose there is skill heterogeneity (w
¯
< w¯). A provi-
sion rule which solves the informative voting problem P is either constant or
belongs to one of the classes with two, three or four mass points.
The proof is sketched in Appendix 3.8. It is based on the insight that, under
IV constraints, the image of a provision rule contains at most one element
smaller than Q¯L and at most one larger than Q
¯H
. If there were, to the
contrary, two provision levels below Q¯L, then an individual with effective
valuation θLw¯ would prefer the larger of these two. But IV rules out this
possibility. Furthermore, optimality prohibits to have a provision rule whose
image lies entirely between Q¯L and Q
¯H
. A provision rule with four mass
points is superior to such a truncated provision rule. Finally, it is established
that an optimal provision rule has exactly one element smaller than Q¯L
and exactly one element larger than Q
¯H
as also partial truncations can be
excluded. These considerations single out the above candidates.
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3.5.3 Solving the informative voting problem
Proposition 3.4 teaches that, in the presence of skill heterogeneity, the op-
timal provision rule under IV differs strictly from Q∗, the one suggested by
the Samuelson rule under I-IC only. Moreover, it gives a hint on how the
Samuelson rule has to be modified for robust implementation.
To actually solve the informative voting problem P , one has to compare
the welfare levels that can be realized within any of the four classes of provi-
sion levels introduced above. In general this requires to solve various separate
optimization problems and to rank the resulting welfare levels.
There is however a general intuition, to which class the optimal provision
rule belongs, depending on the parameters of the model. Reconsider Figure
3.1 and note that if Q¯L is close to Q
∗(0) and Q
¯H
is close to Q∗(1), then
a provision rule with four mass points is close to Q∗, which is optimal if
IV is not required. This suggests that if the polarization of views on the
optimal level of public good provision is relatively mild – in the sense that
all individuals with taste parameter θL want to have a provision level in a
neighborhood of Q∗(0) and all individuals with θH want to have a provision
level similar to Q∗(1) – then one ends up with a provision rule which exhibits
four mass points and hence approximates the optimal I-IC provision rule Q∗.
However, if the difference between Q¯L and Q
¯H
– or equivalently the dif-
ference between θHw
¯
and θLw¯ – shrinks, so does the range over which a
provision rule with four mass points coincides with Q∗. There will be a crit-
ical parameter constellation such that the constraint Qˆs4 ≤ Q˜l4 binds and one
ends up with three mass points.
If the polarization increases further, one ends up with Q¯L being very close
to Q
¯H
. Such a skill distribution implies, for each given taste parameter, a
wide range of preferred provision levels. For individuals with taste parameter
θL, Q¯L marks the endpoint of this range [θLw
¯
, θLw¯], for individuals with θH ,
Q
¯H
gives the initial point of [θHw
¯
, θHw¯].
If the difference Q
¯H
− Q¯L has become very small, then a provision rule
with three mass points needs to have all three provision levels very close to
each other. Hence, there is only very little use of information as a provision
rule with three mass points becomes similar to one with Q(p) = const, for
all p. In such a case a provision rule with only two mass points, which are
however to a larger extent differentiated from each other, is superior. Figure
3.4 illustrates this situation showing a provision rule with three mass points
and one with two mass points. As θHw
¯
− θLw¯ shrinks, so does Ql3 − Qs3. A
provision rule with two mass points eventually becomes more attractive.
Finally, if the difference Q
¯H
− Q¯L has become negative, i.e. we are in the
case of extreme polarization where θHw
¯
< θLw¯, information aggregation is
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Figure 3.4: Three or two mass points?
quite impossible. As discussed in Lemma 3.8, the planner cannot do better
than an uninformed one choosing the constant provision level Qu.
We refrain from providing a general proof of these intuitive statements.
This would require an awkward exercise, which distinguishes a variety of
assumptions on the parameters θL, θH , w¯, w
¯
and λ, i.e. the skill distribution
F . We only provide an example which allows to verify the intuition developed
above.
Example. Suppose K(Q) = 1
2
Q2, θL = 1, θH = 3, and λ = 1. Let
w
¯
= 1 − x and w¯ = 1 + x. In this example x is a measure of the welfare
burden imposed by the requirement of IV. This welfare burden vanishes as
x → 0 implying that w
¯
→ w¯. As x → 1
2
one converges to the case with
θLw¯ = θHw
¯
which precludes any information aggregation. One may verify
that for sufficiently small x, a provision rule with four mass points is optimal.
For x ≥ 2− 32 , an optimal provision rule with four mass points is transformed
into the degenerate case with only three mass points. Finally, for x close to
1
2
a provision rule with only two mass points is superior.
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3.6 Robustness to sampling as a foundation
for informative voting
In this section we explore the connection between the notions of robustness
to sampling of size N on the one hand and informative voting on the other
hand. As we will show, the relationship is not only a formal analogy but a
substantial equivalence in the following sense: The expected welfare EW ∗∗N
induced by the solutions Q∗∗N of the problems PN based on sampling of size N
converges to the he expected welfare EW ∗∗ induced by a solution Q∗∗ of the
informative voting problem P as the sample size N increases. Put differently,
in the limit both concepts are equivalent with respect to the induced expected
welfare achievable. In addition, if there is a unique solution Q∗∗ of problem
P , the solutions Q∗∗N of the problems PN themselves must ‘converge’ to this
solution Q∗∗, i.e. in the limit both concepts are equivalent with respect to
the optimal provision rules induced. This justifies to impose the informative
voting constraints if robust implementation is aimed at in the sense that the
resulting allocation rule takes into account ‘vanishing’, i.e. marginal individ-
ual influence. Hence, the concept of robustness to sampling can be regarded
as a theoretic foundation for the concept of informative voting.
As a byproduct of our analysis we derive a Condorcet Jury Theorem for
the problem of information aggregation in continuum economies: As soon
as information aggregation is possible, i.e. the solution Q∗∗ is not constant,
more information is better, i.e. for a utilitarian planner, there is no optimal
finite sample size.
3.6.1 Large sample properties
We start our analysis with the observation, that the expected welfare EW ∗∗
induced by a solution Q∗∗ of the informative voting problem P serves, for any
sample size N , as an upper bound for the expected welfare EW ∗∗N that can be
achieved by a solution Q∗∗N of the problem PN . To establish this statement,
we employ a construction that will also prove useful as we proceed. For given
N ∈ N, consider the following piecewise constant continuation of Q∗∗N :
Q
∗∗
N : [0, 1] → {Q∗∗N (m)}Nm=0 with
Q
∗∗
N (p) := Q
∗∗
N (m) for
m
N + 1
≤ p < m+ 1
N + 1
, (3.7)
Q
∗∗
N (1) := Q
∗∗
N (N).
The welfare level induced by Q
∗∗
N is denoted EW
∗∗
N .
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Lemma 3.9 For any N ∈ N, the following inequalities hold:
EW ∗∗N ≤ EW
∗∗
N ≤ EW ∗∗.
The first inequality will be strict if and only if Q∗∗N 6≡ Qu.
The proof is provided in the Appendix 3.8. Lemma 3.9 is the key in order to
derive the main results of this section.
Proposition 3.5 The maximum expected utilitarian welfare under RSN con-
verges to the maximum expected utilitarian welfare under IV, i.e.
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N = EW
∗∗.
The proof is also provided in the Appendix 3.8. Proposition 3.5 basically
tells that the concepts of robustness to sampling and informative voting
are equivalent with respect to achievable expected utilitarian welfare. One
can get arbitrarily close to any expected welfare level that can be achieved
imposing the IV constraints to the original revelation game as stated in
Sequence 3.1 by choosing a sufficiently large sample size N and imposing the
RSN constraints on the perturbed revelation game as stated in 3.2.
In case that there is a unique solution Q∗∗ of the informative voting
problem P , this equivalence is even stronger: For growing sample sizes N ,
the optimal provision rules Q∗∗ under IV and Q∗∗N under RSN ‘coincide’ in
the limit. The following corollary makes this statement more precise.
Corollary 3.2 Suppose there is a unique solution Q∗∗ to problem P , and let
Q
∗∗
N be defined as in (3.7). Then, for all p ∈ [0, 1]
lim
N→∞
Q
∗∗
N (p) = Q
∗∗(p).
The proof is provided in the Appendix 3.8.
Hence we have arrived at a theoretic foundation for the imposition of
informative voting. The maximum expected welfare under IV and, given
uniqueness , the optimal provision rule itself can be regarded as the limit
outcome of vanishing individual influence that has been granted to the agents
by using finite samples for the purpose of information aggregation. In this
sense, the optimal provision rule that satisfies the requirement of informative
voting is, at the same time, the optimal one which is robust to sampling.
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3.6.2 A Condorcet Jury Theorem
It has been shown in Lemma 3.9 that EW ∗∗N ≤ EW ∗∗, i.e. a planner who uses
the reports of all individuals for the purpose of information aggregation but
is constrained by the requirement of IV will never do worse than a planner
who just uses the reports of a finite sample of individuals but is constrained
only by the RSN conditions. As stated in the following Proposition, whenever
information aggregation is possible, he can do even better.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose that Qu does not solve problem P .23 Then for any
N ∈ N, the following inequality holds:
EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗.
The proof is provided in the Appendix 3.8.
As an obvious consequence of this result and its interplay with Proposi-
tion 3.5, we can – for the problem of information aggregation in continuum
economies with aggregate uncertainty – formulate some version of a Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem. I.e. a statement that larger sample sizes are preferred
if informative voting of sampled individuals is ensured by appropriate incen-
tive conditions.24
Corollary 3.3 (Condorcet Jury Theorem) Suppose that Qu does not
solve problem P . Then for any given N ∈ N there exists N ′ ∈ N with
N < N ′ such that
EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗
N ′ .
Put differently, whenever information aggregation is possible, there is no
optimal sample size a utilitarian planner could choose for the purpose of
information aggregation. Despite the growing number of incentive constraints
that must be imposed to ensure truthful reporting behavior, he will always
find it preferable to base the decision on public goods provision on a larger
number of individual reports. Additional scope for information aggregation
generates a strictly larger expected welfare level.
The intuition for this result may be expressed as follows: The higher
degree of freedom in choosing different provision levels overcompensates for
the disadvantage of being forced to respect a larger number of incentive
constraints. This stems from the fact that the planner’s estimate of the actual
state of the economy becomes more precise and that more differentiated
23A sufficient condition for this assumption to hold is, for example, given by
θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
and Qˆ∗(0) ≤ Q∗(1) and Q∗(0) ≤ Q˜∗(1).
24A discussion of this Theorem and related results is provided by Piketty (1999).
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information allows for a better adjustment of the provision level to the actual
state of the economy. Moreover, this demand for better information is not
undermined by the additional RSN constraints, which come into play with a
larger sample. One can think of that in the following way: By choosing an
appropriate larger sample the planner can mimic the small sample outcome.
Thus there is no welfare burden implied by additional RSN constraints.
3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has investigated the classical free-rider problem in public goods
provision in a continuum economy, where individuals differ with respect to
their valuation of a public good and with respect to their skills. It has been
illustrated that, in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, the standard notion
of individual incentive compatibility is not suitable for problems of informa-
tion aggregation. Thus a refinement of this solution concept, called robust-
ness to sampling, has been introduced and identified with the requirement of
informative voting. Its application to the free-rider problem in a quasilinear
environment has established the following results: Skill heterogeneity implies
that the optimal individually incentive compatible rule for public goods pro-
vision is not robust. The extent of information aggregation undertaken by
an optimal robust provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of
effective valuations which results from the extent of skill heterogeneity.
In this section we briefly sketch some prospects for further research. The
following is the most obvious one. Our solution concept of individual incen-
tive compatibility (I-IC) cum robustness to sampling (RS), presented in more
detail in Chapter 4, is designed to deal with abstract allocation problems
which incorporate problems of information aggregation as well as screening
problems. The application we discussed – public good provision in a quasi-
linear continuum economy – is one in which the screening part was trivially
reduced to the requirement of equal cost sharing. Hence, this problem be-
came essentially one of pure information aggregation.
We plan to enrich this setting by the introduction of a private consump-
tion good and leisure as arguments in the utility functions of the individu-
als. This will give rise to a more complex screening problem. In particular,
it becomes possible to redistribute consumption goods and to discriminate
contributions to the cost of public good provision according to individual
characteristics. One thus combines a problem of information aggregation
under incentive constraints with a problem of incentive compatible redistrib-
ution.25
25This problem of incentive compatible redistribution is underlying the theory of optimal
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The analysis of this chapter has focussed on large random samples of in-
dividuals, which are investigated for the sake of information aggregation. We
did not analyze the corresponding small sample properties . Further research
might clarify, whether a model based on small random samples could be a
useful tool for an analysis of decision making in committees. If the answer
is yes, this raises a further issue. Our sampling approach takes only those
sample characteristics into account that give rise to aggregate uncertainty. In
the public goods problem, the quantity of provision depends on the number
of individuals with a high valuation. It does not depend on whether these
sample members stem from the upper or the lower end of the skill distribu-
tion. While, due to a large numbers effect, we believe this to be an innocent
assumption in large samples, we do not have an idea of the welfare burden
this procedure implies in small samples.
To see why this concern might be of interest, recall that the requirement
of robustness to sampling admits an interpretation in terms of informative
voting. Hence, an assessment of this welfare burden could be interpreted as
a quantification of the welfare costs associated with the use of simple voting
rules for social choice.
3.8 Appendix: Formal proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
In the following we will denote by φ the density function associated with the
planner’s prior beliefs on p. Obviously the assumption of a uniform distri-
bution implies that φ(p) = 1 for all p ∈ [0, 1]. The probability distribution
associated with the random variable ν, denoting the number of agents with
high taste parameters in a sample of size N , is given by:26
pr(ν = m) =
1∫
0
pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)dp
=
1∫
0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mdp = 1
N + 1
.
(3.8)
taxation, originating from Mirrlees (1971). See Hellwig (2004a) for a recent contribution.
26The following relation is used repeatedly:
1∫
0
pm(1− p)N−mdp = m!(N −m)!
(N + 1)!
.
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This is intuitive: With p uniformly distributed, all possible realizations of
ν are equally likely. Now suppose that ν = m and consider the conditional
density φN thereby induced over p:
φN(p | ν = m) = pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)
pr(ν = m)
= (N + 1)
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m .
2
Proof of Remark 3.2.
Obviously, by definition of I-IC and RSN , a RSN provision rule accompa-
nied by equal cost sharing is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies
within the described revelation game.
Now suppose the feasible allocation rule (QN , tN) to be truthfully imple-
mentable in dominant strategies within the described revelation game. Thus,
the following inequality must hold ∀i ∈ I, ∀(θi, wi) ∈ Θ×Ω, ∀(θˆi, wˆi) ∈ Θ×Ω,
and ∀(θ−i, w−i) ∈ (Θ×Ω)I\{i}, irrespective wether the agent is a sample mem-
ber or not:
θwQ(m)− tN(m, θ, w) ≥ θwQ(mˆ)− tN(mˆ, θˆ, wˆ). (3.9)
with m = m(θi, θ−i) and mˆ = m(θˆi, θ−i).
If the individual is no sample member, she has no influence on the per-
ceived state of the world, i.e. m = mˆ. As in Section 3.3.2, in combination
with the budget balancing requirement this yields equal cost sharing as the
only admissible payment scheme: tN = K(QN).
Thus, condition (3.9) simplifies to the requirement that for any individual
within the sample condition (3.2) has to be satisfied. But this constraint is
just equivalent to RSN .
2
Proof of Lemma 3.4.
The equivalence of (1.) and (2.) is obvious.
To see that (2.) implies (3.), note first that adding the inequalities in
(3.4) yields, for any m ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and any w ∈ Ω,
(θH − θL)w[QN(m′)−QN(m)] ≥ 0 .
This establishes i).
Now suppose that Q(m) < Q(m′). Then for any w ∈ Ω, RSN requires
that
K(QN (m
′))−K(QN (m))
QN (m′)−QN (m) ≥ θLw .
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This property holds for all w ∈ W if and only if it holds for the largest skill
level w¯,
K(QN (m
′))−K(QN (m))
QN (m′)−QN (m) ≥ θLw¯ .
Likewise we derive the requirement
θHw
¯
≥ K(QN (m
′))−K(QN (m))
QN (m′)−QN (m) .
This establishes ii).
The proof that (3.) implies (2.) is immediate.
2
Proof of Lemma 3.5.
At the interim stage 2, when the planner has observed m, he updates his
beliefs as stated in Lemma 3.3. Expected welfare on the interim stage 2 is
hence given by
EW intN (m) = λE[v¯(p)QN(m)−K(QN(m)) | m]
= λ
1∫
0
[v¯(p)QN(m)−K(QN(m))]φ(p | ν = m)dp
= λ(N + 1)
(
N
m
)( 1∫
0
[(
p
θH
λ
+ (1−p)θL
λ
)
QN(m)−K(QN(m))
]
pm(1− p)N−mdp
)
= λ
[
m+ 1
N + 2
θH
λ
+
N −m+ 1
N + 2
θL
λ
]
QN(m)−K(QN(m)).
From an ex-ante perspective at stage 1, the outcome m of the sampling
procedure is as well the realization of a random variable, which we denote
by ν. Taking expectations over m using equation (3.8), expected welfare ex
ante equals
EWN =
N∑
m=0
EW int(m)pr(ν = m)
= λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
QN(m)−K(QN(m))
}
.
2
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Proof of Lemma 3.8.
The equality Q∗∗(p) ≡ Qu follows immediately from the definition of Qu and
Corollary 3.1.
Using Corollary 3.1, under the given parameter constellation the problem
of finding Q∗∗N ≡ Q¯N consists in maximizing
λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q¯−K(Q¯)
}
by the choice of Q¯ (see equation (3.5)). The first order condition is derived
by a simple calculation yielding
v¯(
1
2
) = K ′(Q¯N).
Thus Q¯N = Q
u by the definition of Qu.
2
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Before we start with the proof, note that by a revealed preferences argument
for the utilitarian planner the following inequalities hold for all p, p′ ∈ [0, 1]
with p < p′:
v¯(p)Q∗(p)−K(Q∗(p)) ≥ v¯(p)Q∗(p′)−K(Q∗(p′)),
v¯(p′)Q∗(p′)−K(Q∗(p′)) ≥ v¯(p′)Q∗(p)−K(Q∗(p)).
Note that, by Proposition 3.2, Q∗ is strictly increasing. Hence, those two
inequalities imply that for all p, p′ ∈ [0, 1] with p < p′:
v¯(p′) ≥ K(Q
∗(p′))−K(Q∗(p))
Q∗(p′)−Q∗(p) ≥ v¯(p). (3.10)
We now prove the claims of Proposition 3.3 within four steps.
1. We first show that w
¯
= w¯ implies that Q∗ is IV.
w
¯
= w¯ =: w˜ implies λ =
1
w˜
. Hence, for all p, p′ ∈ [0, 1] with p < p′:
θHw˜ ≥ v¯(p′) = p′θHw˜ + (1− p′)θLw˜,
θLw˜ ≤ v¯(p) = pθHw˜ + (1− p)θLw˜.
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Combining these observations with (3.10) yields,
θHw˜ ≥ K(Q
∗(p′))−K(Q∗(p))
Q∗(p′)−Q∗(p) ≥ θLw˜.
Since, by Proposition 3.2, Q∗ is strictly increasing, it is IV by Lemma
3.6.
2. We have just seen that w
¯
= w¯ implies that Q∗ is IV. Hence, by Lemma
3.7, its restriction Q∗|N is RSN for any N ∈ N. This proves i).
3. Now we show statement ii).
Suppose w
¯
< w¯ which implies w¯ >
1
λ
> w
¯
. Because of Lemma 3.4, it is
sufficient to show that for all sufficiently large N there exist m′,m′′ ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1} such that
K(Q∗|N (m
′ + 1))−K(Q∗|N (m′))
Q∗|N (m
′ + 1)−Q∗|N (m′)
> θHw
¯
,
K(Q∗|N (m
′′ + 1))−K(Q∗|N (m′′))
Q∗|N (m
′′ + 1)−Q∗|N (m′′)
< θLw¯ .
Because of the inequalities in (3.10), a sufficient condition for this
claim to hold is that for all sufficiently large N there exist m′,m′′ ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1} such that
v¯
(
m′ + 1
N + 2
)
> θHw
¯
and v¯
(
m′′ + 2
N + 2
)
< θLw¯ .
To see that these conditions are fulfilled, choose, for all N , m′ = N and
m′′ = 0 and note that
lim
N→∞
v¯
(
N + 1
N + 2
)
=
θH
λ
> θHw
¯
,
lim
N→∞
v¯
(
2
N + 2
)
=
θL
λ
< θLw¯ .
4. We have just seen that w
¯
< w¯ implies that there exists N ∈ N such
that Q∗|N is not RSN . Hence, by Lemma 3.7, Q
∗ cannot be IV.
2
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.
The required arguments are lengthy but not difficult. Hence only a sketch is
provided.
If the optimal IV provision rule Q∗∗ is constant, then Q∗∗ ≡ Qu by its
optimality. As has been shown in Corollary 3.1, there are parameter constel-
lations such that Q∗∗ is indeed constant.
Now suppose that Q∗∗ is not constant. Thus, by Corollary 3.1, θLw¯ ≤
θHw
¯
and hence Q∗(0) ≤ Q¯L ≤ Q
¯H
≤ Q∗(1). We show within the next three
steps, that Q∗∗ is a provision rule with either two, three or four mass points.
Step 1. Denote by VQ the image of a provision rule Q, i.e. x ∈ VQ if and
only if there exists p ∈ [0, 1] with Q(p) = x. Under the IV constraints, there
exists at most one element x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exist x, y ∈ VQ with
x < y < Q¯L. Under IV, as characterized in Lemma 3.6, this implies that
there exist p and p′ > p with Q(p) < Q(p′) < Q¯L. This yields
θLw¯Q(p)−K(Q(p)) < θLw¯Q(p′)−K(Q(p′)) ,
a contradiction to the IV requirement for an individual with effective valua-
tion θLw¯. Analogously one shows that the image of an admissible provision
rule contains at most one element x with x > Q
¯H
.
Step 2. We now show that a provision rule Q for which there exists
y ∈ VQ with y ∈ [Q¯L, Q
¯H
] is a candidate for a solution only if there exist as
well x, z ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L and Q
¯H
< z.
To this end, we first argue that a provision rule Q for which there exist
neither x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L nor z ∈ VQ with z > Q
¯H
cannot be optimal.
Such a hypothetical provision rule would satisfy VQ ⊂ [Q¯L, Q
¯H
]. But this,
for such a provision rule to be optimal, would imply even VQ = [Q¯L, Q
¯H
].
However, this would be the degenerate case of a provision rule with four
mass points, which results as the limit outcome as Qs4 converges to Q¯L and
Ql4 converges to Q
¯H
. Under a provision rule characterized by four mass points
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expected welfare EW satisfies the following equation:
EW
λ
= pˆ
[
v¯
(
pˆ
2
)
Qs4 −K(Qs4)
]
+ (pˆ′ − pˆ)
[
v¯
(
pˆ′ + pˆ
2
)
Qˆs4 −K(Qˆs4)
]
+
p˜′∫
pˆ′
{¯
v(p)Q∗(p)−K(Q∗(p))
}
dp+ (p˜−p˜′)
[
v¯
(
p˜′ + p˜
2
)
Q˜l4−K(Q˜l4)
]
+(1− p˜)
[
v¯
(
1 + p˜
2
)
Ql4 −K(Ql4)
]
,
where Qˆs4 and pˆ
′ are implicit functions of Qs4. Similarly, Q˜
l
4 and p˜
′ are implicit
functions of Ql4. Taking these functional relationships into account one may
compute the partial derivatives and verify that
lim
Qs
4
→Q¯L
∂EW (Qs
4
, Ql
4
)
∂Qs
4
< 0 and lim
Ql
4
→Q
H
∂EW (Qs
4
, Ql
4
)
∂Ql
4
> 0.
Thus, Qs4 = Q¯L and Q
l
4 = Q
¯H
cannot be optimal.
We now argue in a similar manner that it cannot be optimal to choose a
provision rule such that there exist y, z ∈ VQ with Q¯L < y < Q
¯H
< z, but
such that there does not exist x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L.
Note that for such a provision rule to be a solution, y ≤ z˜ by IV, and
hence VQ = [Q¯L, z˜]∪{z} by optimality and step 1. Again, this is a degenerate
case of a provision rule with four mass points, namely the one that results
as Qs4 converges to Q¯L and Q
l
4 = z. As above this hypothetical solution can
be ruled out as lim
Qs
4
→Q¯L
∂EW (Qs
4
, Ql
4
)
∂Qs
4
< 0.
The analogous argument allows to rule out a provision rule such that
there exist x, y ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L < y < Q
¯H
but such that there does not
exist z ∈ VQ with z > Q
¯H
.
Step 3. We now claim that a provision rule, for which there exist x, y ∈ VQ
with Q¯L < x < y < Q
¯H
, is a candidate for a solution only if the whole interval
satisfies [x, y] ⊂ VQ.
By step 2, there are a, b ∈ VQ with a < Q¯L < Q
¯H
< b. However, for
such a provision rule to be a solution, aˆ ≤ x < y ≤ b˜ by IV, and hence
[x, y] ⊂ [aˆ, b˜] ⊂ VQ by optimality.
Steps 1-3 imply that an optimal provision rule under IV that is not con-
stant has to be one with two, three or four mass points.
2
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Proof of Lemma 3.9.
By definition, Q
∗∗
N is monotonically increasing in p and inherits the IV prop-
erty from the fact that {Q∗∗N (m)}Nm=0 is RSN . This is obvious from the char-
acterization of RSN in Lemma 3.4 and the characterization of IV in Lemma
3.6. Hence, by the optimality of Q∗∗ among the provision rules satisfying IV,
EW
∗∗
N ≤ EW ∗∗.
It remains to show that EW ∗∗N ≤ EW
∗∗
N . In order to compute EW
∗∗
N , we
first collect a number of observations wich are easily verified by the reader.
1. For all p
¯
, p¯ ∈ [0, 1]
p¯∫
p
¯
v¯(p)dp = (p¯− p
¯
)v¯
(
p¯+ p
¯
2
)
.
2. For all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}
m+ 1
2
N + 1
=
m+ 1
N + 2
+
m− 1
2
N
(N + 1)(N + 2)
.
3. For all x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x+ y ∈ [0, 1]
v¯(x+ y) = v¯(x) +
θH − θL
λ
y.
4. Recall that by equation (3.5)
EW ∗∗N = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q∗∗N (m)−K(Q∗∗N (m))
}
.
Using these equalities one arrives at
EW
∗∗
N = λ
1∫
0
{
v¯(p)Q
∗∗
N (p)−K(Q
∗∗
N (p))
}
dp
= EW ∗∗N +
θH − θL
(N + 1)2(N + 2)
N∑
m=0
(m− 1
2
N)Q∗∗N (m) .
To complete the proof it remains to show that
N∑
m=0
(m − 1
2
N)Q∗∗N (m) ≥ 0.
This expression will equal
1
2
N∑
m=0
(
1
2
N −m)(Q∗∗N (N −m)−Q∗∗N (m)) (3.11)
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if N is even and
N−1
2∑
m=0
(
1
2
N −m)(Q∗∗N (N −m)−Q∗∗N (m)) (3.12)
if N is odd. However, as Q∗∗N is increasing, those sums are non-negative.
Moreover, they are positive, and hence EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗
N , if and only if Q
∗∗
N is
not constant, i.e. Q∗∗N 6≡ Qu.
2
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Let Q∗∗ be a solution of problem P and Q∗∗|N its restriction to the domain
{0, 1, . . . , N}. By Lemma 3.7, Q∗∗|N is RSN . Denote by EW ∗∗|N the expected
welfare level induced by Q∗∗|N . Then, since Q
∗∗
N is optimal among the RSN
provision rules, EW ∗∗|N ≤ EW ∗∗N .
On the other hand,
EW ∗∗|N = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q∗∗(
m
N
)−K(Q∗∗(m
N
))
}
= λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m
N
)
Q∗∗(
m
N
)−K(Q∗∗(m
N
))
}
+
θH − θL
N(N + 1)(N + 2)
N∑
m=0
(N − 2m)Q∗∗(m
N
).
The first term in this sum is a so-called Riemann sum27 for v¯(p)Q∗∗(p) −
K(Q∗∗(p)) and thus converges to EW ∗∗ for growing N . The second term
in the sum is bounded from above by the expression
θH − θL
(N + 2)
Q∗∗(1), that is
vanishing for growing N . Consequently, lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗|N = EW
∗∗.
Summing up and using Lemma 3.9, the following chain of inequalities
must hold:
EW ∗∗ = lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗|N ≤ lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N ≤ EW ∗∗.
2
27See e.g. Heuser (1994, Chapter X).
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Proof of Corollary 3.2.
By Lemma 3.9 and Proposition 3.5,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N = lim
N→∞
EW
∗∗
N = EW
∗∗.
Note that Q
∗∗
N is IV for all N ∈ N. Thus, the uniqueness of Q∗∗ among the
provision rules satisfying IV and inducing EW ∗∗ implies the stated pointwise
convergence.
2
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
Denote by EW u the expected welfare induced by the constant provision rule
Qu an uninformed planner would choose. If Qu is not a solution to problem
P , then EW u < EW ∗∗.
If, for N ∈ N, a solution to problem PN satisfies Q∗∗N ≡ Qu then EW ∗∗N =
EW u < EW ∗∗. However, if Q∗∗N 6≡ Qu then EW ∗∗N < EW ∗∗ by Lemma 3.9.
2
Chapter 4
Robustness to sampling
This chapter addresses the problem of information aggregation under aggre-
gate uncertainty at a more abstract level, that is, for a general allocation
problem in a continuum economy. The notion of an individually incentive
compatible or decentralizable allocation rule is extended to ensure that an
allocation mechanism is not vulnerable to strategic behavior if a problem of
information aggregation arises. To this end, we introduce the requirement
of robustness to sampling. Underlying is the idea, that an allocation mecha-
nism is trustworthy in a large economy, only if it survives giving individuals
a marginal impact on the perceived state of the world. Besides that, we
introduce a more direct criterion of equilibrium selection called informative
subscription. It respects that whenever an agent is literally indifferent about
the own announcement in a revelation game, he will use his preferences over
the composition of the economy to break this indifference. Arguing that
the requirements of robustness to sampling and informative subscription are
essentially equivalent in the limit, we provide a simple tool to analyze prob-
lems of information aggregation under aggregate uncertainty in continuum
economies.
4.1 The environment
There is a continuum of individuals identified with the unit interval I = [0, 1]
and equipped with a measure µ. An individual i ∈ I has a utility function
U defined over the quantity Q ∈ R+ := [0,∞) of a non-excludable public
good and a vector of private goods A ∈ RL. In addition, utility depends on
individual characteristics. We distinguish a taste parameter θi ∈ Θ, Θ ⊂ R+,
to formalize heterogeneity regarding valuations of the public good and a
productivity or skill parameter wi ∈ Ω, Ω ⊂ R+. For brevity, we denote a
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pair of individual characteristics (θi, wi) by γi and the set Θ× Ω by Γ. The
utility level U is hence written as
U = U(Q,A, θi, wi) = U(Q,A, γi) .
We will often impose the assumption that the utility function U is additively
separable in the utility contribution of the public good, depending on the
taste parameter θi, and the utility contribution of A, depending on the skill
parameter wi.
Assumption 4.1 The utility function U is additively separable: for any
(θ, w) ∈ Θ× Ω,
U = v(Q, θ) + u(A,w) .
Typically, the skill parameter captures individual differences in the utility loss
associated with the need to generate a given income level. This is illustrated
by the following examples.
Example 1. A prominent example can be found in the theory of optimal
income taxation, in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Suppose that assump-
tion 4.1 holds and let A = (C, Y ) ∈ R2 be a pair specifying a consumption
level of private goods C and a level of effective labor supply or income Y .
Hence,
u = u(C, Y, w) .
Typically it is assumed in the literature on optimal income taxation that the
function u satisfies the following single crossing property ,
∀(Y,C) : ∂
∂w
(
dC
dY
)
|du=0
< 0 .
Hence, at any point in the Y -C plane the indifference curve of a less skilled
individual is steeper. I.e. the lower the skill parameter, the higher is the
required compensation for a marginal increase of effective labor supply.
Example 2. As another example, suppose that assumption 4.1 holds and
let
u = − t
w
.
A just captures an individual’s contribution t to the cost of public good pro-
vision. The utility loss associated with a given payment obligation decreases
in the skill parameter (see Chapter 3).
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The assignment of characteristics to individuals is formalized by an as-
signment function γa : I → Γ with image denoted by (γi)i∈I = (θi, wi)i∈I . It
is assumed throughout that there is assignment uncertainty . I.e. the function
γa – or equivalently the profile (γ
i)i∈I – is not commonly known. Instead,
individual i has private information on the parameters γi. It is assumed that
almost all conceivable assignments are measurable functions. This implies
that expressions such as
µ({i | θi ≤ θ and wi ≤ w}) or µ({i | θi ≤ θ })
are, for almost any resolution of assignment uncertainty γa, well defined.
Assumption 4.2 Each individual i ∈ I has private information on γi. Al-
most all assignments γa are measurable functions.
In addition to assignment uncertainty, there is aggregate uncertainty which
refers to the distribution of individual characteristics in the economy. From
an ex ante perspective there are different states of the world. Each such
state corresponds to a cumulative distribution function (cdf) D : Γ→ [0, 1],
which lists for each γ = (θ, w) the fraction of individuals with characteristics
γi ≤ γ,
D(γ) = µ({i | θi ≤ θ and wi ≤ w}) .
Assumption 4.3 There is aggregate uncertainty, in the sense that the actual
distribution of characteristics D in the economy is not commonly known.
There is a commonly known feasible set D of distributions.
The following information about the distribution of characteristics in the
economy is common knowledge. There is aggregate stability regarding the
marginal distribution of productivity parameters. That is, any feasible dis-
tribution D ∈ D gives rise to the same marginal cdf F , with F (w) = µ({i |
wi ≤ w }), of the skill parameter in the economy.
Assumption 4.4 There is aggregate stability with respect to the productivity
parameter. I.e. there is a commonly known marginal cumulative distribution
function F : Ω→ [0, 1].
In addition, it is commonly known that the marginal skill distribution and the
marginal taste distribution are independent. That is, there exists a bijection
between the set D and the set of feasible marginal cdfs of the taste parameter.
Assumption 4.5 The marginal taste and the marginal skill distribution are
independent. For any D ∈ D there exists a cdf G : Θ→ [0, 1] such that
∀(θ, w) : D(θ, w) = F (w)G(θ) .
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For the analysis below, it proves convenient to work with the assumption
that Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θm} is a finite ordered set. This implies that any G
is equivalently represented by a probability density g. Each such density
can be written as a finite list of probabilities g = (g1, . . . , gm), with the
understanding that the share of individuals with taste parameter θj in state
g is given by gj. Accordingly, the set G of possible states is represented by
the set of possible probability densities,
G := {v = (v1, . . . , vm) | ∀j : 0 ≤ vj ≤ 1 and
m∑
j=1
vj = 1} .
Assumption 4.6 The set of taste parameters Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θm} is a finite
ordered set, with θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θm.
Finally, in every state of the world g ∈ G, the profile of taste parameters
(θi)i∈I is taken to be the realization of a stochastic process (θ˜
i)i∈I of inde-
pendent and identically distributed (iid) random variables.
Assumption 4.7 For each g, the profile of taste parameters (θi)i∈I satisfies
the Law of Large Numbers for a Large Economy:
i) For each g, and for each θj ∈ Θ, and for each i ∈ I, the individual
probability that θ˜i equals θj is given by g(θj).
∀i ∈ I : gj = prob(θ˜i = θj | g) .
This relationship is stated as a conditional probability as it refers to
individual randomness conditional on a certain realization of aggregate
uncertainty, i.e. conditional on g.
ii) For each g and any k, l ∈ I the random variables θ˜k and θ˜l are inde-
pendent.
iii) For each g, ex post – that is after aggregate as well as individual uncer-
tainty have been resolved – the share of individuals with taste parameter
equal to θj is given by gj.
∀j : gj = µ({i | θi = θj}) .
Remark 4.1 If one assumes that the continuum I is the real interval [0, 1]
and that µ is the Lebesgue measure, then the assumption that (θ˜i)i∈I is a
process of iid random variables creates a measurability problem.1 Al-Najjar
1Details can be found in Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985).
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(2004) introduces a model of a large economy in which the Law of Large
Numbers as stated in assumption 4.7 holds true. In his model, I is an infinite
countable set and µ is an appropriate generalization of the counting measure.
Our analysis is based on these results.
4.2 Incentive compatible allocation rules
The set of admissible allocation rules is characterized using a mechanism de-
sign approach. More precisely, an allocation rule is said to be implementable
if it is the equilibrium outcome of some revelation game. In addition, we
restrict attention to anonymous allocation rules. An anonymous allocation
rule consists of two mappings, a provision rule for the public good,
Q : G → R+, g 7→ Q(g),
and a private goods allocation rule,
A : G × Γ→ RL+, (g, γ) 7→ A(g, γ) .
Definition 4.1 An anonymous allocation rule [Q,A] is said to be individu-
ally incentive compatible (I-IC) if
∀g,∀γˆ,∀γ : U(Q(g), A(g, γ), γ) ≥ U(Q(g), A(g, γˆ), γ) .
It is said to be feasible if in any state g, [Q(g), {A(g, γ)}γ∈Γ] belongs to the
economy’s production set.
Attention is henceforth restricted to allocation rules which are I-IC and fea-
sible. The requirement of incentive compatibility is due to the fact that
individuals have private information on their characteristics. This restricts
the possibilities for a differential treatment of individuals by an anonymous
allocation rule.
Note that the I-IC conditions are stated for a given g. This reflects that, in
a large economy, no single individual has a direct impact on the distribution
of announced characteristics. I.e. there is no impact on the state of the world
as perceived by the mechanism designer. In combination with the postulate of
anonymity this implies in particular, that no single individual has an impact
on public good provision.
An instructive alternative characterization of I-IC allocation rules has
been provided by Hammond (1979). He calls an allocation rule [Q,A] decen-
tralizable if there exists a collection of budget sets {B(g)}g∈G such that ∀γ,
∀g: A(g, γ) ∈ argmaxX∈B(g)U [Q(g), X, γ]. Hammond (1979) shows that an
allocation rule is decentralizable if and only if it is I-IC.
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Example 3. The equivalence between individual incentive compatibility
and decentralizability is used intensively in the theory of optimal income
taxation. To illustrate this, consider again the setting of Example 1 and
let A = (C, Y ). An allocation rule is thus represented by a collection of
mappings [Q,C, Y ]. Now define an income tax as follows: [Q,C, Y ] is called
an income tax, if there exists a function T : G × R+ → R such that for all g
and for all γ: Consumption equals after tax income:
C(g, γ) = Y (g, γ)− T (g, Y (g, γ)) ,
individuals choose a utility maximizing level of income subject to the given
income tax schedule,
Y (g, γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(g), Y − T (g, Y ), Y, γ) ,
and the public sector budget constraint is satisfied,∫
Γ
T (g, Y (g, γ))dD = K(Q(g)) ,
where K is a cost function, which captures the cost of public good provision.
In this setting, the results in Hammond (1979) yield the observation that an
allocation rule is I-IC and feasible if and only if it is an income tax.2
The I-IC constraints ensure that an individual is willing to reveal the
own characteristics for a given cross-section distribution of characteristics.
However, under aggregate uncertainty, an incentive compatible allocation
rule is used in addition for the purpose of information aggregation as the
mechanism designer has to deduce the actual distribution of characteristics
from the profile of individual announcements. To make this more explicit,
it is instructive to think of the revelation game in the following sequential
manner:
Sequence 4.1
1. The allocation mechanism specifies a collection of choice sets {B(g)}g∈G
and of public good provision levels {Q(g)}g∈G. I.e. there is a distinct
level of public good provision Q(g) and a distinct choice set B(g) for
each possible state g of the economy.
2. The mechanism collects all individual data and uses this information
to deduce the state of the world g.
2A formal proof can be found in Guesnerie (1995).
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3. The quantity Q(g) of the public good is provided. Individuals maximize
utility by a decentralized choice from the set B(g) and behave in the
intended manner due to I-IC.
4.3 The problem of multiple equilibria
The possibility to use an I-IC allocation rule for the purpose of informa-
tion aggregation under aggregate uncertainty, relies on the fact that, in a
large economy, individuals have no chance to affect directly the mechanism
designer’s perception of the state of the world.
As the discussion of the specific allocation problem in Chapter 3 has
shown, it could well be the case that individuals are entirely indifferent re-
garding their treatment for a given state of the world – suppose A(g, γ) is, for
given g, just a constant and hence independent of individual characteristics.
Consequently, the utility level an individual realizes depends only on the
mechanism designer’s state perception. As we argued before, in such a situa-
tion the implementability of an allocation rule can be questioned. Individuals
might apply the following reasoning: They want to avoid a perceived state
which they do not like and hence feel that, instead of revealing themselves,
they should contribute to a different state perception.
The present section serves to make this intuitive reasoning more precise.
We will show that the underlying problem which gives rise to this ‘temptation
to deviate’ is one of multiple equilibria. This is most easily demonstrated if
preferences satisfy the separability assumption 4.1. In this case I-IC holds
only if each individual possesses multiple best responses.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose assumption 4.1 holds. An anonymous allocation rule
is I-IC if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
i) The no discrimination of taste in terms of utility (NDT-U) property:
∀g,∀w,∀θ,∀θ′ : u(A(g, θ, w), w) = u(A(g, θ′, w), w) .
ii) The individual revelation of productivity (I-RP) property:
∀g,∀θ,∀w,∀w′ : u(A(g, θ, w), w) ≥ u(A(g, θ, w′), w) .
Proof. To prove the only if-part note that, because preferences satisfy as-
sumption 4.1, the NDT-U property is an implication of I-IC. Obviously I-RP
is also an implication of I-IC. To prove the if-part, suppose an allocation rule,
such that the NDT-U and the I-RP property hold, is not I-IC. Then there
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exist (θ, w) and (θˆ, wˆ) and g such that u(A(g, θ, w), w) < u(A(g, θˆ, wˆ), w).
Using NDT-U and I-RP one has: u(A(g, θˆ, wˆ), w) = u(A(g, θ, wˆ), w) ≤
u(A(g, θ, w), w). Hence, a contradiction.
2
The lemma follows from the fact that individuals take the state g and
hence the level of public good provision as given. Due to the separability
assumption, the utility contribution of the public good vanishes from indi-
vidual incentive compatibility constraints. In particular, this implies that
I-IC conditions become independent of taste parameters. Consequently, an
I-IC allocation mechanism can use only individual differences in productivity
as a screening device and leaves all individuals indifferent regarding possible
taste announcements.
To make the implications of this observation for the multiplicity of best
responses in the revelation game apparent, the following notation is intro-
duced. For an individual with characteristics γ, denote by b[g | γ] the set of
best responses in the revelation game if the distribution of announcements is
given by g,
b[g | γ] := argmaxγ˜ U(Q(g), A(g, γ˜), γ) .
Making use of this notation, the I-IC condition is equivalently written as
∀g,∀γ: γ ∈ b[g | γ]. Under the NDT-U property, however, b[g | γ] is not a
singleton. For an individual with characteristics γ = (θ, w) any announce-
ment (θˆ, wˆ) with wˆ = w belongs to b[g | γ]. Put differently, with separable
preferences, individuals are willing to announce any taste parameter.
Recall that by assumption 4.5 aggregate uncertainty is entirely due to
the unknown marginal distribution of taste parameters. The implementabil-
ity of an allocation rule hence requires that all individuals reveal their taste
parameter truthfully and that the true distribution of characteristics can be
deduced from the profile of taste announcements. Consequently, assuming
that individual incentive compatibility and feasibility are sufficient condi-
tions for implementability is equivalent to the assumption that individual
indifference among all taste announcements is always broken in favor of the
truth.
We believe that this postulate is not particularly plausible based on the
observation, that individuals are not indifferent with respect to the mecha-
nism designer’s state perception. They just have no direct influence on it.
In case of being literally indifferent among all conceivable taste announce-
ments, individuals might break indifference as well such that they indirectly
contribute to a more favorable announced distribution of taste parameters.
This is the perspective that we want to adopt in the following. We say
that an allocation rule is robustly implementable only if it survives breaking
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indifference in the way just outlined. The refinement which we discuss in the
next subsections serves to achieve this notion of stability.
4.4 Finite samples
As a preliminary step for the definition of our refinement concept, in this
section we consider the following situation: the mechanism designer first col-
lects data on taste parameters from a finite random sample SN of individuals
with sample size N . He observes the distribution of characteristics in the
sample and updates his prior beliefs about the actual state of the economy.
These updated beliefs are interpreted as the perceived state of the world.
Based on these beliefs, the mechanism designer decides in a second step on a
level of public good provision Q and on the menu of private goods B which
is offered to the individuals in the economy. Finally, individuals enjoy the
public good and choose their utility maximizing element from the menu B.
This allows to get rid of the multiple equilibrium problem in the following
manner. It is assumed that the mechanism designer’s estimation procedure is
commonly known. This implies that all sampled individuals can predict how
their own statement on their preference parameter affects the provision level
Q and the menu B. The refinement idea now works as follows: We require
that sample members make a taste announcement which is consistent with
their optimizing behavior at the final stage. Under this constraint, sample
members are free to choose the taste announcement which affects the mech-
anism designer’s state perception in the most favorable way. As will become
clear, this implies that, whenever individuals have a multiplicity of best op-
tions at the final stage, indifference is broken such that their announcement
contributes to the most preferred state perception.
As a result of these considerations, allocation rules are made more robust
as they do not depend any more on a fragile way of breaking individual
indifference. However, this comes at a cost. In order to ensure that sampled
individuals are willing to reveal their taste parameter, even if they are granted
some influence on the mechanism designer’s state perception, an additional
set of incentive conditions comes into play. As will become clear, I-IC and
feasibility are no more sufficient conditions for implementability.
4.4.1 Information aggregation based on sampling
In this paragraph we describe how a certain state perception of the mech-
anism designer comes about, if the actual state of the economy can not be
deduced from the whole profile of announcements (γˆi)i∈I but instead a finite
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random sample of taste parameters is evaluated.
Recall that each state of the economy can be represented by a vector
g ∈ G . We assume that the mechanism designer has some prior beliefs on
the likelihood of different states. That is, he attaches probability weights to
the elements of G. These prior beliefs are formalized with a density function
φ : G → R+, defined on the set of possible states of the world.
The mechanism designer draws a random sample SN of N individuals
and evaluates the profile of taste parameters which is denoted by θN :=
{θ1, θ2, . . . , θN}, where θj is the taste parameter of the sample member at
position j, j ∈ {1, . . . N}. A sample realization gives rise to an empirical
sample density, denoted by
gN = (gN1, . . . , gNm) ,with gNk =
#{j ∈ SN | θj = θk}
N
.
The set of possible sample realizations GN is represented by the set of m-
dimensional vectors v = (v1, . . . , vm) such that each component vk is a mul-
tiple of 1/N and such that all components sum up to 1,
GN := {v | ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},∃x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} : vk = x
N
and
m∑
k=1
vk = 1} .
Note that GN is a finite set. A typical element is denoted by gN or, if
the dependence on a specific underlying profile of taste parameters deserves
emphasis, by gN(θN).
After observing a certain sample distribution of characteristics gN , the
planner updates his prior beliefs on the likelihood of different states. These
updated beliefs constitute the perceived state of the economy based on a
finite sample of size N . Formally, a perceived state is a conditional density
function, which is derived using Bayes’ rule,
φN(· | gN) : G → R+ ,with φN(g | gN) = prob(gN | g)φ(g)∫
G
prob(gN | g)φ(g)dg .
We use in the following the notation φN to denote a typical posterior density
of the mechanism designer. If we want to emphasize the dependence on a
certain sample distribution we write φN(· | gN) or φN(· | gN(θN)).
Note that there exists a bijection between the set GN of possible sample
distributions and the set of posterior density functions. With a slight abuse
of notation, we will write φN ∈ GN to indicate that there exists a sample
realization gN , which gives rise to the state perception φN .
Remark 4.2 One can derive an explicit expression for prob(gˆN | g). Making
repeated use of conditional probabilities and the binomial probability distrib-
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ution one verifies that
prob(gˆN = v | g) =
m∏
k=1
(N−NPmj=k+1 vj
Nvk
)
gNvkk (1− gk)(N−N
Pm
j=k vj) ,
with the convention that
∑m
j=m+1 vj = 0.
4.4.2 Allocation rules based on sampling
Having clarified how the mechanism designer uses the sample information to
update his prior beliefs on the likelihood of different states of the economy,
we now define the notion of an allocation rule based on sampling of size N .
It consists of a provision rule for public goods,
QN : GN → R+, φN 7→ QN(φN) ,
and a private goods allocation rule
AN : GN × Γ→ RL+, (φN , γ) 7→ AN(φN , γ) .
Both functions depend on the perceived state of the world φN , as opposed to
the actual distribution g of characteristics in the economy. I.e. based on the
sample observation gN the mechanism designer forms beliefs φN and decides
on public good provision and the offered menu of private goods.
We require that the pair [QN , AN ] is feasible, i.e. for each state perception
φN and for each actual state g the collection {QN(φN), {AN(φN , γ)}γ∈Γ} lies
in the economy’s production set. In addition, we consider only pairs [QN , AN ]
which permit a decentralization via a collection of budget sets {B(φN)}φN∈G.
Equivalently, again I-IC is required, i.e.
∀φN∀γ∀γˆ : U(QN(φN), AN(φN , γ), γ) ≥ U(QN(φN), AN(φN , γˆ), γ) .
To sum up, whenever we consider allocation rules based on sampling we refer
to the following sequence of actions.
Sequence 4.2
1. The allocation mechanism specifies a collection of choice sets
{B(φN)}φN∈G and of public good provision levels {Q(φN)}φN∈G. I.e.
there is a distinct level of public good provision Q(φN) and a distinct
choice set B(φN) for each possible state perception φN .
2. The mechanism collects individual data from sample members and uses
this information to arrive at the actual state perception φN . As a con-
sequence φN is via gN a function of θN , the profile of taste parameters
in the sample.
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3. The quantity Q(φN) of the public good is provided. Individuals maxi-
mize utility by a decentralized choice from the set B(φN) and behave in
the intended manner due to I-IC.
4.4.3 Robust implementation based on sampling
Similarly as in the previous section, the set of optimal announcements at the
final allocation stage is denoted by bN [φN | γ] and formally defined as
bN [φN | γ] := argmaxγ˜ U(QN(φN), AN(φN , γ˜), γ) .
As has been clarified before, I-IC is equivalent to the requirement that ∀φN ,
γ ∈ bN [φN | γ]. In general, however, the set bN [φN | γ] is not a singleton.
E.g. as discussed in the previous section, if U satisfies additive separability,
then I-IC holds only if any announcement (θˆ, wˆ) with wˆ = w belongs to
bN [φN | γ].
To eliminate the possibility that individuals break this indifference in
such a way as to contribute indirectly to a false state perception, we now
introduce a condition, which we call robustness to sampling of size N (RSN).
Some additional notation is needed. Let θN−i be the vector of character-
istics for all sample members with exception of individual i. For a sample
member i ∈ SN with characteristics γ = (θ, w), denote by
rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)] :=
{
(θˆ, wˆ) | (θˆ, wˆ) ∈ bN [φN(· | gN(θN−1, θˆ)) | (θ, w)]
}
the refined best response set , i.e. the set of best responses at the final stage
which are consistent with reporting θˆ in case of being a sample member at
stage 2. Finally, denote by ΦN(θN−i | (θ, w)) the set of state perceptions
a sample member i with characteristics (θ, w) has at his disposal if he is
constrained not do deviate from this refined best response set,
ΦN(θN−i | (θ, w)) :=
{
φN(· | g(θN−i, θˆ)) | ∃wˆ : (θˆ, wˆ) ∈ rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)]
}
.
A typical element of ΦN(θN−i | (θ, w)) is henceforth by φˆN . The element
which results if sample member i reveals his taste parameter truthfully, is
denoted φN .
Definition 4.2 An I-IC and feasible pair [QN , AN ], is said to be robust to
sampling of size N (RSN) if
∀i ∈ SN ,∀θN−i,∀(θ, w), and ∀φˆN ∈ ΦN(θN−i | (θ, w)) :
U(QN(φN), AN(φN , θ, w), θ, w) ≥ U(QN(φˆN), AN(φˆN , θ, w), θ, w) .
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Remark 4.3 The RSN property can alternatively be written as follows:
∀i ∈ SN ,∀θN−i,∀(θ, w), and ∀φˆN ∈ ΦN(θN−i | (θ, w)) :
U(QN(φN), AN(φN , θ, w), θ, w) ≥ U(QN(φˆN), AN(φˆN , θˆ, wˆ), θ, w) ,
with the understanding that (θˆ, wˆ) ∈ rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)] is the announcement
which induces the state perception φˆN . To see that this condition is equivalent,
note that by I-IC, for all (θ, w) and for all θN−i, (θ, w) ∈ rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)].
Hence, both (θ, w) and (θˆ, wˆ) belong to the best response set rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)],
and we have:
U(QN(φˆN), AN(φˆN , θ, w), θ, w) = U(QN(φˆN), AN(φˆN , θˆ, wˆ), θ, w) .
The RSN -constraints are to be read as follows: Suppose an individual hap-
pens to be a sample member and is able to foresee how his or her announce-
ment affects the estimate φN and hence the level of public good provision
Q(φN) as well as his own choice from the set B(φN) := {A(φN , γ)}γ∈Γ. The
individual is constraint to give a best response at the final stage. Further-
more, the individual is required to behave at the sampling stage consistent
with the best response he finally plans to give. These consistency require-
ments define the refined best response set rbN [·]. That is, we apply a lexico-
graphic reasoning : Only if optimal behavior at the final stage is not uniquely
determined we grant a sample member a degree of freedom. He may devi-
ate from the truth at the sampling stage only if this deviation is compatible
with some alternative best response taking the induced perceived state of the
world as given.
The requirement of RSN serves as a refinement of I-IC. It restricts the
admissible ways to break the indifference individuals may have at the final
stage. The refinement says that implementability of an allocation rule is
incompatible with the existence of false reports, which are consistent with
optimal individual behavior ex post and – conditional on being a sample
member – strictly superior. Loosely speaking, one may not break indifference
in favor of truth-telling if this counters individual incentives as soon as the
individual has some – possibly arbitrarily small – influence on the perception
of the state of the world.3
3To see that those statements are formally sound, note that, if bN [·] happens to be a
singleton for all φN and hence contains only the truth, then the RSN -property is implied
by I-IC.
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4.4.4 RSN under separable preferences
Under the assumption that preferences are additively separable, the require-
ment of RSN can be simplified. Recall that under this specification I-IC
holds only if individuals are willing to announce any taste parameter. As we
will show in the following, the RSN requirement holds if and only if sampled
individuals are willing to announce the true taste parameter.
To see this, it proves convenient to introduce a partition of the set
rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)]. We refer to the collection of those elements for which
wˆ = w, in the following as rb∗N [θN−i | (θ, w)]. Note that under the sep-
arability assumption 4.1, rb∗N [θN−i | (θ, w)] is equal to {(θˆ, wˆ) | wˆ = w}.
The set of elements of rbN [θN−i | (θ, w)], for which wˆ 6= w, is denoted by
rb′N [θN−i | (θ, w)].
Lemma 4.2 Suppose the separability assumption 4.1 holds. The restriction
of the RSN -requirement to the set rb
∗
N [θN−i | (θ, w)] is sufficient for overall
RSN .
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose the RSN requirement
holds if applied to the set rb∗N [θN−i | (θ, w)], but ∃θN−i, ∃(θ, w), ∃(θˆ, wˆ) ∈
rb′N [θN−i | (θ, w)] such that the induced state perception φˆN satisfies
v(Q(φN), θ) + u(A(φN , θ, w), w) < v(Q(φˆN), θ) + u(A(φˆN , θ, w), w) .
However, the state perception φˆN is also induced if the report (θˆ, wˆ) is re-
placed by (θˆ, w) ∈ rb∗N [θN−i | (θ, w)]. Hence a contradiction to the assump-
tion that the RSN requirement is fulfilled for reports in the set rb
∗
N [θN−i |
(θ, w)].
2
Denote by Φ∗N(θN−i) the set of state perceptions sample member i can
induce via some announcement from {(θˆ, wˆ) | wˆ = w},
Φ∗N(θN−i) := {φN(· | gN(θN−i, θˆ))}θˆ∈Θ .
Again, denote a typical element of Φ∗N by φˆN . Denote by φN the element
which results if sample member i has taste parameter θ and reports this
parameter truthfully.
Corollary 4.1 With separable preferences RSN holds if and only if
∀θN−i,∀(θ, w),∀φˆN ∈ Φ∗N(θN−i) :
v(Q(φN), θ) + u(A(φN , θ, w), w) ≥ v(Q(φˆN), θ) + u(A(φˆN , θ, w), w) .
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We have thus arrived at a separation of incentive problems. The RSN -
constraints deal with a revelation of those characteristics for which aggregate
uncertainty prevails – assuming that the assignment uncertainty regarding
individual earning ability has been resolved. The I-IC constraints by contrast
address the revelation of skill parameters, which satisfy aggregate stability.
4.4.5 Mechanism design based on finite samples
In this paragraph we define a mechanism design problem under the assump-
tion that only a finite random sample of individuals is used for the purpose
of information aggregation.
The investigation of this class of mechanism design problems is not the
main focus of this paper’s analysis. However, as will become clear, the defin-
ition of an optimal allocation rule with the RSN property is an ingredient for
a definition of optimal allocation rules which are robust to sampling, without
referring to a particular sample size N .
We consider the mechanism design problem of a utilitarian planner who
has prior beliefs φ on the distribution of taste parameters in the economy.
His object of choice is an implementable allocation rule based on sampling
of size N . I.e. the mechanism designer chooses a pair of functions [QN , AN ]
with the properties of feasibility, I-IC and RSN . The planner’s objective is
to maximize expected utilitarian welfare from an ex ante perspective.
To complete the statement of the mechanism design problem, this objec-
tive function is derived as follows: Ex post, under a given state perception
φN and for a given state of the economy g, utilitarian welfare is given by
WN(φN , g) :=
∫
Θ
∫
W
U(QN(φN), AN(φN , θ, w)), θ, w)f(w)dw g(θ)dθ .
From the interim perspective, the state of the world is not known, but the
planner has already observed the sample realization gN and has derived at
the posterior beliefs φN . From the interim perspective expected utilitarian
welfare equals,
EW intN (φN) =
∫
G
WN(φN , g)φN(g | gN)dg .
The planners’s objective function is given by expected utilitarian welfare
from an ex ante perspective. Accordingly, the planner has not yet observed a
certain sample realization and perceives φN as a random quantity. Expected
utilitarian welfare from the ex ante perspective thus reads as
EWN =
∑
GN
EW intN (φN) prob(φN)
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where prob(φN) is equal to the ex ante probability to observe the sample
realization gN . Hence,
prob(φN) = prob(gN) =
∫
G
prob(gN | g)φ(g)dg ,
where φ are the planner’s ex ante beliefs.
We are now able to formally define an optimal allocation rule based on
sampling of size N .
Definition 4.3 The mechanism design problem based on a finite sample of
size N is to find a pair of functions [QN , AN ], which maximizes the expected
welfare function EWN subject to the constraints of feasibility, I-IC and RSN .
We will refer to the solution of this problem henceforth as [Q∗∗N , A
∗∗
N ].
We call this mechanism design problem in the following the finite sample
problem.
4.4.6 Some clarifying remarks
Remark 4.4 A first remark concerns the question whether our sampling ap-
proach should be really understood as a sequential game with two distinct
stages, an early stage for information aggregation and a final stage for public
goods provision and the allocation of private goods. Even though we distin-
guish these two stages, we conform with the common approach in the theory
of mechanism design to use the normal form for a characterization of the set
of admissible allocation rules. To see this, frame the final stage as a revela-
tion game – as opposed to a collection of decentralized utility maximization
problems. This yields a revelation game with two stages, in which individuals
who happen to be in the sample have to report their characteristics twice.
However, the consistency requirements which shape the refined best response
set ensure that sampled individuals undertake the same report twice.
Remark 4.5 Another clarification concerns the estimation procedure. At
the sampling stage, the perceived state of the world φN is determined such that
an allocation rule [QN , AN ] does not make use of the full sample information.
Neither the level of public good provision Q(φN) nor the menu B(φN) depend
on the vector wN := {wi}i∈SN . This implies a loss of generality for two
different reasons:
i) As long as one does not assume that the empirical distributions induced
by the sets of parameters (θi)i∈I and (w
i)i∈I are independent, this partial
ignorance will affect the statistical accuracy of the estimate of the true
distribution of characteristics.
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ii) Even if independence is assumed, the incentive constraints at the esti-
mation stage – i.e. the RSN constraints – depend on the whole vector
of individual characteristics, i.e. on w and on θ. Consequently, a more
general sampling approach would make the level of public good provi-
sion Q(·) and the menu of private goods B(·) a function of the empirical
distribution of sample characteristics induced by (wN , θN).
The main line of defense for our sampling approach is twofold. First, it is
more tractable. The allocation mechanism reacts identically to all samples
which give rise to the same statistical estimate of the true state of the world.
Second, our main interest lies in asymptotic results. As the sample size
gets very large, the law of large numbers implies that the empirical cross
section distribution of {wi}i∈SN converges to F . Hence, in a large sample
our approach should not be misleading.
Remark 4.6 Finally, we comment a peculiarity of our approach which is a
no discrimination of sampled individuals-property. That is, individuals who
happen to be in the sample are – at the final screening stage – not treated
differently as compared to individuals with the same characteristics who hap-
pened not to be in the sample. In particular, this precludes the possibility to
design a specific scheme of payments for sample members to let them inter-
nalize the impact of their statements on the whole system. In this sense, our
approach rules out transferable utility among sampled individuals. Put differ-
ently, it forces individuals to take the impact of their announcement on their
personal well-being – via its impact on the final screening mechanism – into
account. There is no additional instrument that permits an internalization
of the impact on the well being of others.4
The reason is that our attempt is to provide a guideline to a problem of
equilibrium selection for incentive compatible allocation mechanisms in con-
tinuum economies. We do not aim to model a different game that gives rise
to a different set of equilibria. This is captured formally by restricting sam-
pled individuals to choose among their best responses at the final allocation
stage.
4Green and Laffont (1979) analyze a tradeoff between information precision and com-
munication costs in the context of Clarke-Groves mechanisms. These authors also use the
idea of sampling and ask for the optimal size of the subset of individuals subjected to the
play of a Clarke-Groves mechanism. Inherent in their approach is the possibility of an
allocation mechanism which treats individuals in the sample different from those outside
the sample. Here, by contrast, the allocation rule treats all individuals with the same
characteristics identically.
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4.5 Informative subscription
We return in this section to the set of anonymous allocation rules defined in
Section 4.2. The objective is to propose a simple rule for breaking individual
indifference if the problem of multiple equilibria, discussed in Section 4.3,
arises. The main idea is illustrated as follows: Suppose an individual with
characteristics (θ, w) is willing to announce (θ′, w′) in two states of the econ-
omy, namely if the distribution of characteristics equals g and if it equals g′,
where g and g′ differ only by the shares of individuals with taste parameters
θ′ and θ. Under g′, the share of individuals with θ′ is higher. Imposing the
requirement of informative subscription means, that the individual has to be
weakly better off in state g. Otherwise he was tempted to break indifference
in such a way as to contribute indirectly to a more favorable state perception.
In more abstract terms, we apply a lexicographic reasoning. In a revela-
tion game based on an anonymous allocation rule, individuals make a utility
maximizing announcement taking the state of the economy as given. If these
considerations still allow for a wide range of optimal announcements due to
multiple equilibria, then individuals are assumed to take their preferences
over the composition of the economy into account. I.e. indifference is bro-
ken such that individuals contribute indirectly to the most preferred state
perception. Informative subscription thus requires that an individual wants
to subscribe to the ‘right’ group of individuals, namely those who share the
own characteristics.
A clarification of the relationship between the requirements of informative
subscription and robustness to sampling introduced in the previous Section
4.4, is postponed until the next section. There we will argue, for the case of
separable preferences, that robust allocation rules based on sampling of size
N are in the limit as N →∞ essentially – that is, for the purpose of welfare
analysis – the same as allocation rules under informative subscription.
4.5.1 Allocation rules under informative subscription
Recall that an anonymous allocation rule is represented by a provision rule
for the public good Q : g 7→ Q(g) and an allocation rule for private goods
A : (g, θ, w) 7→ A(g, θ, w). As before, we restrict attention to those allocation
rules which are feasible and I-IC. The purpose of this paragraph is to define
an additional set of constraints, referred to as informative subscription (IS)
constraints.
Some additional notation is needed. Suppose the true state of the econ-
omy is given by g = (g1, . . . , gm). With reference to g, define Gkl(g) as the
subset of G such that, relative to g, more individuals have taste parameter
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θl and less individuals have taste parameter θk, anything else being equal.
Formally,
Gkl(g) := {v ∈ G | ∃ǫ ≥ 0 : vk = gk − ǫ, vl = gl + ǫ, vj = gj else} .
Moreover, we write g′ k≤l g to indicate that g′ ∈ Gkl(g). Likewise we write
g′ k<l g if g′ ∈ Gkl(g)\{g}.
Definition 4.4 Consider an I-IC and feasible allocation rule [Q,A]. This
allocation rule is said to satisfy the property of informative subscription (IS)
if the following statement holds true: for any g ∈ G, any k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
with k 6= l, any g′ k<l g and any w ∈ Ω, whenever (θl, wˆ) ∈ b[g¯ | (θk, w)] for
all g¯ with g′ k≤l g¯ k≤l g then,
U(Q(g), A(g, θk, w), θk, w) ≥ U(Q(g′), A(g′, θk, w), θk, w) .
The definition says that, whenever an individual with characteristics (θk, w)
is willing to make the same false announcement (θl, wˆ) in the true state of
the world, g, as well as in any false one, g¯, that results if, starting from g,
one successively replaces individuals with taste parameter θk by individuals
with taste parameter θl until arriving at g
′, then it must not prefer to live in
state g′.
IS is a local requirement because, if g′′ k<l g′ k<l g, then by transitivity
an individual with characteristics (θk, w) prefers not only g over g
′ and g′
over g′′ but also g over g′′. Hence, if the IS property holds for pairs g′ and
g which are arbitrary close to each other, then it holds for all elements of
Gkl(g). I.e. even though the above definition applies to any pair g′ and g with
g′ k<l g, it is essentially a condition on neighboring pairs.
The postulate that (θl, wˆ) ∈ b[g¯ | (θk, w)] for all g¯ with g′ k≤l g¯ k≤l g
reflects the idea that an individual is tempted to contribute to a false state
perception only if he is ensured not to be harmed. Accordingly, a ‘temptation
to deviate’ is considered only if all states g¯ between g and g′ are such that
the false announcement (θl, wˆ) belongs to the best response set b[g¯ | (θk, w)].
That is, even if the individual is not able to predict exactly the final state
perception but only knows the ‘direction’ to which he contributes, he is not
forced to depart from optimizing behavior.
The IS requirement ensures incentive compatibility ex post in the follow-
ing sense: After the true state of the world g has become commonly known,
there must not exist individuals with the impression that they should have
undertaken a false taste announcement in order to contribute indirectly to a
different state perception.
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4.5.2 IS under separable preferences
In this paragraph we show that under the assumption of separable prefer-
ences, the IS condition can be considerably simplified. Recall that the separa-
bility assumption 4.1 implies that the requirement of I-IC can be decomposed
into the I-RP property and the NDT-U property. The latter implies that in-
dividuals are willing to announce any taste parameter. I.e. for all g, and all
(θ, w), the set
b∗(θ, w) := {(θˆ, wˆ) | θ ∈ Θ and wˆ = w}
is contained in b[g | (θ, w)]. Denote by b′[g | (θ, w)] the complement of
b∗(θ, w),
b′[g | (θ, w)] := {(θˆ, wˆ) ∈ b[g | (θ, w)] | wˆ 6= w} .
In analogy to lemma 4.2, we first show that to ensure IS, it is sufficient to
ensure that this property holds for reports in b∗(θ, w).
Lemma 4.3 Suppose the separability assumption 4.1 holds. The restriction
of the IS requirement to the set b∗(θ, w) is sufficient for overall IS.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose there exists (θ, w)
such that the IS requirement holds if applied to the set b∗(θ, w), but there
exist g, and k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and g′ k<l g and (θl, wˆ) such that (θl, wˆ) ∈ b′[g¯ |
(θk, w)] for all g¯ with g
′ k≤l g¯ k≤l g and
v(Q(g), θk) + u(A(g, θk, w), w) < v(Q(g
′), θk) + u(A(g
′, θk, w), w) .
However, under separable preferences, for all g, (θl, w) ∈ b∗(θ, w). Hence, a
contradiction to the assumption that the IS requirement is fulfilled for reports
in the set b∗(θ, w).
2
The observation that the IS property has to be postulated for the reports
in b∗(θ, w) only, yields the following characterization of the IS property under
separable preferences.
Corollary 4.2 Suppose the separability assumption 4.1 holds. Consider an
I-IC and feasible allocation rule [Q,A]. This allocation rule satisfies the
property of informative subscription (IS) if and only if the following statement
holds true: for any g ∈ G, any k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with k 6= l, any g′ k<l g and
any w ∈ Ω:
v(Q(g), θk) + u(A(g, θk, w), w) ≥ v(Q(g′), θk) + u(A(g′, θk, w), w) .
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Analogously to corollary 4.1, we now have a separation of incentive condi-
tions. The IS-constraints deal with a revelation of those characteristics for
which aggregate uncertainty prevails – assuming that individuals reveal their
skill levels truthfully. The I-IC constraints by contrast address the revelation
of skill parameters.
Under separable preferences, the condition of informative subscription
has a straightforward interpretation. In any state g, an individual with taste
parameter θk must not prefer to live in an economy in which less individuals
have taste parameter θk. I.e. the informative subscription condition ensures
that an individual always wants to support the group of individuals who
share the own taste parameter.
4.5.3 Mechanism design under IS
We can now define a mechanism design problem for anonymous allocation
rules [Q,A] which have to satisfy feasibility, I-IC and IS conditions. As in
Subsection 4.4.5 we assume that the mechanism designer has prior beliefs
φ on the distribution of taste parameters in the economy and aims at a
maximization of expected utilitarian welfare from an ex ante perspective. To
derive this objective function, denote the level of utilitarian welfare realized
ex post, as a function of the actual state g of the economy, by
W (g) :=
∫
Θ
∫
W
U(Q(g), A(g, θ, w)), θ, w)f(w)dw g(θ)dθ .
The objective function is given by expected utilitarian welfare from an ex
ante perspective. Accordingly, the mechanism designer has not yet observed
a certain sample realization and perceives g as a random quantity. Expected
utilitarian welfare from the ex ante perspective is given by
EW :=
∫
G
W (g)φ(g)dg .
Definition 4.5 The mechanism design problem under the requirement of
informative subscription is to find an anonymous allocation rule [Q,A] which
maximizes EW subject to the constraints of feasibility, I-IC and IS.
For brevity, we refer to this mechanism design problem as the informative
subscription problem.
4.6 The relationship between RSN and IS
In this section we argue that under the assumption of separable preferences
the previously defined mechanism design problems are essentially equivalent
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as N →∞. That is, for large N , an allocation rule based on sampling of size
N , which satisfies robustness to sampling, can be found such that it induces
a level of expected welfare arbitrarily close to that of any given allocation
rule which satisfies the requirement of informative subscription.
We proceed in two steps. First, it is shown that if one restricts the domain
of an allocation rule [Q,A] which satisfies the IS property, one arrives at a
pair [QN , AN ] with the RSN property. This allows to show in a second step,
that, for large N , a mechanism designer with a finite sample problem can
approximate any outcome under informative subscription. The latter part of
the argument is only sketched. We appeal to the Law of Large Numbers to
establish this result. However, we do so only informally, without specifying
the details of the underlying probability spaces and the appropriate notions
of convergence.
Let [Q,A], with Q : G → R+ and A : G × Γ→ RL, be a given allocation
rule. Note that, for any N , GN ⊂ G. Denote by [Q|N , A|N ] the restriction of
[Q,A] to the domain GN . I.e. the functions Q|N : GN → R+ and A|N : GN ×
Γ→ RL, coincide with Q and A, respectively, for g ∈ GN . The interpretation
is that whenever the sample realization gN is observed and the corresponding
state perception φN is induced, then the allocation rule based on sampling
[Q|N , A|N ] prescribes the same outcome as [Q,A].
Intuitively, as N → ∞ the set GN lies dense in G and the domain of
[Q,A] and the domain of the restriction [Q|N , A|N ] are ‘essentially’ the same.
The following lemma shows that, in addition, if [Q,A] is admissible under
informative subscription, then [Q|N , A|N ] satisfies all relevant constraints of
a finite sample problem.
Lemma 4.4 Suppose that preferences satisfy the separability assumption 4.1.
If [Q,A] satisfies feasibility, I-IC and IS, then, for any N , [Q|N , A|N ] satisfies
feasibility, I-IC and RSN .
Proof. By corollary 4.2, the IS property implies that for any k, l ∈{1, . . . ,m}
and any pairwise comparison of a pair g′, g with g′ ≤kl g, an individual
with taste parameter θk prefers state g over g
′. Now consider the restric-
tion [Q|N , A|N ]. For some θN−i consider two state perceptions φN and φˆN in
Φ∗N(θN−1). Without loss of generality assume that the true sample distrib-
ution is gN and that it induces the state perception φN , whereas φˆN results
from some gˆN . Then there must exist k, l such that gˆN
k≤l gN . The RSN
property requires that sample member i prefers gN . This is implied by the
IS property.
2
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We have thus shown that any allocation rule [Q,A] which satisfies the
constraints defining the informative subscription problem induces a sequence
of restricted allocations rules ([Q|N , A|N ])
∞
N=0 which are admissible for the
corresponding finite sample problems. Moreover, as N → ∞, the restric-
tion [Q|N , A|N ] and the initial allocation rule [Q,A] ‘coincide’. We will now
heuristically argue that the welfare level EWN [Q|N , A|N ] which results from
[Q|N , A|N ] under finite sampling converges to the welfare level EW [Q,A]
which results from [Q,A] under informative subscription. To this end we
make use of the Law of Large Numbers. However, we do not go into mathe-
matical details.5
The expected welfare level EWN [Q|N , A|N ] which results from [Q|N , A|N ]
under finite sampling can be written as
EWN [Q|N , A|N ] =
∫
G
(∑
GN
WN(φN , g) prob(gN | g)
)
φN(g)dg
where
WN(φN , g) :=
∫
Θ
∫
W
U(Q|N(φN), A|N(φN , θ, w)), θ, w)f(w)dw g(θ)dθ .
Intuitively, the Law of Large Numbers, stated in assumption 4.7, implies that
as N → ∞, gN lies almost surely in a small ǫ ball, Bǫ(g) ⊂ G, surrounding
g. That is, as N → ∞, prob(gN ∈ Bǫ(g) | g) = 1, for ǫ arbitrarily close to
zero. Hence, for large N , the expression
∑
GN
WN(φN , g) prob(gN | g)
is arbitrarily close to welfare level W (g) which results (ex post) from [Q,A]
if the state of the world is given by g,
lim
N→∞
∑
GN
WN(φN , g) prob(gN | g) = W (g) .
As a consequence,
lim
N→∞
EWN [Q|N , A|N ] =
∫
G
W (g)φ(g)dg = EW [Q,A] .
To sum up, starting out from any [Q,A] with the IS property, for sufficiently
large N , there is an allocation rule based on sampling of size N , which yields
approximatively the same welfare level.
5The interested reader is referred to Al-Najjar (2004).
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4.7 Conclusion
We have addressed a problem of public goods provision in a continuum econ-
omy with private information of individuals on their valuation of a public
good and uncertainty about the aggregate valuation. It has been assumed
that the decision on public good provision is based on a process of infor-
mation aggregation. In addition, there is a need to cover the cost of public
good provision via some incentive compatible allocation mechanism, which
respects the private information of individuals on their taste as well as their
skill characteristics.
As has been argued in Section 4.3, the requirement of incentive compat-
ibility will in general give rise to a problem of multiple equilibria for the
process of information aggregation. I.e. multiple equilibria do not arise in-
cidentally. For the special case of separable preferences, it has been shown
that incentive compatibility holds only if there are multiple equilibria. In-
tuitively, the reason is that, in a large economy, no single individual is ever
pivotal for the quantity of the public good that is installed. As a conse-
quence, individual behavior in the underlying revelation game is essentially
undetermined.
We have formulated two different approaches to deal with this problem.
The first one, discussed in Section 4.4, is based on the idea to separate more
explicitly the stages of information aggregation to determine the quantity of
public good provision and the financing of this desired quantity. We assume
that a large random sample of individuals is used for the process of informa-
tion aggregation and that sampled individuals foresee the consequences of
their preference announcement. Individuals now have an impact on public
good provision and their preferences over the level of public good provision
govern their behavior in the revelation game. This allows to get rid of the
multiple equilibrium problem.
The crucial assumption is that sampled individuals are treated at the fi-
nal allocation stage not differently as compared to individuals who possess
the same characteristics but have not been in the sample. This implies that
sample members internalize the consequences of their own announcements
for a given final allocation mechanism, which is used to finance public good
provision. From a general mechanism design perspective, this assumption
clearly involves a loss of generality. There certainly exist welfare superior
allocation mechanism, which force sample members to internalize the con-
sequences of their announcements not only on their own well-being but also
on the well being of others. Hence, it has to be emphasized, that we ask a
different question, namely how a scheme of taxation, which treats all indi-
viduals equally for public goods finance, should be designed if there is a need
4.7. CONCLUSION 137
of information aggregation.
The second idea, formulated in Section 4.5, is a simple criterion for break-
ing individual indifference in the continuum: Whenever an individual is lit-
erally indifferent about the own announcement in a revelation game, use
the individual’s preferences over the composition of the economy to break
this indifference. I.e. whenever an individual is indifferent between, say, an-
nouncements a and b but would be happy if more individuals in the economy
announced b, then assume that the individual in question will announce b as
well.
As such, this simple rule is subject to the criticism of ad-hocery. In the
final Section 4.6 we have argued, however, that for large random samples, the
two approaches are essentially equivalent. That is, the simple rule which we
refer to as informative subscription can be interpreted as the limiting outcome
of vanishing individual influence on aggregate data – under the premise of a
sampling mechanism under which the stages of information aggregation and
the final allocation stage are separated from each other.
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